Narisong Huhe, Daniel Naurin and Robert Thomson*

With or without you? Policy impact and networks in the Council of the EU after Brexit

Abstract
Brexit is likely to be a major chapter in the history of European integration. Clearly, the most important consequences will concern the UK itself, but losing one of its largest members is also a momentous occasion for the EU. What will it mean for the negotiations and outcomes of the intergovernmental Council of the EU – and for the relative influence between the remaining member states – whether the UK is in or out? This analysis show that the policy impact of Brexit is likely to be relatively modest. The findings indicate that some of the remaining member states will be more negatively affected than others, in terms of policy impact and network centrality during the negotiations in the Council of the EU. In particular, some smaller and medium sized Northern European states – Sweden, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands – confront the toughest challenges with respect to defending their influence in the Council. These are the states with the closest network ties to the UK, and with the most similar policy positions. If (or when) the UK leaves, these states will need to increase their efforts in forming alliances with other member states, in order to defend their (often) liberal positions against pressure for higher subsidies and more regulations of the common market. The network positions of the remaining larger member states, on the other hand, and in particular France, Germany and Poland, are likely to be enhanced by Brexit.

1 Introduction
What impact will Brexit have on the decision-making processes and output of the European Union? While much has been said about the possible effects of Brexit for the UK, and for the economic relations between the EU27 and the UK, there still exists little systematic analysis of the possible effects on the functioning of EU decision-making institutions. Losing one of its major member states – in terms of population, economic and military power – is likely to have important consequences for which policies that will be taken and how. This is true in particular with regards to the Council of the EU, the primary intergovernmental institution in everyday EU decision-making.

We approach this question in two ways in this report. The first approach we adopt is to focus on the likely impact on decision outcomes in the legislative procedures. We examine 331 controversial issues in the recent past in which the UK was a member. Our data in this part of the report is based on interviews with participants in the decision-making process, and includes information on the positions and salience

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of member states, the Commission and the European Parliament. It stems from the Decision-Making in the European Union (DEU) project, and refers mainly to the periods of 1998-2000 and 2004-2008. The latter period is more representative of the current EU of 28 member states, and we devote most attention to the analysis of this part of the dataset. We ask whether the decision outcomes on these issues would have been different had the UK not been a member. We estimate the proportion of issues on which the outcomes would likely have been different without the involvement of the UK, and for those issues on which the outcomes are likely to have been different, by how much and in what respect. In estimating the outcome we consider different models of decision-making – a Procedural model and a Bargaining model – which make diverse assumptions regarding the modes of interaction and the role of formal procedural institutions, based on previous research on decision-making in the Council.

The second approach we adopt is to study the impact of Brexit on the cooperation networks of member state representatives in the Council preparatory bodies. These are the committees and working groups that prepare the ministers’ decisions and in practice perform the bulk of the negotiations in the Council. We ask whether and how Brexit is likely to affect the cooperation networks in 11 committees and working groups, including the most high-ranking committees. Our data is based on two surveys of member state representatives carried out in 2012 and 2015, including in total 474 respondents from all member states. The respondents were asked which other member states they cooperate with most often. On the basis of this information we calculate three different network centrality measures – degree, closeness and betweenness – which address both direct and indirect cooperation patterns. We subsequently compare the network centrality of member states in a situation where the UK is included in the network to their centrality when the UK is removed from the network.

With regards to policy outcomes, we find that regardless of which decision-making model we use the impact of Brexit is relatively modest. In the Procedural model, depending on the decision-making rule and the number of member states, we find that 90-95 per cent of the cases would have had the same outcome even if the UK had been absent. In the Bargaining model, removing an actor always changes the outcome (if that actor is not indifferent to the outcome). However, we find that the size of the effect of removing the UK is fairly small, on average about 4 scale points on a policy scale that ranges from 0 to 100. The direction of the (relatively modest) impact points towards legislative outcomes with more regulations and higher subsidies. However, we find no significant difference with regards to more or less European integration. Furthermore, we find that Sweden was the member state (followed by the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark) that had the same (or a similar) position as the UK most often in the issues we study. Southern European states, such as Spain, Greece and Italy, had the least number of positions in common with the UK. It is no surprise, therefore, that we find that the direction of the (relatively modest) impact of Brexit on legislative outcomes is to the advantage of Spain, but to the disadvantage of Sweden.

The network analyses also indicate that Sweden, along with Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark, is among those member states that stand out as being particularly affected by Brexit, both when considering direct and indirect ties. These states have strong direct ties (degree) with the UK, which they are not able to compensate by easily accessible indirect ties (closeness) when the UK is taken out of the network. We also find that the positions of some member states as intermediary players in the network, bridging the gaps between more distant actors, are strengthened by Brexit. This includes in particular the larger states, Germany, France and Poland. These states are therefore likely to become more central to the information flows in the network. At the committee level, we find that Brexit may impact the Council committees and working groups towards less efficient networks. The UK has been a central actor in many committees and working groups. When such an actor disappears the distances (average path length) between the remaining states increase, unless they are able to compensate the loss with new ties.

2 The impact of Brexit on legislative outcomes

The first approach we adopt to addressing the question of the impact of Brexit is to focus on the likely effect on decision outcomes in the legislative arena. We examine controversial issues in the recent past in which the UK was obviously a member. We ask whether the decision outcomes on these issues would have been different had the UK not been a member. We estimate the proportion of issues on which the outcomes would likely have been different without the involvement of the UK, and for those issues on which the outcomes are likely to have been different, by how much and in what respect.

