"Ruling Divided: Disagreement, Issue Salience and Portfolio Allocation"

Zachary Greene, Ph.D.

Christian Jensen, Ph.D.

Abstract:

Issue salience and ideological disagreement often predict coalition government behavior. However, research on portfolio allocation has yet to fully specify the complex relationship between issue salience, disagreement and coalition negotiations. Scholars treat issue salience and disagreement as distinct and disconnected, despite evidence that they work together and with conditional effects in a range of settings. Following a logic of portfolio trades or 'logrolls', we propose that the relative salience of issues and disagreements at the issue level within the coalition both moderate the effect of issue salience on portfolio allocation. Using data drawn from the Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive, we find compelling evidence for our theory that links party manifestos to portfolio allocation. Consistent with a story on the conditional effect of salience and disagreement, we find evidence that the effect of salience is mitigated by the extent of disagreement between coalition parties.

Key Words: Issue Salience, Issue Disagreement, most salient, portfolio allocation, coalition governance

Ideological disagreement and issue salience play important roles in government outcomes. Scholars show that the interaction of parties' issue priorities and policy positions influence party behaviors such as coalition duration (Laver and Shepsle 1996; Bäck et al. 2011) and oversight (Falcó-Gimeno 2012). However, analyses have yet to fully consider the ways that salience and position jointly impact coalition bargaining. Extreme positions on salient issues pose a quandary for coalition governments; parties seek to avoid delegating policy to ideologically distant parties, yet these are the issues parties likely desire most. Extreme positions on issues may pose less of a problem for negotiations if parties place little emphasis on them. If a party holds an issue more salient than others and is ideologically distant on that issue, it may be unwilling to join a coalition in which it delegates policy on this portfolio. How do potential coalitions adjudicate this dilemma?

Although substantial research examines how many cabinet positions each party receives in coalitions, less research explains who received which portfolio and why. Building on Budge and Keman (1990) and Laver and Shepsle (1996), Bäck et al. (2011) demonstrate that issue salience plays a key role in this process; parties likely control the portfolios salient in their election platforms. Yet, we argue that salience alone only signals the strength of parties' priorities. We extend their approach in two major ways; first, we incorporate ideological disagreement at the issue level and second we consider the extent to which relative salience within coalitions matter. We further posit that disagreement, absolute salience and relative salience are conditional. Following a bargaining logic based on a legislative logroll (see also de Marchi and Laver 2016), we

hypothesize that the parties' position and salience on issues relative to others involved in coalition negotiations indicates the willingness of coalition partners to forego portfolios in coalition negotiations. Assuming that portfolios are policy management positions, parties are unlikely to bargain away portfolios on issues they hold most salient, particularly if they are ideologically distant from the coalition's negotiated position on that issue.

Using evidence from thirteen West European countries from 1948 to 1998, we propose two measures that account for issue level disagreement and relative salience. We demonstrate that issue level disagreement among potential partners and the salience of an issue to each party matter for portfolio allocation using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) (Volkens et al. 2011) and the Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive (Strøm et al. 2008). Parties holding the issue more salient than any other coalition party benefit the most. The level of issue salience is less important when there is greater disagreement on that issue and another party holds it as more salient.

Theory

Government formation research emphasizes bargaining over the allocation of cabinet posts among coalition partners (Warwick and Drukman 2001; Druckman and Warwick 2005; Proksch and Slapin 2006; Carroll and Cox 2007; Bäck et al. 2011) or among factions within parties (Mershon 2001a, 2001b). Most of this research assumes that cabinet portfolios are valuable to parties as the rewards of office. Although both

disagreement (Laver and Shepsle 1996) and salience (Bäck et al. 2011) play an important role in these studies, less research directly considers the moderating relationship between salience and disagreement on portfolio allocation. We argue that the relative salience of issues to coalition parties and their ideological distance signify both the cost that coalition parties forego in policy concessions to potential coalition partners as well as how important those policy costs are to each party.

Research on disagreement in coalition formation and termination has taken numerous forms. Axelrod (1970) argued that governing coalitions should be ideologically connected or not exclude any party contained within the ideological range of the coalition. While both size and ideological distance between coalition parties influence the likelihood that a coalition forms (Franklin and Mackie 1984; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Laver and Schofield 1998; Strøm et al. 2008), there is mixed evidence that disagreements cause coalition failures. Warwick (1994) argues that disagreement causes coalitions to terminate pre-maturely as they are incapable of developing legislation. Indeed, this relationship holds strongest empirically accounting for issue diversity in parties' platforms (Greene 2016).

Furthermore, ideological proximity can drive intra-party decisions about cabinet portfolio assignments (Kam et al. 2010; Ceron 2013; Greene and Jensen 2016) and cabinet reshuffles (Kam and Indridason 2005; Indridason and Kam 2008). Relatedly, Dewan and Hortala Vallve (2011) argue that prime ministers prefer to assign portfolios to a diverse cabinet in a multi-dimensional issue space. De Marchi and Laver (2016) show formally that coalition allocation follows a logic akin to a legislative logroll, where

parties trade portfolios across diverse interests. Prime ministers use cabinet assignments and reshuffles to combat intra-party and electoral threats to their leadership (Kam et al. 2010). We add that in contexts requiring coalition governments, salience and disagreement on issues jointly predict outcomes of the formation process.

As the rewards for joining a coalition (Laver and Shepsle 1996), potential coalition partners seek portfolios on which they hold strong preferences for policy (Bäck et al. 2011) and office motives (Warwick and Druckman 2006). As the party in parliament with the first opportunity to propose a coalition, the *formateur* party likely seeks to find ideologically close partners on the most important dimensions of conflict. *Formateur* parties may seek coalition partners with ideological similarities, but hold different issues salient to allow for policy trades or logrolls. This guarantees the *formateur* party's dominance of its most preferred portfolios.

From this perspective, the *formateur* identifies ideologically similar parties and offers portfolios to those parties based on their salient issues (Laver 1998).[1] Yet, parties' choice to accept a coalition offer depends on their payoff in policy and portfolios. Policy negotiations lead to an agreement on a common position on the issues they include in their platforms where drift from this position might lead to coalition termination (Warwick 1994; Tsebelis 2002). Given that parties' compromise on some policies to be in a coalition, we theorize that the *formateur*'s proposal will be unlikely to offer cabinet positions to extreme parties on an issue that also hold it in high salience. Instead, the proposal will minimize policy drift from the coalition's position through the proposed

ministers. The *formateur*'s proposal powers should reduce policy deviations from the coalition's negotiated position, particularly when parties hold issues highly salient. From an issue focused approach, however, coalition negotiations depend not only on the *formateur*, but also the partners' preferences. Parties that prioritize the environment or immigration, for example, will make participation in a coalition conditional on controlling these portfolios. Budge and Keman (1990), for example, show that the issues traditionally important to a party influence coalition behavior. Bäck et al. (2011) add that parties' preferences based on historical party family and the salience of issues in their platforms predict the portfolios they receive. Furthermore, in their study of German Land governments, Raabe and Linhart (2013) show that parties seek portfolios in areas that are more salient to them.

While they make a strong case for issue salience (Bäck et al. 2011), they treat coalitions as if portfolios are salient to only a single party. This may be the case under some settings, but more often multiple parties hold a portfolio salient. It is unlikely that the issues salient to each party easily sort themselves into distinct portfolios without overlapping interests. We propose that the effect of issue salience depends on the relative salience amongst coalition members. We argue that if a party places greater salience on an issue than other partners, the potential coalition parties may be more willing to agree to requests for that particular portfolio. For example, both the German Green Party and the Social Democratic Party during the 1998 election discussed the issue of environmental protection in their manifestos (6.9% and 3.1%). While neither party dedicated a large amount of attention, the higher salience levels for the Greens

likely increased their chance of gaining the environmental minister. Therefore, the Greens should see the environmental portfolio as representing a greater share of the potential value of the coalition and be more willing to abandon negotiations if they do not get it. We predict that the effect of salience should be amplified for parties that hold an issue most salient.