When conducting this analysis, we use the best available dataset that describes specific controversies that were raised in the EU between 1998 and 2008. The dataset, which is
known as the Decision-making in the EU or DEU dataset, has been used in a large number of peer reviewed publications in recent years (Thomson et al. 2006; 2012). The dataset examines 125 legislative proposals that were discussed in the EU during the period 1998-2008. The selected proposals were discussed mainly in the period 1998-2000, in which there were 15 member states, and in the period 2004-2008, during which the EU enlarged from 25 to 27 member states. This latter period is more representative of the current EU of 28 member states and we devote most attention to the analysis of this part of the dataset.

Each of the 125 legislative proposals were examined in detail to describe the main controversial issues that were raised and the policy alternatives favoured most by each of the member states, as well as the Commission and the European Parliament where relevant. The dataset contains information on 331 controversial issues in total, since each proposal raised on average between two and three main controversial issues. Semi-structured interviews with key informants or experts were conducted to describe the issues and the positions of the actors. Two teams of researchers held over 350 semi-structured interviews over a 10-year time span to gather the required information. The informants were participants in the decision-making processes. Most were officials from the permanent representations or the primarily responsible officials in the Commission.

The dataset describes each of the controversial issues in a standard way to facilitate comparison across issues. This way of describing specific controversies has been used in a wide range of previous and related studies. Each controversial issue is described as a policy scale ranging from 0 to 100. The endpoints represent the most ‘extreme’ positions taken by any of the actors or under consideration by the actors. The key informants place the intermediate positions on the scale to reflect the relative political distances between the alternatives. The policy scales are comparable in the sense that they each reflect the range of the bargaining space on each controversy. The expert key informants estimated the policy alternative most favoured by each of the actors at the outset of the negotiations just after the introduction of the legislative proposal by the Commission. In addition to estimating the positions of each of the actors, the informants also estimated the salience of each issue to each actor, again on a scale of 0 to 100.

Figure 1 depicts one of the 331 controversial issues described in the DEU dataset. This case refers to a controversial issue raised by the proposal to extend the EU’s emission trading scheme to aviation activities. The controversy concerned the extent to which the auctioning of carbon credits should be allowed. The position ranged from those that opposed the introduction of auctioning (the 12 actors referred to on the left of the figure) to those, including the European Parliament, that supported the maximum possible extension of the scheme. The actual decision outcome introduced a modest amount of auctioning, which our informants placed at position 30 on the policy scale. The UK favoured the introduction of somewhat more extensive auctioning, and was placed at position 50 on the policy scale to represent its position. The question is whether the outcome would have been substantially different if the UK had not been a member of the EU when this decision was taken.

The answer to the question of whether and how much the UK’s exit will affect decision outcomes depends in part on the positions typically taken by the UK representation. Previous analyses emphasise that there are no fixed coalitions in the Council and that alignments of states are typically formed on an issue-by-issue basis. Nevertheless, some patterns are clear, and Figure 2 shows a clear tendency in the UK’s positions, which corresponds with the conventional wisdom. The figure identifies the percentage of the 331 controversial issues in the DEU dataset in which the UK takes exactly the same position as each of the other actors in the system. For comparison, it also shows the percentage of issues on which the UK takes a “similar” position, which we define as being 20 points or less on our standardised 0-100 policy scales. As close observers of EU decision-making would expect, the

![Figure 1: One of the main controversial issues raised by proposal on the inclusion of aviation in the Emission Trading Scheme](image-url)
UK’s positions show most similarity with the positions of Sweden, the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark. The UK’s positions show least similarity with the positions of Italy, Greece, Spain and the European Parliament.

The impact of Brexit depends not only on the actors with which the UK is typically closest, but also on the process through which actors’ positions are transformed into decision outcomes in the EU. We apply two alternative models of legislative decision-making to investigate the impact of Brexit further: a procedural model and a bargaining model. We selected these models because they have featured prominently in previous analyses of EU decision-making, including previous analyses of the DEU dataset. They also offer quite different accounts of the legislative process, which enables us to check the robustness of the main results. As the name suggests, the procedural model posits that the main drivers of decision-making can be found in the formal rules of the game. In the context of EU decision-making, these are the rules laid down in the treaties, which specify which actors can introduce proposals, which actors can amend proposals and the required levels of support for amendments to be successful. By contrast, according to the bargaining model we use here, the process is defined by informal bargaining, and actors seek a compromise outcome following a cooperative process. In the following sections, we describe each of these models and the results they produce in more detail.

3 The procedural model

The EU treaties have postulated several different decision-making procedures over the years, depending on the policy area. In some policy areas unanimity in the Council has been required, while in others a qualified majority of member states has been enough to approve a Commission proposal. The role of the European Parliament has varied, from being only a consultative body to having equal powers with the Council. The legislative proposals we analyse have been subject to one of three procedures.

First, the simplest of the EU’s legislative procedures is the consultation procedure combined with unanimity voting in the Council. Here, the Commission introduces a proposal and the member states must approve it unanimously. The member states may also amend the Commission’s proposal by unanimity. The European Parliament is consulted and gives an opinion, but neither the Commission nor Council is obliged to incorporate the EP’s proposed amendments.

Secondly, the consultation procedure may also be combined with qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council. Again, the Commission introduces the legislative proposal, but now the Council must either approve the proposal with a qualified majority of member states or amend it with the support of all member states. The rules for qualified majority voting differ between the EU-15 and the post-2004 periods. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a new version of QMV. In the EU-15, member states held a total of 87 votes,
distributed among them in relation to their population sizes, but with small states being overrepresented in relation to their population sizes. According to the QMV rule, a legislative proposal had to be approved by member states with votes that summed to at least 62 of the 87 votes. In the enlarged EU in the time period examined here, QMV was based on the triple-majority system introduced by the Nice Treaty. According to the Nice Treaty rules that governed QMV up to 2016, a bill could be adopted by the Council of 27 member states if approved by states that together i) hold 255 of 345 votes, ii) are at least 14 in number and iii) have at least 62 percent of the EU’s total population.

The Lisbon Treaty introduced a new system of QMV in the Council. From the year 2014, decisions taken by QMV need the approval of 55 percent of member states, 15 of 27 EU members, that make up 65 percent of the combined total of EU states’ populations. To prevent a small number of large states from blocking a decision, the population criterion only applies if at least four member states are against adoption. If only three or fewer states oppose the adoption of a bill, the population criterion does not apply, even if these states have more than 35 percent of the EU’s population. The new system came into effect gradually after 2014. In the first three years after its introduction, any member state could request that a decision be taken according to the Nice triple-majority rules.

Third, in the co-decision procedure – which was adjusted slightly and renamed the ordinary legislative procedure by the Lisbon Treaty – the Commission introduces a proposal that must be approved by both the Council and EP. Co-decision is usually combined with QMV in the Council. In the version of the co-decision procedure defined in the Amsterdam Treaty, and that applies to all of the co-decision cases examined here, the Council and EP formally have equal power as co-legislators. In the event of protracted disagreements between the Council and EP, a conciliation committee composed of representatives of the Council and EP is formed. This committee then works on a text that must be approved by both the Council and the EP if the legislative proposal is to be passed.

When modelling the contemporary co-decision procedure we take what is arguably the most literal interpretation of the treaty rules regarding the co-decision procedure. Since the Council and EP can amend the legislative proposal without the approval of the Commission, the Commission is excluded from the formal decision-making process. Moreover, since the formal rules give equal power to the Council and EP, the specification of the procedural model’s prediction should not ascribe an advantage to either of the two (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000: 24-5).

The concept of pivotal positions is central to all procedural models. In models where unanimity is required, the pivotal position is that which is closest to the disagreement outcome (or reference point). In models where QMV is applied, the pivotal position refers to the location of the preference of the member state or states that turn a losing minority into a blocking minority.

4 Results of the application of the procedural model

More often than not, the procedural model indicates that the departure of the UK would not lead to a change in the expected decision outcome. The case depicted in Figure 1 illustrates why this is the case. As mentioned, this proposal was subject to the codecision procedure and QMV. Note that the 12 states that opposed the introduction of auctioning controlled 108 votes and therefore constituted a blocking minority. Therefore, according to the procedural model, this is the decision outcome that should have prevailed. The procedural model predicts the decision outcome based on a bargain struck between the state or states on the pivotal position and the EP under the codecision procedure. However, the bargaining space ends when either of the actors prefers the status quo to the outcome. In this particular case, there is no proposal in the range of positions between the pivotal actors and the EP that those pivotal actors prefer to the status quo. The pivotal position does not change in this case due to the departure of the UK. The pivotal actors are still located on the status quo position and this is the outcome predicted by the model. The actual outcome, however, did involve some shift in policy from the status quo, since the legislation adopted introduced a modest amount of auctioning in this sector.

Had the Lisbon rules regarding Council voting applied to this case, the procedural model predicts that the outcome would have been quite different. However, once again, the departure of the UK would not have changed the outcome according to the model. The 12 member states that supported the status quo house less than 21 percent of the EU’s population. In number, they are obviously also less than the required blocking minority of 13 states under the Lisbon rules. With the addition of the nine states located on position 20, however, this group becomes a large blocking minority under the Lisbon rules. The actors located on position 20 are therefore pivotal. The bargaining
game between these pivotal actors and the EP results in an outcome of 40 on the policy scale. This is the point at which this group is indifferent between the compromise proposed by the EP and the status quo. The location of the pivotal actors and the outcome is the same under the Lisbon rules with or without the UK as a member.

There are some cases, however, in which the departure of the UK would have led to a different outcome according to the procedural model. The issue depicted in Figure 3 illustrates such a case. The legislative proposal that raised this issue was subject to the codecision procedure, and therefore the outcome is determined by negotiations between the EP and the actors in the pivotal position in the Council according to the procedural model. The controversial issue depicted in the figure concerns the extent to which the Commission should have competencies over non-Community carriers when regulating air transport services in Europe. At the time of the introduction of this proposal in 2006, the status quo was that the Commission did not have competencies over non-Community carriers, and although this regulation brought other noteworthy changes to the operation of air transport services in Europe, it did not change the status quo.

Consider first the prediction of the procedural model based on the decision rules that actually applied, which were those laid down in the Treaty of Nice, and with the UK as a member. The prediction of the procedural model is that the status quo would prevail, which is indeed what happened. The six member states that favoured the continuation of the status quo (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Slovenia and the UK) together held 110 of the votes in the Council, comfortably exceeding the 91 votes required for a blocking minority. Together they make up more than 45 percent of the EU’s population. This means that there was no policy alternative to the status quo that would be supported by a group of member states that meets the voting threshold of 255 of the 345 votes and the population threshold of 62 percent of the population. Note that only 11 of the then 27 members took a position on this issue; the other 16 states were said to be indifferent. We assume that these indifferent states behave in such a way that they would not interfere with the emerging outcome and place them half way between the agenda setter (the EP) and the reference point. The decision outcome predicted by the model is the same regardless of where we place these indifferent actors.