> H1: Holding an issue more salient than any other coalition partner increases the effect of issue salience on the likelihood that the corresponding portfolio will be assigned to that party.

Our discussion has yet to directly consider the role of ideological disagreement. Laver and Shepsle (1996) add that ideological disagreement influences the parties included in coalitions. From their perspective parties avoid coalitions with ideologically distant rivals and hold greater bargaining power when they are near the ideological center of multiple dimensions.

Research on issue salience finds that parties receive portfolios linked to prominent issues in their platforms (Bäck et al. 2011) while studies of parties' preferences theorize that relative location of preferences on the most important dimensions of conflict matter (Laver and Shepsle 1996). This focus on ideological differences has spread widely (Tsebelis 2002; Bawn 1999; Thies 2001; Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005, 2011; Kim and Loewenberg 2005; Indridason and Kam 2008; Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011; Eichorst 2013). This literature identifies coalition

agreements, junior ministers or legislative committees, as tools used to oversee and constrain coalition partners' activities in each ministry. We argue that ideological differences between potential coalition parties influence negotiations for portfolio allocation as well. If a party expresses preferences distant from the proposed coalition's negotiated position, coalition partners may be less willing to delegate responsibility for the corresponding portfolio to that party.[2] Furthermore, ideologically central parties have greater coalition opportunities and therefore, greater intra-coalition bargaining potential (Laver and Shepsle 1996; Laver and Schofield 1998).

Disagreement on the broadest dimension of conflict among coalition partners is likely to be an important factor as it structures legislative politics. For example, research in American politics has found mixed support for the argument that Congressional committees are made up of preference outliers; actors whose preferences are not representative of the legislature as a whole (c.f. Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Krehbiel 1990; Groseclose 1994; Londregan and Snyder 1994). Research on parliamentary systems also finds mixed support for the argument that committees and ministers are preference outliers (Franchino and Rahming 2003; McElroy 2006; Indridason and Kam 2008; Indridason and Kristinsson 2013).

This discussion is similar, but not identical to, Laver and Shepsle's (1996) description of *very strong parties*. They argue that parties with ideological positions on multiple dimensions of conflict located at the generalized median of the legislature have a decisive advantage for coalition participation; such a party must be included in any proposed coalition for that coalition to be successfully established (Laver and Shepsle

1996: 70). We extend that logic to the allocation of portfolios within a coalition, although we add that parties' preferences for specific portfolios depend on disagreements related to the exact issues connected to each portfolio. Broad ideological dimensions may be indicative of issue level preferences, but a focus on the largest dimensions likely masks more nuanced and dynamic preferences for individual portfolios. Our second hypothesis therefore posits that when a party's position diverges from the within coalition average position on some issue dimension, its chances of being assigned the corresponding ministerial portfolio decrease.

> H2: The ideological distance between a party and the average coalition position will decrease the likelihood that corresponding portfolio will be assigned to that party.

Following this perspective, we expect that ideological differences and issue salience will interact to influence portfolio allocation. Although ideological diversity may limit the parties that join a coalition and their bargaining power (Laver and Shepsle 1996), disagreement likely plays a different role in portfolio allocation. Assuming that cabinet ministers have strong agenda setting powers within policy jurisdictions (Laver and Shepsle 1996), ideologically distant parties place greater value on portfolios tied to salient issues. While ideologically central parties also seek out portfolios on issues prominent in their platforms or historically important to the party, their ability to form a coalition with broadly ideologically close parties inherently

depends on their willingness to compromise with more extreme parties. Ideologically distant parties likely see less reason to join coalitions and are less likely to trust their coalition partners. From this perspective, *formateur* parties are also unlikely to propose coalition arrangements that grant parties with distant preferences on an issue strong policy-making influence, particularly when the coalition partner holds the issue more salient.

It has long been argued that parties join coalitions when the policy gains outweigh the electoral costs of participation in the coalition (Strøm 1984; Martin and Vanberg 2011). Additionally, Martin and Vanberg (2011) show that coalition parties subject their partners' policy proposals to greater scrutiny the more the partners' preferences diverge. Falcó-Gimeno (2012) finds that ideological divergence within coalition governments increases their reliance on "control mechanisms" to enforce cooperation between coalition partners. Conversely, ideologically central partners have a greater likelihood of being the *formateur* party and controlling the prime minister position and therefore may have less bargaining power for additional portfolio positions (Glasgow et al. 2011).

When coalition partners' preferences converge, there is more likely to be trust between the partners. Conversely, preference divergence reduces trust . By making a disagreement salient, an issue that is very important to at least one coalition party likely exacerbates distrust. In effect, salience can exacerbate disagreement's negative impact on the likelihood of portfolio allocation. This logic leads us to the following hypothesis.

H3a) Ideological disagreement decreases the positive effect of issue salience on the likelihood that a particular portfolio will be assigned to a party.

The *formateur*'s goals, however, are at odds with the policy goals of the other potential coalition members. Faced with strong disagreement, policy motivated parties will be unwilling to join a coalition in which their salient policies are left to other parties. When a party holds an issue more salient than its partners and disagrees with the *formateur*, that party likely sees that portfolio as a key condition for their coalition participation. Consider a green party that holds the environmental portfolio more salient than other coalition parties and also places great salience on the environment itself. If its position on the environment also differs from the *formateur's*, the green party would presumably only join the coalition if it were offered the environment portfolio.

This context creates the opportunity for the portfolio equivalent of a legislative logroll (see de Marchi and Laver 2016 for a similar, formal theoretical approach). Because parties hold varying issues salient and disagree on a number of issues, parties agree to support each other's relatively extreme policies on the issues that each holds most important. From this perspective, parties demand policy on issues they care about more than other parties in the coalition and on which other coalition parties would take a dramatically different approach. Further, the party proposing the initial policy trade (or portfolio) is unlikely to care much that the bargaining party will take a more extreme position because the party does not hold the policy or portfolio as salient.

Indeed, coalition formation in Western Europe closely conforms to a legislative bargaining logic based on their control of legislative seats (Cutler et al. 2016).

This logic leads us to predict that holding an issue salient, but not as strongly as another coalition party decreases the likelihood of controlling a portfolio. However, a party holding distinct preferences for an issue that also prioritizes the issue more than other coalition partners will be able to use logrolls (on issues it holds less important) to control the associated portfolio. The *formateur* may even offer portfolios on issues not salient to the *formateur*, but of substantial importance to a potential partner to avoid concessions on more important issues as a form of a portfolio logroll. In the face of greater disagreement, the party emphasizing the issue most is more likely to demand control of the portfolio as central to its policy demands for coalition participation. We summarize this logic in the final hypothesis.

H3b) When a party holds a portfolio the most salient, ideological disagreement increases the positive effect of issue salience on the likelihood that a portfolio will be assigned to that party.

We propose a theory of portfolio allocation in coalition formation that takes into account the relative salience of portfolios to parties as well as their ideological disagreements. We expect that issue salience increases the likelihood that a party receives a minister, particularly if they hold the issue more salient than their coalition

partners. Disagreement on these issues, however, decreases the likelihood that a party receives a portfolio by decreasing the effect of salience. Therefore, ideologically central parties with the high salience on an issue are the most likely to receive them unless another potential coalition party holds it more salient. In this context, the effect of disagreement reverses as the parties engage in portfolio logrolls.

Methods and Data

There has been a great deal of research on the allocation of portfolios in coalition governments (Warwick and Druckman 2001, 2006; Mershon 2001; Druckman and Roberts 2005; Carroll and Cox 2007; Bäck et al. 2011). We build on this research following Bäck et al. (2011) in using party-portfolio pairings to test our hypotheses on the portfolios parties receive. Structuring our data this way allows us to examine relationships between individual parties systematically at the portfolio level. We examine disagreements on each issue between a party and its coalition partners while accounting for issue salience.