Suppose, however, that the UK had not been a member of the EU in 2006. Would the decision outcome have been substantially different? According to the procedural model, in this particular case the answer is yes. Without the UK, the five member states that support the status quo would still have been a few votes short of the current threshold of 91 votes for a blocking minority. We assume that without the UK the threshold for passing a law under QMV would have been maintained at 74 percent of the total qualified majority votes in the Council, amounting to 234 of the remaining 316 votes. This implies that a blocking minority would have been set at 83 votes or more. The five member states that support the status quo would still have been a few votes short of this lower blocking minority threshold of 83 votes. These five member states have 37.84 percent of the EU’s total population without the UK, and are therefore also just short of the required blocking minority in terms of population size of 38 percent of the EU’s population. It is only with the addition of Italy, which took a somewhat more conciliatory position to the extension of the Commission’s competencies to non-Community carriers, that this group is able to muster a blocking minority. This means that Italy, which takes position 20 on the policy scale, becomes the QMV pivot in a scenario in which the UK is not a member of the EU. According to the logic of the procedural model, the outcome is then a negotiation between the EP and Italy. The model specifies that the bargaining space ends when either one of the actors is indifferent between the outcome and the reference point. In this case, at position 40, Italy is indifferent between the outcome and the reference point. So the prediction of the procedural model is that without the UK, the decision outcome would have been position 40. This outcome represents the granting of substantially more powers to the Commission over non-Community carriers than was actually adopted.

FIGURE 3 ONE OF THE MAIN CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES RAISED BY PROPOSAL ON THE OPERATION OR AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

What are the positions of the actors on the issue of the Commission’s competencies with regards to non-Community carriers?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current integration</th>
<th>More integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DK, FR, DE, EL, SI, UK</td>
<td>COM, EP, BE, LV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT, NL</td>
<td>FL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 0: No competencies. Reference point. Outcome.</td>
<td>Position 100: Extensive competencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:</td>
<td>30:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50: Some competencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Proposal COD/2006/130.
The alignment of actors depicted in this case is less sensitive to the departure of the UK if we assume that the Lisbon double-majority rules apply. In that scenario, the member states that supported the status quo have a blocking minority either with or without the UK, as these states have more than 35 percent of the EU’s population. Consequently, the prediction of the procedural model is that the status quo would prevail either with or without the UK as a member.

It is also possible, although a rare occurrence, that the exit of the UK leads to a predicted outcome that is somewhat closer to the UK’s position according to the logic of the procedural model. Figure 4 depicts such a counterintuitive case. The controversial issue concerns the reduction in fishing opportunities near Mauritania as part of a partnership agreement with that territory. The legislative proposal was subject to the consultation procedure and qualified majority voting in the Council. Only member states with substantial fishing interests took positions on this issue. Five member states (Greece, Latvia, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) wanted to maintain the status quo with respect to the availability of fishing opportunities. However, these five member states held only 63 votes and made up less than 16 percent of the EU’s population, and therefore did not constitute a blocking minority. Only with the addition of Poland and the UK, both of which favoured some modest reduction in the level of fishing opportunities, did these actors constitute a blocking minority. With the addition of both Poland and the UK, this group of actors held 119 votes and over 35 percent of the EU’s population. Note that with Poland alone this group holds only 90 votes and is therefore still one short of a blocking minority. The UK’s position was estimated to be at point 30 on the policy scale, which makes this position pivotal.

According to the procedural model, the Commission will pitch its proposal so that the proposal is as close as possible to its own preference, while making the pivotal actors indifferent between the status quo and the proposal. This means that the model’s prediction is position 60 on the policy scale. In fact, our key informants placed the actual outcome closer to the Commission’s preference, locating it at position 80 on the policy scale. This indicates that the final act embodied a substantial reduction in fishing opportunities.

Now suppose that the UK had not been a member of the EU in 2008 while similar decision rules had applied. The procedural model now predicts a decision outcome at position 40 rather than 60, which is somewhat closer to the UK’s preferred position. In this scenario, the five states that support the status quo plus Poland would constitute a blocking minority. They hold 90 votes. Although this is one short of the blocking minority threshold that actually applied, it is reasonable to assume that the threshold in terms of the number of votes would have been reduced had the UK not been a member. As noted above, it is most likely that this threshold would have been reduced to 83 votes or more. With this group of six states being the minimum blocking minority, Poland’s position at point 20 on the scale becomes pivotal. Following the logic of the procedural model, the Commission would introduce a proposal such that Poland would be indifferent between the proposal and the status quo. This is position 40 on the policy scale.

The application of the procedural model based on the Lisbon rules to this alignment of actors leads to somewhat different outcomes following the departure of the UK. As above, with the UK as a member, the minimum blocking minority consists of the five states that support the status quo, plus Poland and the UK. Together, these states hold just over 35 percent of the EU’s population. Therefore, as above, the prediction of the model is point 60 on the policy scale. However, without the UK as a member, the procedural model based on the Lisbon rules generates a quite different prediction. The five states that support the status quo plus Poland are no longer a blocking minority. They hold less than 27 percent of the total EU population without the UK. It is only with the addition of France and Italy, which take position 50 on the scale, that this group holds a blocking minority. This means that the pivotal position is position 50 on the policy scale. This gives the Commission a great deal of power to shape the decision outcome in line with its own policy preferences. The model predicts that the Commission would introduce a proposal in line with its own preference at position 100, and that this would pass into law.
These three cases show the range of effects that Brexit might have according to the procedural model. We now turn to the summative analyses of all 331 controversial issues in the dataset. The procedural model can be applied to 236 of the 331 controversial issues in the dataset due to the fact that not all issues contained the so-called reference point, or disagreement outcome on the relevant issue. This might be considered a limitation of the model or of the data to which the model is applied. The main findings of these summative analyses are reported in Table 1.

The headline finding from Table 1 is that on the vast majority of cases, the exit of the UK would make no difference to decision outcomes according to the logic of the procedural model. On only 6 percent of the issues to which we could apply the procedural model (13 out of 236 issues) did the procedural model generate a different prediction with and without the UK as a member. This was usually because the exclusion of the UK made no difference to the location of the pivotal position in the Council. In a slightly larger number of cases (8 percent or 19 issues), the exclusion of the UK did change the location of the Council pivot, but had no effect on the predicted outcome. This was usually due to the fact that the Commission (or the EP in the case of codecision) preferred the reference point. As we would expect, the results in Table 1 suggest that the exit of the UK would have had a greater impact on decision outcomes in the EU-15 than in the EU25 or EU27.

We also conducted a supplementary analysis to investigate whether the exit of the UK has a greater impact on decision outcomes if we assume that the Lisbon rules were used. The results, which are contained in Table 2, indicate that this is not the case. Again, in the vast majority of issues (95%) the predictions of the procedural model with and without the UK are identical. These analyses are limited to the 103 issues subject to co-decision and QMV to which we could apply the procedural model.

5 A bargaining model
We now turn to an alternative model of the legislative decision-making process, one which posits that decision outcomes are reached through compromise and cooperative behaviour. This view of the decision-making process is encapsulated in the so-called compromise model, which is a first-order approximation of the famous Nash Bargaining Solution.

### Table 1: The Impact of Brexit on Decision-Making Using the Procedural Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Amount of change for different outcomes.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period and procedure</td>
<td>Same pivot</td>
<td>Different pivot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU15</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QMV</td>
<td>76 (88%)</td>
<td>10 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unan.</td>
<td>37 (95%)</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU25/7</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QMV</td>
<td>96 (93%)</td>
<td>7 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unan.</td>
<td>8 (100%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>217 (92%)</td>
<td>19 (8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Frequencies and percentages of issues.

### Table 2: The Impact of Brexit on Post-Enlargement QMV Issues Re-Examined Assuming the Lisbon Rules

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Amount of change for different outcomes.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QMV rules</td>
<td>Same pivot</td>
<td>Different pivot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Nice rules (as in Table 1)</td>
<td>96 (93%)</td>
<td>7 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Lisbon rules</td>
<td>95 (92%)</td>
<td>8 (8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Frequencies and percentages of issues. EU25/27 QMV cases.
When the disagreement outcome is extremely undesirable, the Nash Bargaining Solution can be represented in a very simple form. As the value that each of the actors attaches to the disagreement outcome becomes smaller and smaller, the Nash Bargaining Solution approaches a weighted average of actors’ positions and at the limit, is identical to the weighted average.

As a formula, this weighted average is simply:

\[
\text{outcome} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{salience}_i \times \text{capabilities}_i \times \text{preference}_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{salience}_i \times \text{capabilities}_i}
\]

Where:

- \(\text{outcome}\) is the predicted outcome.
- \(\text{salience}_i\) is the level of salience that actor \(i\) (from the set \(n\)) attaches to the issue.
- \(\text{capabilities}_i\) is the level of capabilities that actor \(i\) has over the outcome of the issue. In the following analyses we use the log of member states’ population sizes (in millions plus one) as an estimate of states’ relative capabilities.
- \(\text{preference}_i\) is the policy preference of actor \(i\) on the issue in question.

The compromise model represents a quite different view of the decision-making process, one which many observers would say is more realistic. Indeed, in previous comparative assessments of the predictive accuracy of the compromise model versus various procedural models, the compromise model performed significantly better in terms of predictive accuracy. Unlike the procedural model, the compromise model always generates a decision outcome that lies between the most extreme positions taken by any of the actors with capabilities. Finally, it is worth noting that the exclusion of an actor from the calculations based on the compromise model always results in a prediction further from that actor’s position as long as the excluded actor takes a position on the issue and has a salience score of greater than zero. In our analyses, having a position implies a positive salience score.

6 Results of the application of the bargaining model

We turn immediately to the summative analyses of all of the issues in the EU dataset rather than dwelling on the illustrations, all of which show a slight shift in the predicted outcome away from the UK’s preferred outcome. The main results are contained in Table 3 and show that the exclusion of the UK leads to modest changes to the location of the decision outcomes on the majority of issues according to the logic of the compromise model. An advantage of the compromise model is that it can be applied to all 331 issues in the dataset. On 85 percent of these issues (282 of the 331 issues), the compromise model yields different predictions if the UK is excluded from the analysis. On the remaining 15 percent of issues, the UK was indifferent and had no position, which means that its exclusion would not affect the outcomes. Of the issues on which the exit of the UK would have made a difference to the outcome, the size of that difference is on average 4.08 points on the 0-100 policy scales.

While the magnitude of these changes is small, the results depicted in Figure 5 indicate that there is a clear pattern in many but not all respects. First, the outcomes predicted by the compromise model without the UK are not significantly more pro-integration than its predictions with the UK included. Second, the outcomes predicted without the UK are significantly more regulatory than the outcomes predicted with the UK. Third, the outcomes predicted without the UK involve higher subsidies than the outcomes predicted with the UK.

There are also patterns concerning the location of the predicted outcomes in relation to other member states positions. Outcomes without the UK will be significantly closer to the positions of the Spanish delegation. This accords with the observation discussed above that the UK’s positions are generally furthest from the Spanish positions. By contrast, decision outcomes without the UK will be significantly further from the positions taken by the Swedish delegation according to the compromise model. Finally, although obvious, it is worth noting that decision outcomes without the UK will be significantly further from the UK’s preferred positions.