To test our hypotheses, we combine data on portfolio allocation and party preferences. Like Bäck et al. (2011), our unit of analysis is the party-portfolio pair for each coalition government. We analyze the effects of individual parties' characteristics on portfolio allocation. By including an observation for each party on each portfolio in a government, we can directly link parties' issue level preferences and salience. Using data from Strøm and Müller (2000), our analysis includes party-portfolio pairings from thirteen Western European countries.[34]

We measure our dependent variable as a dummy variable equaling one if the party controls the portfolio using the 13 issues/policy jurisdictions identified by Back et al. (2011) using the CMP. This limits our analysis to 4363 observations in 169 cabinets. We lose additional observations because of the availability of party level data from the CMP for the measures of ideological disagreement and issue salience. The sample decreases further due to limited data on coalition agreements from Strøm et al. (2008).

To measure our primary independent variables, ideological disagreement and issue salience, we use data from the CMP (Volkens et al. 2011). We construct a measure of issue salience by connecting each portfolio to the issues most closely related to the substantive jurisdiction of the cabinet position based on Bäck et al. (2011).[5] We then create a dummy variable to test our first hypothesis equal to one if the party holds the issue more salient than any other coalition party.[6] We create an interaction between these measures of issue salience and ideological disagreement to test our primary hypotheses. We present summary statistics in Table 1.

*****TABLE 1 HERE*****

Although previous analyses include a dummy variable to measure whether the party was in the median position of the coalition, this measure underrepresents ideological disagreement in coalitions. We relax the assumption that the left-right ideological position best represents differences between parties on diverse issues. Instead, we construct a new portfolio specific measure of disagreement using the issue level codes in the CMP. We use this data to create logged measures of ideology for parties on individual issue scales.[7] We use the same categories used to establish salience

for the issue (Bäck et al. 2011) and use Lowe et al.'s (2011) logged transformation to create directional scales.[8] Negative scores indicate leftward positions.[9] We then find the party's distance from the mean coalition position on each issue as the absolute difference between the mean position and each party's position.[10]

To account for the traditional importance of a portfolio in a country we include the portfolio's rank from Warwick and Druckman (2005). Because the conditional logit estimates require variation within each portfolio in a cabinet, we include only the interaction of the portfolio's rank with the percentage seats a party controls.[11] The conditional logit drops the constitutive terms from the model because of the perfect collinearity with the fixed effects. To account for the coalition bargaining conditions, we also include dummy variables if the coalition reached a comprehensive policy agreement from Strøm et al. (2008) and for minority coalitions using data from the ParlGov Database (Döring and Manow 2012). Following Bäck et al. (2011), we create interactions of these variables with issue salience because they do not vary within the coalition. We expect that issue salience is less important when there is a coalition agreement because policy goals are more explicitly determined before the start of the coalition. Likewise, salience should matter more in minority governments because the coalition relies on each party's seat contribution more than under conditions of surplus majority or minimum winning coalitions. We also include a dummy variable to indicate the median party in parliament (Laver and Shepsle 1996).[12] We account for the *formateur*'s bargaining power using a dummy variable for the Prime Minister's party. Additional models controlling for the relative salience of parties in the broader

parliament, the ideological range of the parliament, the number of coalition parties, previous experience controlling the portfolio (Martin and Stevenson 2010) and parliamentary parties as well as alternate specifications of the issue disagreement lead to similar patterns of significance (see the Online Appendix).

We test our hypotheses using a conditional logit model, allowing us to predict the likelihood that each party places a minister on a portfolio based on their issue disagreement and relative salience. The portfolio directed nature of the dependent variable means that the same portfolio in each government is in the sample multiple times, introducing a lack of independence between the observations. The conditional logit model accounts for these issues by treating each portfolio in a government as the discrete choice in a government formation opportunity and parties as the alternatives.

Analysis

We hypothesize a complex relationship between the absolute and relative importance of a portfolio to a party (and the coalition), the extent of disagreement between that party in a coalition and its likelihood of being assigned that portfolio. Table 2 presents the results from our analysis. Model 1 presents baseline, non-interacted results, whereas the following models present increasingly complex interactions with and without standard controls. The results provide suggestive evidence consistent with our theory.

In our first hypothesis (H1), we predict that relative issue salience increases the likelihood that a party controls a portfolio.. The effect of issue salience depends on whether the party holds the issue more important than other coalition parties. The evidence for this hypothesis is mixed. In Model 1 (excluding the interaction of ideological disagreement), the coefficient for holding a portfolio most salient is in the correct direction, but not statistically significant. The effect becomes significant once it is interacted with ideological disagreement in the fully specified models, but is in the wrong direction. In the fully interacted models, the coefficients for the constitutive term and the three-way interactions are in the expected directions, suggesting that holding an issue more salient than coalition partners boosts the likelihood that a party controls the minister, although the constitutive term is not significant in the model with controls.

<<<FIGURE 1 HERE>>>

The presence of complex interactions makes direct interpretation of coefficients difficult. Therefore, we present the effect of issue salience graphically in Figure 1 holding the level of disagreement at high and low levels (two standard deviations above and below the mean). Consistent with past research, salience increases the likelihood that a party controls a minister. The increase is quite strong at low levels of disagreement, however, the intercept for the party that holds the issue the most salient at low disagreement is higher than those that do not. At higher levels of disagreement, the effect of issue salience weakly increases the likelihood of controlling the minister for parties that hold the issue most salient, but the level of salience has no effect for parties

that do not hold the issue most salient. These results are weakly consistent with H1; they further indicate that ideological disagreement plays an important role.[13]

Our second and third hypotheses consider the effect of issue level disagreement between cabinet members on portfolio allocation. In particular, we predict that increased distance from the mean coalition position will decrease the chance that a party will control that portfolio in a coalition (H2). We also hypothesize that the effect of ideological disagreement will moderate the effect of issue salience (H3a and H3b). The results in Table 1 are somewhat consistent with the hypotheses. In particular, the coefficients and the constitutive terms for disagreement are in the wrong direction, and statistically different from zero in the models, although the presence of multiple interactions limits the direct interpretability of the constitutive terms. However, the strong negative and statistically significant coefficients for salience and disagreement in the fuller models indicate that the effect of disagreement is conditional on issue salience. This evidence suggests that ideological disagreement on a specific issue decreases the likelihood that a party controls a portfolio in most contexts, but the positive and statistically significant coefficients for the three way interaction in Model 4 and Model 5 indicate that the effects differ across parties that hold the portfolio salient and those that hold it the most salient.

The complicated specification makes substantive interpretation of the coefficients difficult. To illustrate the moderating effect of ideological disagreement, Figure 2 presents the predicted change likelihood associated with ideological disagreement for parties which hold an issue at high levels of salience.[14] We plot the predicted likelihood

of holding the minister as the level of disagreement increases. This effect holds most clearly for coalition parties that hold an issue very salient, but for which another party holds it more important. Consistent with H3a, ideologically distant parties are less likely to gain portfolios that they dedicate substantial attention to in their platforms, but on which another party finds more salient. Presumably, coalition parties are unwilling to give distant coalition partners portfolios, particularly when another party finds the issue more salient (H3b). Furthermore, as predicted in H3b, the effect of holding an issue most salient seems to counter the negative effect of ideological disagreement at high levels of salience, as the likelihood of controlling the portfolio increases. Disagreement increases the likelihood of controlling a minister for the party holding the issue most salient at high levels of salience presumably because it is unwilling to join a coalition without controlling these portfolios and will engage in logrolls on portfolios most salient to other parties. This result is consistent with a story in which these parties have made their coalition participation conditional on controlling these portfolios.