### Table 3 The impact of Brexit on decision-making outcomes using a bargaining model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period and procedure</th>
<th>Same outcomes</th>
<th>Different outcomes</th>
<th>Amount of change for different outcomes. Mean (range and s.d.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU25/7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QMV</td>
<td>25 (17%)</td>
<td>120 (83%)</td>
<td>3.41 (.01 – 18.23; 3.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unan.</td>
<td>3 (23%)</td>
<td>10 (77%)</td>
<td>2.63 (.63 – 8.89; 2.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>49 (15%)</td>
<td>282 (85%)</td>
<td>4.08 (.01 – 20.71; 3.55)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7 The impact of Brexit on cooperation networks

Besides its impact on decision outcomes in the legislative arena, we explore the impact of the exit of the UK on the cooperative relationships among the EU member states in the Council. In this section, we examine how Brexit, as a disruption in the EU collaborative networks, may affect remaining EU members and their cooperative interactions in the different committees and working groups that prepare the decisions of the ministers. Information on the network relations among member state representatives in these committees and working groups was obtained through a survey of officials from the representations of all member states to the EU in Brussels. Over the years, five such surveys have been conducted, in 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015, including interviews with in total 1093 member state representatives (Naurin, Johansson and Lindahl 2016). The data has been used extensively in previous research to analyse negotiations and decision-making in the Council (see, for example, Naurin 2015, Johansson 2015, Häge and Naurin 2013, Naurin and Lindahl 2010, Naurin 2010, Arregui and Thomson 2009).

In this report, we base our analyses on the two most recent surveys, in 2012 and 2015. All representatives in eleven selected committees and working groups in the Council were approached for the interviews. Both high-level committees and lower-level working groups were included, involving a broad range of policy areas, ranging from economic policy, agricultural policy, foreign and security policy, environmental policy, competition and internal market policy, to tax policy and justice and home affairs. The interviews were conducted by telephone. The response rate was 84% in 2012 and 73% in 2015. In 2012, 249 member states were interviewed, and in 2015, the number of respondents was 225.

In all three surveys, the following question was asked: “Which member states do you most often cooperate with within your working group, in order to develop a common position?” On the basis of the respondents’ answers to this question, we identify the network relations between member states. The question posed focuses respondents’ attention on direct contacts with people from other member states in their working groups. Respondents were free to list other member states with which they cooperated, and typically mentioned between three and five others. Their answers revealed interesting patterns of cooperation evolution for each surveyed committee.

FIGURE 5 THE DIRECTIONAL IMPACT OF BREXIT ON DECISION OUTCOMES

Note: Positive values (greater than zero) indicate outcomes that bring more integration, more regulation, and higher subsidies, as well as outcomes that are closer to the Spanish positions, and further from the Swedish and UK positions. Circles refer to the average impact of Brexit. Bars represent the 95% confidence intervals. Diamonds refer to the minimum and maximum values of the effect found in the DEU issues.

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1 The preparatory bodies include Coreper 1, Coreper 2, the Political Security Committee (PSC), the Special Committee on Agriculture (SCA), the Economic Policy Committee (EPC), the Politico-Military Group (PMG), the Working Party on Tax Questions, the Coordinating committee in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (CATS), the Working Party on Agricultural Questions, the Working Party on Competitiveness and Growth, and the Working party on the Environment.
Figure 6 presents the cooperation networks of Coreper I and Coreper II in 2012 and 2015. The UK and its cooperative ties are highlighted in the figure. It is clear, however, that a simple visual inspection of the complex collaborative networks among the states in the Council preparatory bodies will not go far in terms of understanding of the impact of Brexit. Therefore, we will now turn to the calculation of network centrality measures. We approach this question by firstly distinguishing between direct and indirect cooperation ties and highlight three types of important players.

8 Direct and indirect impacts of Brexit on cooperative network relations

Direct collaborative ties perhaps are the most intuitive and important form of cooperation. Partners in a direct cooperative relationship can easily exchange information and bargain with each other, which in turn is of critical importance to the emergence of consensus. Therefore, an efficient collaborative network is usually associated with dense direct cooperative ties. Although direct ties are highly desirable in facilitating communal cooperation and consensus, its initiation and maintenance can be quite costly (e.g., time costs). In such contexts as the EU Council, the development of direct cooperative relationships is further constrained by political factors. Our earlier study reveals that the EU member states tend to choose their direct partners in a strategic way, and that the overall density of direct cooperative ties has stabilized at a relatively low level (Huhe, Naurin and Thomson 2017).

However, a relative sparsity of direct cooperative ties does not necessarily entail an inefficient network. To acquire valuable information or to reach consensus, players can resort to a less-recognized relationship, that is, indirect ties (or brokerage ties). For instance, actors with relatively modest resources can rely on a popular or central player who can help facilitate information exchange and policy...
compromise. In fact, the more modest the resources, the more a member state might need to rely on an intermediate player to reach some unfamiliar and remote partners. Indirect ties, therefore, is a key mechanism by which some disconnected and remote member states can interact with each other. On the other hand, the intermediate players not only can serve as a mediator – resolving disagreement and possible conflicts – they can also benefit from information, opportunities, or knowledge that flow across the indirect ties.2

A thorough assessment of Brexit’s impact on the collaborative networks in the EU Council, therefore, require us to explore both direct and indirect cooperative ties systematically. Specifically, we intend to answer three questions. (1) What is the direct impact of Brexit to cooperation in the EU Council? (2) Could disconnected and dissimilar member states still easily acquire information and interact with each other (indirect impact)? (3) After the UK exits as a central actor in the network, will the relative importance of other intermediate players increase?

9 Country-level statistics and comparisons

To answer these questions, we first focus on three key network statistics at the state-level; degree centrality, closeness, and betweenness. The three hypothetical cooperation graphs in Figure 7 provides an illustration of how these three statistics capture important changes to direct partners, remote partners, and intermediate players respectively.

Degree centrality. Figure 7.a illustrates the direct impact of Brexit on UK’s close partners. In this example, Brexit tends to directly affect the three countries in red (i.e., SE, DK, and IE), while the other two countries in grey (i.e., FR and DE) remain unaffected. Beyond the changes in their partnership, what is more important are the changes in member states’ relative positions in the group. Originally, DK enjoys three direct partners as FR and DE do. However, after removing the UK from Figure 7.a, DK has only two direct partners, indicating a relative decline of importance compared to FR and DE. Similarly, SE and IE also suffer from losses in relative importance, particularly when comparing to FR and DE. To capture these changes, we employ the measure of degree centrality. The basic idea is that member states’ centrality in the cooperation network helps reveal their relative positions in the Council, and central states are those who have the most cooperative ties with other member states.

Closeness. The degree centrality of a member state is determined merely by the number of its direct partners, and thus cannot reflect potential indirect impacts of Brexit on remote partners. These are better captured by the measure of closeness, as depicted in Figure 7.b. Here we first take SE as our focus state (in black). After Brexit we find that SE has only one direct partner, FR (in grey), rather than two as when the UK is in the network. Moreover, SE also suffers a negative indirect impact to one of its remote partners, IE. Figure 7.b. shows that SE has three potential remote

FIGURE 7 AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT IMPACTS OF BREXIT

Note: Countries in black are our focus under a specific type of relationship; countries in red are negatively affected by removing UK; blue countries are unaffected; and countries in grey are irrelevant to the relationship of interest.

2 A realpolitik version of intermediate players is a power broker, who benefits from side parties’ ongoing conflict, sometimes by putting one side against another, other times by seizing opportunities the others ignore in the heat of their own battle.
partners (i.e., DK, DE, and IE), i.e. actors with whom SE has no direct contact. Originally, SE can reach all these three remote partners via short two-step connections (i.e., SE-FR-DK, SE-FR-DE, SE-UK-IE, ). However, UK’s exit from the group would make the indirect short link SE-UK-IE impossible. SE now has no other choice but to resort to a longer and less efficient three-step connection to reach IE (i.e., SE-FR-DE-IE). The exact same loss of both direct and indirect connection applies to IE, while FR and DE are unaffected in this respect. DK, on the other hand, while losing a direct partner, the distance to its remote partners SE and IE are still only two steps away (DK-FR-SE, DK-DE-IE).

This example illustrates that loss in direct partnership does not necessarily entail a loss in closeness. It is this particular feature that makes many collaborative networks quite resilient against the removal of a partner. Closeness centrality focuses on how close a member state is to all other members in the Council. The idea is that a member state is central if it can quickly interact with all other member states. In other words, states with a small total network distance are considered as more important than those with a high total distance. We quantify closeness by surveying all the shortest paths between member states (i.e., geodesics).

**Betweenness.** As hinted in our elaboration of closeness, UK’s exit from the group is likely to strengthen the immediate roles of some other member states. A typical case here is FR in Figure 7.c (in black). (DE is occupying a mirroring spot and thus enjoys the same position as FR in this regard.) First, consider the indirect contact between SE and IE. After removing the UK, SE and IE have to rely on FR to acquire information about each other (i.e., from SE-UK-IE to SE-FR-DE-IE). In this process, the importance of FR has been increased as an intermediate player. Second, FR’s intermediate role is further strengthened in the indirect relationship between SE and DK. While originally the two states can rely on two channels to reach each other (i.e., SE-UK-DK and SE-FR-DK), after UK’s exit they would depend solely on FR. Analytically, we use betweenness to capture the changes to intermediate players. We use the number of times a member state acts as a bridge along the shortest path between two other states to quantify betweenness.

In sum, the three network statistics – degree centrality, closeness, and betweenness – help reveal important changes to direct partners, remote partners, and intermediate players after Brexit. In the forthcoming empirical estimations, we generalize the above analysis to the Council surveyed in 2012 and 2015. We calculate the three statistics for each member state before and after removing UK from the 22 committee and working group networks. Paired t-tests are used to test the significance of the impact of Brexit to individual member states.

Figure 8 presents our analysis of degree centrality. Member states are ordered by the average post-Brexit degree centrality as aggregated over all committees and working groups in the surveys from 2012 and 2015. At least three important findings stand out. First, the paired t-tests suggest that over half of the remaining member states (i.e., 15 out of 27) are substantially and significantly affected. This is a result of the fact that the UK has been an active and central member state, with many direct ties to other members. Second, a closer look at these significantly affected countries suggests that they tend to be central and well-connected actors in the group. Specifically, the top eight most well-connected countries all suffer from significant loss in direct partnership when the UK leaves. Third and finally, we find that SE, NL, DK, and IE are likely to suffer the most after Brexit. In contrast for member states such as Austria, Belgium, Greece and Spain, the impacts of Brexit on their direct partnership are negligible.

We then turn to indirect impacts of Brexit and compare changes in the closeness centrality of EU member states.
Compared to the broad direct impacts, Brexit exerts a more limited impact on member states’ abilities to reach remote partners. Specifically, paired t-tests show that only nine members are likely to be negatively and significantly affected by Brexit with respect to closeness. The decline in the number of countries that are significantly affected suggests that the existence of dense indirect cooperative ties in the EU Council could mitigate the shock entailed by Brexit. Second, a scrutiny of countries whose closeness are significantly undermined reveals that, again, SE, NL, DK, IE and MT are more severely affected by the UK’s exit from the EU Council. This in turn suggests that these countries not only have had strong direct ties with the UK, but also have relied heavily on the UK to reach other member states in various committees.