<<<FIGURE 2 HERE>>>

Many of the control variables also meet our expectations. The percentage of seats a party contributes to the coalition is strongly significant in Model 5. Consistent with Gamson's Law, the party's seat contribution to the cabinet positively increases the likelihood of controlling each portfolio. However, as Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason (2013) show, the relationship between seats and portfolios is hardly proportional. The positive coefficient for the interaction of portfolio rank and percentage seats is also positive, but does not reach statistical significance in Model 5. Expert portfolio rankings

may partially reflect shared issue preferences of parties that traditionally enter into government. In contrast to Bäck et al. (2011), the interactions of issue salience with comprehensive policy agreements and minority governments are positive, although only minority governments reach statistical significance. Finally, dummy variables for the prime ministers' party and the median party in the parliament are positive, but not statistically different from zero. This result may reflect support for our nuanced empirical measurement of the ideological relationships between parties. Overall, the models perform quite well, slightly increasing the percent correctly predicted by about .5% or 21 additional portfolio allocations between the simple and full models.

Conclusion

Studies have found increasing evidence that parties' characteristics influence the likelihood that they control a portfolio. We add to that disagreement on issues between coalition partners and relative salience conditionally influence portfolio allocation. We test hypotheses using new measures of portfolio level disagreement and an indicator for coalition parties holding an issue most salient.

We find that portfolio allocation depends in part on an interaction between relative issue salience and issue level disagreements. The effect of issue salience and disagreement depends on the extent to which the party holds an issue more salient than any other coalition party. Parties likely demand portfolios they hold more important than others and hold more distant positions on, yet are willing to forego portfolios to distant partners when others hold them more salient. This adds to evidence that

coalition formation and portfolio allocation is driven by ideological differences between coalition partners (Laver and Shepsle 1996; Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011), but adds that measures of broad disagreement alone tell only part of the story. Our use of issue based measures of disagreement further validates approaches that suggest parties hold distinct preferences on diverse issues and that this variance holds important implications for political outcomes.

Our findings tell a fuller story of portfolio allocation. Bäck et al. (2011) predicted that the presence of formal coalition agreements should diminish the importance of issue salience. However, their analysis did not find a significant interaction (p. 458). Our findings demonstrate that ideological disagreement has different effects on the probability of a given portfolio being allocated to a particular party depending on the salience of the related issue area. Namely, salience matters most in relation to ideological disagreement. Müller and Strøm (2000) argue that coalition agreements are a function of *ex ante* policy uncertainties. There is considerable literature that such *ex ante* uncertainties are correlated with ideological disagreement (c.f. McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; McCubbins et al. 1987, 1989; Huber and Shipan 2002). In this context, our finding that ideological disagreement has a significant effect when an issue is extremely important to a party, but on which another party values it more suggests a possible explanation for findings of a statistically insignificant interaction effect between salience and coalition agreements.

Furthermore, our analysis touches on research on preference outliers and ministerial drift. Much of the research on coalition government focusses on how

coalition partners constrain each other's ministers (Thies 2001; Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005, 2011; Kim and Loewenberg 2005; Indridason and Kam 2008; Lipsmeyer and Pierce 2011; Indridason and Kristinsson 2013). This research views ministers as preference outliers in coalitions. Our findings further underscore the importance of issue salience in coalition behavior and suggest an additional reason that parties with extreme long term salience might receive the same ministers across coalitions over time (e.g. Martin and Stevenson 2010). Ministers tend only be preference outliers when parties care about a set of issues more than others. These findings indicate the need for additional research into the motivations for employing mechanisms for constraining coalition partners such as watchdog junior ministers, strong committees and amendments to proposed legislation from the floor of the parliament.

Appendix

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
% Issue Salience	.105	0.072	.0013	.296	4279
Most Salient	.317	0.465	0	1	4279
Disagreement	.03	0.032	0	.329	4279
% Cabinet Seats	.339	0.248	.0156	.972	4279
Comprehensive Agreement	.391	0.488	0	1	4279
Minority Coalition	.156	0.363	0	1	4279
Median Party	.118	0.323	0	1	4279
PM Party	.331	0.471	0	1	4279
Portfolio Weight	1.14	0.288	.5	2.01	4279

Table 2. Conditional Logit Estimates of Portfolio Allocation

	(1) Simple	(2) Salience	(3) Disagreement	(4) Full	(5) Controls
% Issue Salience	1.988*	3.542**	3.459**	5.900***	4.820**
	(0.935)	(1.122)	(1.187)	(1.491)	(1.668)
Most Salient	0.023	0.256*	0.006	0.348*	0.195
	(0.073)	(0.113)	(0.074)	(0.157)	(0.180)
Disagreement	1.324***	1.337***	2.369***	3.091***	3.299***
	(0.377)	(0.376)	(0.623)	(0.760)	(0.768)
Most Salient X % Issue Salience		-2.371**		-4.122**	-2.290
		(0.897)		(1.278)	(1.448)
% Issue Salience X Disagreement			-7.511*	-16.065**	-17.981**
			(3.512)	(5.416)	(5.740)
Most Salient X Disagreement				-0.934	-1.090
				(0.816)	(0.880)
Most Salient X % Issue Salience X Disagreement				13.213*	12.770+
				(6.349)	(6.767)
% Cabinet Seats					2.190***
					(0.551)
% Cabinet Seats X Portfolio Importance					-0.031
					(0.449)
Comprehensive Agreement X Salience					0.411
					(1.572)
Minority Coalition X Salience					6.960***
					(1.987)
Median Party					0.036
					(0.094)
PM Party					0.065
					(0.072)
X	27.212	35.146	31.112	40.980	355.003
Log-Likelihood	-1485.201	-1481.474	-1482.869	-1476.119	-1302.598
AIC	2976.402	2970.948	2973.739	2966.238	2631.196
Percentage Correctly Predicted	65.786	66.324	65.903	66.324	71.979
Observations	4279	4279	4279	4279	4279

Conditional Logit estimates are clustered on the government id. Standard Errors are in parentheses. All significance tests are two-tailed. $^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. The results for each model excludes issue salience outliers in the 95% (over 29%

of the platform). Analysis including the outliers including a dummy variable to control for them leads to similar coefficients for the key coefficients, although the joint effects are no longer significant.

Figure 1. Predicted Effect of Relative Issue Salience at Low and High Disagreement[15]



Figure 2. Predicted Effect of Disagreement on Portfolio Allocation[16]



Bibliography

Axelrod, Robert. 1970. *Conflict of Interest*. Chicago: Markham.

Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus and Patrick Dumont. 2011. "Who Gets What in Coalition Governments." *European Journal of Political Research* 50: 441-478.

Bawn, Kathleen. 1999. "Money and Majorities in the Federal Republic of Germany: Evidence for a Veto Players Model of Government Spending." 43 (3): 707-736.

Budge and Keman. 1990. *Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carroll, Royce and Gary Cox. 2007. "The Logic of Gamson's Law: Pre-election Coalitions and Portfolio Allocations." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2): 300-313.

Cutler, Josh et al. 2016. "Cabinet Formation and Portfolio Distribution in European Multiparty Systems." *British Journal of Political Science* 46(1): 31–43.

De Marchi, Scott and Michael Laver. 2016. "Government Formation as Logrolling." *Working Paper*.

Dewan, Touran and Rafael Hortala-Vallve. 2011. "The Three A's of Government Formation: Appointment, Allocation and Assignment" *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3): 610-627.

Döring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2012. Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies. Version 12/10 – 15 October 2012.

Druckman, James N., and Andrew Roberts. 2005. "Context and Coalition-Bargaining: Comparing Portfolio Allocation in Eastern and Western Europe." *Party Politics* 11: 535-555.

Druckman, James N., and Paul V. Warwick. 2005. "The Missing Piece: Measuring Portfolio Salience in Western European Parliamentary Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 44: 17-42.

Dumont, Patrick. 1998. "Keys for the Analysis of the Relation between Parties' Programmatic Preferences and Portfolio Allocation in Government Formation." Paper presented at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium for Political Research, Warwick, 23-28 March.