Finally, we examine the changes to the betweenness centrality. First, we observe much larger variations in member states’ betweenness than in degree centrality or closeness. This suggests that member states in the Council rely heavily on a few intermediate players (in particular FR, DE, and PL) to reach other remote partners. Second, and consistent with our expectation, the intermediate roles of these central players are further strengthened by UK’s exit from the EU Council. We find that eight countries’ betweenness scores have been significantly increased. Among these eight states, the positions of FR, DE, and PL would be particularly enhanced.

In conclusion, our analysis of three key network statistics at the country level reveal that the impacts of Brexit on the collaborative networks in the EU Council are complex. Because the UK has been a central actor in many committees and working groups Brexit introduces large changes to the other states’ direct partnership. Yet, the indirect impacts of Brexit seem to be two-folded. On the one hand, thanks to the dense indirect cooperative ties, a smaller number of states would suffer from significant loss in closeness. Particularly, MT, SE, NL, IE and DK tend to be vulnerable after the UK’s exit from the EU Council. On the other hand, the positions of remaining key intermediate players (i.e., FR, DE, and PL) have been significantly enhanced.

### 10 Committee-level statistics and comparisons

While the above country-level statistics can capture changes to individual member states, they are limited in revealing overall changes at the network level. We therefore calculate and compare two network-level statistics of the EU committees; network density and average path length.

**FIGURE 9 COUNTRY-BASED COMPARISON OF CHANGES IN CLOSENESS**

**FIGURE 10 COUNTRY-BASED COMPARISON OF CHANGES IN BETWEENNESS**
Network density. Network density can be interpreted as the aggregate measure of degree centrality at the country level. It describes the portion of the potential direct ties in a network that are actual connections. A “potential connection” is a connection that could potentially exist between two countries — regardless of whether or not it actually does. In light of this, network density reflects the overall level of direct partnership in a given network. Figure 11 then presents the average network densities of the 11 committees surveyed in 2012 and 2015.

First, we find moderate levels of network densities across the 11 committees. The overall network density stabilizes under 0.20, which confirms our earlier discussion that direct partnership tends to be costly and strategic. It should be noted, however, that our wording in the survey question might underestimate the actual density of cooperative ties in the EU Council. This is so because we only asked for the member states with which the respondent “cooperate most often”. However, this possible underestimation of density does not affect our conclusion about the relative changes associated with Brexit.

Average path length. In a sparse yet locally clustered network, cooperation could still be efficient if dissimilar members could reach each other easily. We thus examine the average path length, which, to a certain degree, can be regarded as an aggregate measure of closeness. The basic idea is to capture the number of actors you will have to communicate through, on an average, to contact a remote actor. More specifically, average path length is quantified as the average number of steps along the shortest paths for all possible
pairs of network members. Therefore, average path length is commonly accepted as the key measure of network efficiency or network separation. Figure 12 reports our analysis of the average path length.

First and foremost, we find that average path length would be significantly increased after Brexit. This corroborates our findings about changes in closeness at the individual state level. Together, these results suggest that Brexit is likely to make the EU Council more separated and less efficient if the member states do not compensate Brexit with new ties. Second, as for changes to specific committees, the Working Party on the Environment (Env), the Working Party on Tax Questions (Tax), and the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) tend to suffer most in terms of efficiency, quite similar to our findings about network density.

In conclusion, our analysis of the 11 committee and working group networks suggests that the post-Brexit EU would be sparser and less efficient. However, as discussed below, the actual outcome will depend on the strategies and actions of the remaining member states with respect to compensating the loss of the UK as a member.

11 Discussion

Brexit is likely to be a major chapter in the history of European integration. Clearly, the most important consequences will be for the UK itself, but losing one of its largest members is also a momentous event for the EU. Predictions are hard to make as to what the effects will be in terms of the functioning, effectiveness and outcomes of the decision-making processes, and the relative influence between the remaining member states.

The findings from this report indicate that some of the remaining member states will be more negatively affected than others, in terms of policy impact and network centrality during the negotiations in the Council of the EU. In particular, some smaller and medium sized Northern European states – Sweden, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands – confront the toughest challenges with respect to defending their influence in the Council. These are the states with the closest network ties to the UK, and with the most similar policy positions. If (or when) the UK leaves, these states will need to increase their efforts in forming alliances with other member states, in order to defend their (often) liberal positions against pressure for higher subsidies and more regulations of the common market. The network positions of the remaining larger member states, on the other hand, and in particular France, Germany and Poland, are likely to be enhanced by Brexit.

Our analyses also showed that the policy impact of Brexit is likely to be relatively modest. In most cases, excluding the UK from the bargaining game would not alter the position of the pivotal player. Furthermore, the outcome of the negotiations is often close to a weighted average of all member states positions. Given that the UK is but one (although important) of 28 member states, the overall impact of Brexit on the outcome is unlikely to be dramatic.

Finally, we will also emphasise two important caveats with respect to the findings of this report. First, the analyses of the impact of Brexit on legislative outcomes is based on the best available data. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the DEU data does not include policy-issues from more recent years. However, we find it unlikely that a newer sample of issues would have led to very different results in terms of the direction (more regulations, higher subsidies, further from Sweden's position, closer to Spain's) and the relatively modest impact of Brexit. Secondly, we study the effects of taking the UK out of historically existing processes and networks. We are unable to account for the fact that the remaining 27 member states may adjust their strategic behaviour in the event of Brexit. Thus, our results are best viewed as indications of the challenges that the remaining states will need to address, rather than a precise prediction of what the state of the world post-Brexit will be. This applies both to the network analyses and the analyses of legislative decision-making. In the absence of the UK, Sweden and some other member states that are most affected may be compelled to invest more in the bargaining process to ensure that decision outcomes do not depart from their preferred positions.
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