Eichorst, Jason. 2013. "Explaining Variation in Coalition Agreements: The Electoral and Policy Motivations for Drafting Agreements." *European Journal of Political Research* 53(1): 98-115.

Falcó-Gimeno, Albert. 2012. "The use of Mechanisms in Coalition Governments: The Role of Preference Tangentiality and Repeated Interactions." *Party Politics* 20 (3): 341-356.

Falcó-Gimeno, Albert and Indridi Indridason. 2013. "Uncertainty, Complexity, and Gamson's Law: Comparing Coalition Formation in Western Europe." *West European Politics* 36 (1): 221-247.

Franchino, Fabio and Anne J. Rahming. 2003. "Biased Ministers, Inefficiency, and Control in Distributive Policies: An Application to the EU Fisheries Policy" *European Union Politics* 4(11): 11-36.

Franklin, Mark and Thomas Mackie. 1984. "Reassessing the Importance of Size and Ideology for the Formation of Governing Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (4): 671-692.

Giannetti, Daniela, and Michael Laver. 2005. ''Policy Positions and Jobs in the Government.'' *European Journal of Political Science* 44 (1): 91–120.

Glasgow, Garrett, Matt Golder and Sona Golder. 2011. "Who 'Wins'? Determining the Part of the Prime Minister." *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (4): 936-953.

Greene, Zachary, and Christian Jensen. 2016. "Manifestos, salience and junior ministerial appointments." *Party Politics* 22 (3): 382-392.

Greene, Zachary. 2016. "Working through the Issues: How Issue Diversity and Ideological Disagreement Influence Coalition Duration." *European Political Science Review* FirstView.

Groseclose, Tim. 1994. "Testing Composition Hypotheses for the U.S. Congress" *The Journal of Politics* 56(2): 440-458.

http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Le-ministere/Histoire/Les-ministres-de-la-Veme-Republique. Accessed July 7, 2013.

Huber, John and Charles Shipan. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Indridason, Indridi and Christopher Kam. 2008. "Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift." *British Journal of Political Science* 38(4): 621-656.

Indridason, Indridi and Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson. 2013. "Making Words Count: Coalition Agreements and Cabinet Management." *European Journal of Political Research* EarlyView.

Kam, Chistopher and Indridi Indridason. 2005. "The Timing of Cabinet Reshuffles in Five Westminster Parliamentary Systems" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 30(3): 327-363.

Kam, Christopher, William T. Bianco, Itai Sened, and Regina Smyth. 2010. "Ministerial Selection and Intraparty Organization in the Contemporary British Parliament." *American Political Science Review* 104(2): 289–306.

Kim, Dong-Hun and Gerhard Loewenberg. 2005. "The Role of Parliamentary Committees in Coalition Governments: Keeping Tabs on Coalition Partners in the German Bundestag." *Comparative Political Studies*, 38: 1104-1129.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. "Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers" *The American Political Science Review* 84(1): 149-163.

Laver, Michael and Kenneth Shepsle. 1996. *Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Laver, Michael and Norman Schofield. 1998. *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lowe, Will, Kenneth Benoit, Slava Mikhaylov, and Michael Laver. 2011. "Scaling Policy Preferences from Coded Political Texts." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 36 (1): 123-155.

Lipsmeyer, Christine S. and Heather Nicole Pierce. 2011. "The Eyes that Bind: Junior Ministers as Oversight Mechanisms in Coalition Governments." *Journal of Politics* 73 (4): 1152-1164.

Londregan, John and James M. Snyder. 1994. "Comparing Committee and Floor Preferences" *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19(2): 233-266.

McElroy, Gail. 2006. "Committeee Representation in the European Parliament" *European Union Politics* 7(5): 5-29.

Martin, Lanny and Georg Vanberg. 2004. "Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny." *American Journal of Political Science,* 48 (1): 13-27. 27

Martin, Lanny and Georg Vanberg. 2005. "Coalition Policy Making and Legislative Review." *American Political Science Review*, 99 (1): 93-106.

Martin, Lanny and Georg Vanberg. 2011. *Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Martin, Lanny, and Randolph Stevenson. 2010. "The conditional impact of incumbency on government formation." *American Political Science Review* 104(3): 503–518.

McCubbins, Matthew and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrol versus Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science* 28: 165-179.

McCubbins, Matthew, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 3: 243-277.

McCubbins, Matthew, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies." *Virginia Law Review* 75: 431-482.

Mershon, Carol. 2001a. "Contending Models of Portfolio Allocation and Office Payoffs to Party Factions: Italy, 1963-1979." *American Journal of Political Science,* 45 (2): 277-293.

Mershon, Carol. 2001b. "Party Factions and Coalition Government: Portfolio Allocation in Italian Christian Democracy." *Electoral Studies* 20:555-580

Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strøm, eds. 2003. *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Narud, Hanne and Henry Valen. 2008. "Coalition Membership and Electoral Performance." In *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe* by Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, eds. Oxford University Press.

Proksch, Sven-Oliver and Jonathan Slapin. 2006. "Institutions and Coalition Formation: The German Election of 2005." *West European Politics* 29 (3): 540-559.

Raabe, Johannes and Eric Linhart. 2013. "Does Substance Matter? A Model of Qualitative Portfolio Allocation and Application to German State Governments Between 1990 and 2010." *Party Politics* (published online May 27, 2013).

Shepsle, Michael and Barry Weingast. 1987. "The institutional Foundations of Committee Power". *American Political Science Review* 81(1): 85-104.

Smale, Alison and Melissa Eddy. 2013. "German Rivals Reach Pact for Coalition Government." *The New York Times* (November 27).

Strøm, Kaare and Wolfgang Müller. 2000. *Coalition Government in Western Europe.* Oxford University Press.

Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang Müller and Torbjörn Bergman. 2008. *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Strøm, Kaare. 1990. "A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 34 (2): 565-598.

Tables d'archives. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/histoire/tables_archives/. Accessed July 7, 2013.

http://archives.assemblee-nationale.fr/

Thies, Michael. 2001. ''Keeping Tabs on One's Partners: The Logic of Delegation in Coalition Formation.'' *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (3): 580–98.

Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Volkens, Andrea et al. 2011. "The manifesto data collection." *Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR), Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)*.

Warwick, Paul. 1994. *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies.* Cambridge University Press.

Warwick, Paul and James Druckman. 2001. "Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments." *British Journal of Political Science*. 31: 627-649

Warwick, Paul and James Druckman. 2006. "The Portfolio Allocation Paradox: An Investigation into the Nature of a Very Strong but Puzzling Relationship." *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (4): 635-665.

Online Appendix to "Ruling Divided: Disagreement, Issue Salience and Portfolio Allocation"

In this Online Appendix, we present a number of supplementary materials for the main manuscript. In particular, we outline much greater detail the operationalization of key independent variables. We also present the results of a number of robustness checks. These checks include an alternate measure of relative salience, multiple analyses meant to evaluate the sensitivity of the models to problems identified in the Comparative Manifestos Project, and a model that includes range of alternate controls.

Measurement

In the main analysis we use three measures derived from the CMP: issue salience, relative salience and issue preferences. These measures are based on the coding scheme proposed by Bäck et al. (2011).[1] In their analysis, they propose a

[1] As described in the data and methods section, we also add data from France. In particular, our analysis includes the *Ministre des Affaires étrangères* (Foreign Affairs), *Ministre de l'intérieur* (Interior), *Ministre de la justice* (Justice), *Ministre des finances* (Finance), *Ministre de la defense* (Defense), *Ministre du travail* (Labour), *Ministre de L'éducation nationale* (Education), Ministre de la santé (Health), *Ministre de l'agriculture*

'maximalist' scheme for measuring issue priorities linked to the policy jurisdictions of 13 portfolios common in parliamentary democracies. For the exact list of the portfolios used in each country or the fuller logic behind the classifications, see Bäck et al. (2011).

Table A1 presents the codes used to create the measures of salience for each portfolio. After reviewing their exact coding scheme we found little reason to disagree with their exact issue coding. Following Bäck et al (2011), we summarized each of the categories, regardless of direction, to create our measure of issue salience. For example, equation 1 illustrates the process for the Defence portfolio below. We then found the sum of the positive and negative issue categories, *i*, (105 and 104 for defence) for each party, *p*, on each portfolio jurisdiction from the party's manifesto in the most recent preceding election as our primary independent variable. Since the issue classifications from the CMP are the percentage of manifesto statements on that category, the salience measures represent the percentage of statements related to the portfolio's jurisdiction.

Equation 1. Issue or Portfolio Salience

	$Porfolio\ salience_p = \sum i_p + i_p$	(1)
	$Defence\ porfolio\ salience_p = \sum per104_p + per105_p$	(2)

We construct our second independent variable as a special case of issue salience. We measure a dummy variable equal to one if the party holds the issue more salient than any other party in the coalition. In particular, we find the maximum value on each portfolio jurisdiction, *j*, in a coalition. The party or parties that has this value in the coalition is allocated a 1 for our *Most Salient* variable on portfolio, *j*. If no party finds an issue salient the variable is equal to zero (and is dropped from the analysis based on the fixed effects used in the conditional logit.

Finally, we construct a measure of issue disagreement at the portfolio level. Using the same categories as those used to construct the measure of salience, we then find the positive (conservative or right) and negative (liberal or left) categories based on the CMP coding scheme. Using Lowe et al.'s (2011) transformation we construct issue level scales based on the portfolios' jurisdictions. To create the measure, we find the difference in the logged percentage of statements on right categories, +, and left categories, *L*. Equation 2 illustrates the process below.

(Agriculture), *Ministre de l'industrie* (Industry), *Ministre de l'environnement* (Environment), and the *Ministre des affaires sociales* (Social Affairs). We recode the data for France by checking the Minister's party affiliation from the websites affiliated with each Ministry. For example, we checked and recoded the party affiliation for the Interior ministry (*Ministre de l'intérieur*) by linking the minister's name from the website for the Interior with the person's affiliation listed at the time from the online archives of the *Assemblée Nationale* and *Senat.*

Equation 2. Issue or Portfolio Disagreement.

	$portfolio\ position_{j,p} = \log(R_{j,p} + C_p) - \log(L_{j,p} + C_p)$	(3)
	$C = 100\frac{.5}{N}$	(4)
	$portfolio\ position_{defenc,p} = \log(per105_{defence,p} + C_p) - \log(per104_{defence,p} + C_p)$	(5)

We updated Lowe et al.'s scales based on their online materials using their updated means for transferring percentages to their logged scale.[2] The main difference is in how *C,* the offset, is calculated given the usage of percentages rather than raw counts of statements. Following their online materials we calculated *C* as the fraction of 0.5 and the total number of statements in the manifesto, *N*, multiplied by 100. As with salience, we use the defence portfolio to illustrate the process. The exact codes linked to the left and right for each portfolio are presented in Table A1. To convert this to a measure of disagreement, we then find the mean position of disagreement across coalition parties and find the absolute value of the difference from the party and mean position. In robustness checks below, we show that the exact choice of measurement for disagreement has few consequences for our substantive analysis.

Robustness Checks and Sensitivity Analyses

We include a number of robustness checks to insure that our results are not spurious or driven by our measurement choices. In particular, we focus our sensitivity analyses on the measurement of the key independent variable, relative salience, the measurement of disagreement from the CMP (logged versus non-logged RILE and accounting for the Standard Errors – Benoit et al. 2009), and we offer a model that accounts for a number of additional controls.

Relative Salience – Ratio versus dummy

In the main analysis we measure relative salience using a dummy variable for the party that holds an issue more salient in their platforms than any other cabinet party. The measurement follows the logic that there is something special about holding an issue most important. An alternate measure that captures more information parties' relative salience, yet introduces substantially more multicollinearity would produce a ratio of how much less salient other coalition parties hold a portfolio. We construct this

[2] See the discussion in the Appendix at the following link (Accessed September 19, 2016): https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/17073&studyListingIndex=0_5770dea2e7a7c2ac7d8938933f90

measure by dividing each party's salience score by the value of salience that the party with the highest salience in that coalition. The value therefore equals 1 for the party with the highest value and decreases to zero for those that do not discuss the portfolio.

We present these results in Table A2. Although not all coefficients are significant the substantive interpretation of the coefficients is largely similar to that in the main analysis. The full set of interactions are jointly significant at the 90% level from zero based on a Wald test. Consistent with the first hypothesis, the constitutive term for issues salience is clearly positive and significant. Yet, the interaction of salience with the relative ratio is negative, and the three way interaction is positive. The combined effect of issue salience and the ratio of salience do not quite reach statistically different effects from issue salience alone with p-values at the 84% level. However the moderating effect of issue disagreement remains significant at the 95% level in joint tests of the coefficients' significance. Broadly, although the alternate operationalization of relative salience increases the multicollinearity in the model and leads to a small increase in the standard errors, the substantive interpretation of the results is similar to that presented in the main analysis.

Measuring Ideological Disagreement –RAW CMP scores

In our main analysis we use a logged version of the CMP RILE scale based on Lowe et al.'s (2011) approach. In Table A3 and Table A4, we present results with two alternate operationalizations to show they are not sensitive to the approach. In particular, we present models similar to those in the main analysis in Table A3, but use the raw categories form the CMP. Rather than logging the issue categories and finding the difference, we instead find the simple difference in left-right categories to create the issue level positions. The coefficients and patterns of significance are extremely similar to those presented in the main analysis. Importantly, a joint test of the of the interaction components is significant at the 95% level.

Measuring Ideological Disagreement –CMP scores with varying error

Given that the simulation commands (SIMEX) proposed by Benoit et al. (2009) are not compatible with a conditional logit analysis, Bäck et al. (2011) proposed an analysis at upper and lower bounds of the CMP. We take a similar approach adding or subtracting one standard deviation of each issue category based on the observed "standard error" of each code from Benoit et al. (2011). We then run this analysis with the lower and upper bounds in Table A4. Intriguingly, varying the results at the upper bound leads to strong significant results for each of the components, like the primary analysis, but the lower bound leads many variables to drop just below significance. This likely occurs as a reduction by the standard error marks a difficult test; it systematically reduces values to zero (we replace any value as zero that would be less than zero) that would otherwise be positive. The main result for issue salience and disagreement holds and remains strong in both models. Disagreement moderates the effect of issue salience, although the effect of holding the issue most salient disappears.

Measuring Ideological Disagreement – overview

Each of the sensitivity analyses for measurement suggests strong evidence for the effect of issue salience and disagreement. However, evidence for holding the issue most salient is less consistent. Future analysis should consider in greater detail the nuances of issue salience and disagreement in this context.

Additional Controls

In Table A5 and Table A6 we include varying control variables related to the broader parliament's characteristics. In particular, we include measures of the effective number of cabinet parties, effective number of parliamentary parties, the parliamentary ideological range for each portfolio, the mean parliamentary position for each portfolio, the mean parliamentary salience for each portfolio and the maximum parliamentary salience for each portfolio. The results are not only robust to the inclusion of these variables, but also the level of significance for joint tests of the interactions remains significant at the 95% level in both cases.

Previously controlling the Minister

Based on Martin and Stevenson's (2010) work, there is some potential that controlling a minister in the past increases the likelihood that they will control it in the future. To account for this, we create a count variable equal to the number of times the party has controlled the portfolio in previous coalitions within the sample. As they might predict, the variable is positive and strongly significant. However, the variable has little effect on the results of the primary variables. The full interaction is statistically significant at the 90% level and the effect of issue level disagreement for parties that hold the issue most salient is different than the effect for issue level disagreement for other parties.

Listwise presentation of results with full controls

In Table A8, we include the same models as those presented in the main analysis, but including the full set of controls used in Model 5 of the main analysis. The results closely mirror those of the primary analysis. Given the similar baseline for comparison from the controls, we can show more realistically the difference between model performance based on Table A8. Therefore, we include the percent correctly predicted for each model in Figure A1. Similar to the improvement shown by the main models, the overall performance increases by nearly 0.5 percent once the full interaction is included. This is a somewhat small increase, but not inconsequential as this helps place approximately 21 additional ministers over those predicted by the Bäck et al. (2011) models.

Conclusions

This Online Appendix has outlined the exact measurement strategy and a large number of robustness checks. Although the exact levels of significance for the full interaction vary across models, the trend occurs repeatedly, regardless of the model specification. These results lead us to conclude that the data largely support the hypotheses.

Table A1.

Portfolio Jurisdiction	Left Issue Categories	Right Issue Categories
Foreign	101: Foreign Special Relationships: Positive 103: Anti-imperialism 106: Peace + 107: Internationalism: Positive 108: European Community: Positive	102: Foreign Special Relationships: Negative 109: Internationalism: Negative 110: European Community: Negative
Defence	105: Military: Negative	104: Military: Positive
Interior	201: Freedom and Human Rights 202: Democracy 203: Constitutionalism: Positive 301: Decentralisation 607: Multiculturalism: Positive	204: Constitutionalism: Negative 302: Centralisation 303: Governmental and Administrative Efficiency 304: Political Corruption 605: Law and Order 608: Multiculturalism: Negative
Justice	201: Freedom and Human Rights 202: Democracy 203: Constitutionalism: Positive	204: Constitutionalism: Negative 303: Governmental and Administrative Efficiency 304: Political Corruption 605: Law and Order
Finance	402: Incentives	414: Economic Orthodoxy
Economy ("408: Economic Goals" used in salience measure, but not position)	403: Market Regulation 404: Economic Planning 405: Corporatism 406: Protectionism: Positive 412: Controlled Economy 413: Nationalisation 415: Marxist Analysis	401: Free Enterprise 407: Protectionism: Negative 409: Keynesian Demand Management 410: Productivity
Labour	504: Welfare State Expansion 701: Labour Groups: Positive	505: Welfare State Limitation 702: Labour Groups: Negative
Education	506: Education Expansion	507: Education Limitation
Health	504: Welfare State Expansion 706: Non-economic Demographic Groups	505: Welfare State Limitation
Agriculture	501: Environmental Protection	703: Agriculture and Farmers
Industry ("408: Economic Goals" used in salience measure, but not position)	402: Incentives 403: Market Regulation 404: Economic Planning 405: Corporatism 406: Protectionism: Positive 412: Controlled Economy 413: Nationalisation	401: Free Enterprise 407: Protectionism: Negative 409: Keynesian Demand Management 410: Productivity 414: Economic Orthodoxy
Environment	501: Environmental Protection416: Anti-growth Economy	410: Productivity
Social Affairs	503: Social Justice 604: Traditional Morality: Negative 606: Social Harmony	603: Traditional Morality: Positive

	705: Underprivileged Minority Groups 706: Non-economic Demographic Groups	

Table A2. Salience Ratio[3]

	(1) Salience Ratio
Min % Issue Salience	12.237**
	(3.919)
Salience Ratio	-0.088
	(0.338)
Disagreement	2.868**
	(1.095)
% Issue Salience X Disagreement	-25.360*
	(12.332)
Salience Ratio X % Issue Salience	-7.081*
	(3.419)
Salience Ratio X Disagreement	0.440
	(1.290)
Salience Ratio X % Issue Salience X Disagreement	13.909
	(13.521)
% Cabinet Seats	2.371***
	(0.564)
% Cabinet Seats X Portfolio Importance	-0.105
	(0.456)
Comprehensive Agreement X Salience	0.608
	(1.649)
Minority Coalition X Salience	7.115***
	(2.120)
Median Party	0.064
	(0.095)
PM Party	-0.005
	(0.070)
X	378.985
Log-Likelihood	-1249.991
AIC	2525.983
Observations	4116

[3] Instead of a dummy variable for holding the issue most salient, the variable is a ratio of the salience to the party, relative to the party that holds it most salient in the coalition. Therefore, the value equal 1 for the party that holds it most salient.

Table A3. Positions from raw CMP scores

	(1) Simple	(2) Ideology	(3) Salience	(4) Full
Min				
% Issue Salience	2.147*	1.375	3.485*	3.215+
	(0.941)	(1.407)	(1.574)	(1.808)
Most Salient	0.044	0.062	0.470**	0.371*
	(0.073)	(0.081)	(0.149)	(0.171)
Disagreement	0.043	-1.891	0.444	5.423+
	(1.498)	(3.108)	(3.220)	(3.252)
% Issue Salience X Disagreement		11.715	-10.417	-31.751
		(15.764)	(17.600)	(19.473)
Most Salient X % Issue Salience			-4.412***	-3.289*
			(1.178)	(1.303)
Most Salient X Disagreement			-5.450	-10.025*
			(4.340)	(4.709)
Most Salient X % Issue Salience X Disagreement			53.687*	77.129**
			(22.901)	(25.304)
% Cabinet Seats				2.267***
				(0.556)
% Cabinet Seats X Portfolio Importance				-0.088
				(0.449)
Comprehensive Agreement X Salience				0.297
				(1.538)
Minority Coalition X Salience				7.164***
				(1.996)
Median Party				0.029
				(0.094)
PM Party				0.079
				(0.074)
X	12.901	13.036	24.709	323.552
Log-Likelihood	-1493.377	-1493.088	-1486.213	-1309.888
AIC	2992.754	2994.177	2986.426	2645.775
Observations	4279	4279	4279	4279

Table A4. Positions with positions +/- Standard Deviation of CMP codes from Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov (2009)

	(1) Lower Bound	(2) Upper Bound
Min		
% Issue Salience	4.594**	5.113**
	(1.651)	(1.606)
Most Salient	0.073	0.253
	(0.184)	(0.185)
Disagreement	3.215***	3.384***
	(0.766)	(0.761)
% Issue Salience X Disagreement	-17.547**	-18.593***
	(5.703)	(5.594)
Most Salient X % Issue Salience	-1.519	-2.857+
	(1.472)	(1.476)
Most Salient X Disagreement	-0.678	-1.422
	(0.893)	(0.912)
Most Salient X % Issue Salience X Disagreement	10.522	15.023*
	(6.797)	(6.933)
% Cabinet Seats	2.167***	2.178***
	(0.552)	(0.553)
% Cabinet Seats X Portfolio Importance	-0.021	-0.033
	(0.450)	(0.450)
Comprehensive Agreement X Salience	0.469	0.349
	(1.569)	(1.566)
Minority Coalition X Salience	7.021***	6.908***
	(1.996)	(1.988)
Median Party	-0.025	-0.028
	(0.093)	(0.093)
PM Party	0.075	0.067
	(0.072)	(0.070)
X	353.545	350.365
Log-Likelihood	-1303.575	-1302.279
AIC	2633.151	2630.557
Observations	4281	4280

Table A5. Controls for number of parliamentary and cabinet parties.

	(1) Simple
Min	
% Issue Salience	4.608**
	(1.633)
Most Salient	0.234
	(0.170)
Disagreement	3.506***
	(0.800)
% Issue Salience X	-19.160**
Disagreement	(6.008)
Most Salient X % Issue	-2.420+
Salience	(1.358)
Most Salient X	-1.234
Disagreement	(0.899)
Most Salient X % Issue	13.517*
Salience X	(6.873)
Disagreement	
% Cabinet Seats	-0.887
	(0.640)
% Cabinet Seats X	0.312
Portfolio Importance	(0.399)
Comprehensive	0.697
Agreement X Salience	(1.614)
Minority Coalition X	7.088***
Salience	(2.107)
Median Party	0.055
	(0.084)
PM Party	-0.002
	(0.076)
ENPP X % Cab Seats	0.290+
	(0.149)
EN Cab Parties X %	0.721***
Cab Seats	(0.207)
Parliamentary Issue	0.746*
Range X % Cab Seats	(0.335)
X	584.123
Log-Likelihood	-1285.414
AIC	2602.828
Observations	4281

Table A6. Controls for wider parliamentary preferences and Salience

	(1) Simple
Min	
% Issue Salience	3.119^{+}
	(1.780)
Most Salient	0.386*
	(0.169)
Disagreement	6.497*
	(3.299)
% Issue Salience X	-35.545^{+}
Disagreement	(20.121)
Most Salient X % Issue	-3.502**
Salience	(1.274)
Most Salient X	-9.986*
Disagreement	(4.712)
Most Salient X % Issue	79.390**
Salience X Disagreement	(25.474)
% Cabinet Seats	-0.562
	(0.670)
% Cabinet Seats X	0.172
Portfolio Importance	(0.408)
Comprehensive Agreement	0.704
X Salience	(1.573)
Minority Coalition X	7.041***
Salience	(2.033)
Median Party	0.076
	(0.084)
PM Party	0.024
	(0.080)
ENPP X % Cab Seats	0.402**
	(0.148)
EN Cab Parties X % Cab	0.668**
Seats	(0.219)
Mean Parliamentary Issue	-3.385***
Position	(0.528)
Parliamentary Issue Range	71.637***
	(6.223)
Average Parliamentary	159.819***
Salience	(20.503)
Maximum Parliamentary	-150.466***
Salience	(14.621)
X	.
Log-Likelihood	-1291.266
AIC	2614.532
Observations	4279

Table A7. Number of times previously controlling the portfolio

	(1) Previous Experience
Min % Issue Salience	4.362*
	(1.824)
Most Salient	0.268
	(0.180)
Disagreement	6.640*
	(3.215)
% Issue Salience X Disagreement	-37.813+
	(19.542)
Most Salient X % Issue Salience	-3.450**
	(1.298)
Most Salient X Disagreement	-7.768
	(5.582)
Most Salient X % Issue Salience X Disagreement	71.259*
	(27.842)
% Cabinet Seats	1.657**
	(0.562)
% Cabinet Seats X Portfolio Importance	-0.184
	(0.425)
Comprehensive Agreement X Salience	-0.003
	(1.619)
Minority Coalition X Salience	6.096**
	(2.026)
Median Party	-0.096
	(0.104)
PM Party	0.025
	(0.086)
Minister in past	0.160***
	(0.021)
X	352.704
Log-Likelihood	-1233.771
AIC	2495.542
Observations	4279

Table A8. Basic Models with full Controls.

	(1) Simple	(2) Salience	(3) Ideology	(4) Full
Minister				
% Issue Salience	1.720	2.171	3.472*	4.820**
	(1.205)	(1.367)	(1.403)	(1.668)
Most Salient	0.032	0.100	0.008	0.195
	(0.081)	(0.130)	(0.083)	(0.180)
Disagreement	1.198***	1.201***	2.557***	3.299***
	(0.325)	(0.324)	(0.625)	(0.768)
Most Salient X % Issue Salience		-0.695		-2.290
		(1.009)		(1.448)
% Issue Salience X Disagreement			-9.817*	-17.981**
			(3.874)	(5.740)
Most Salient X Disagreement				-1.090
				(0.880)
Most Salient X % Issue Salience X Disagreement				12.770+
				(6.767)
% Cabinet Seats	2.218***	2.206***	2.207***	2.190***
	(0.548)	(0.547)	(0.550)	(0.551)
% Cabinet Seats X Portfolio Importance	-0.042	-0.041	-0.028	-0.031
	(0.441)	(0.442)	(0.447)	(0.449)
Comprehensive Agreement X Salience	-0.062	-0.029	0.586	0.411
	(1.528)	(1.529)	(1.584)	(1.572)
Minority Coalition X Salience	7.051***	7.025***	6.959***	6.960***
	(1.986)	(2.000)	(2.015)	(1.987)
Median Party	0.054	0.050	0.043	0.036
	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)
PM Party	0.060	0.060	0.059	0.065
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
X	353.106	354.087	355.698	355.003
Log-Likelihood	-1308.603	-1308.338	-1305.211	-1302.598
AIC	2635.206	2636.675	2630.421	2631.196
Percentage Correctly Predicted	71.582	71.489	71.792	71.979
Observations	4279	4279	4279	4279

Figure A1. Percent Correctly Predicted. [4]



[4] The percent correctly predicted are based on the results in Table 2 in the primary analysis. Basic controls are added for each level to allow for more comparable predictions across models.

[1] Like Bäck et al. (2011), we assume that the number and policy jurisdictions of portfolios remain stable within a country. While this assumption is not always supported empirically, this is unlikely to be problematic for our analysis, as we focus on a limited number of portfolios that tend to be more established in the countries under study.

[2] Considerable research examines the similarity of preferences and the willingness of principals to delegate to agents (Epstein and O'Halloran 1994; Huber et al. 2001; Huber and Shipan 2002). Principals support less delegation when their preferences differ from those of the intended agents. In the case of portfolio allocation within coalition governments, a minister is the agent of the coalition as a whole.

[3] We pool data from coalition governments in Austria (1949-1998), Belgium (1961-1998), Denmark (1953-1998), Finland (1945-1995), France (1959-1997), Germany (1953-1998), Ireland (1948-1998), Italy (1946-1998), Luxembourg (1945-1994), the Netherlands (1946-1998), Norway (1961-1998), Portugal (1978-1985), and Sweden (1951-1994). Like Bäck et al. (2011), we used online government archives to recode any portfolio for which more than one minister listed.

[4] Bäck et al. (2011) exclude France from the analysis because of difficulty recoding the data. We include data from France by linking the portfolios most closely associated with the 13 types under analysis, excluding the Economy category because the French cabinets combine this ministry with the Finance portfolio. See the Online Appendix for additional details.

[5] For additional information see Bäck et al. (2011), Dumont (1998) or the Online Appendix. Using this 'maximalist' approach, the data includes some observations with extremely high levels of salience for some issues relative to the rest of the sample. To account for the potential that these extreme values drive our results we exclude all observations over the 95% in the reported results. The primary independent variables drop slightly below standard levels of significance when these extreme values are included, although the negative effect for issue level disagreement remains weakly significant at the 90% level.

[6] We also use the ratio of the relationship between issue salience and the coalition party with the highest salience and find that the coefficients are largely in the predicted direction, but the effect of this relative salience does not reach standard levels of significance. The primary effect seems to derive from this qualitative difference of holding the issue most salient and not how much more salient.

[7] See the Online Appendix (Table A1) for the exact coding of our issue scales.

[8] For additional information on the issue categories or the issue positions, see the Online Appendix. In the main analysis, we use logged measures of issue position, but robustness checks in the Appendix using the raw CMP scales lead to substantively similar results.

[9] We subtract the directional left codes from right codes using the CMP's subjective positioning. For the Agricultural portfolio, we subtract code 501 "Environmental Protection" from code 703 "Agriculture and Farmers" because the original salience measure only included a single category.

[10] A common alternative is to construct the weighted mean by accounting for the relative size of the coalition partners. We choose our approach for two reasons. First, taking the weighted mean prevents us from distinguishing between the influence size (a la gamson's law) and ideological position have on coalitions' assignment of particular portfolios to particular parties. Second, our implied mechanism for coalition partners' negotiating leverage is the threat of exit from the coalition negotiations. Laver and Shepsle (1996) and Tsebelis (1999; 2002) argue that pivotal position relative to other strategic actors is a more important factor driving negotiating advantage than size. More broadly, including seat share as an independent variable and as a weighting mechanism likely introduces unnecessary multicollinearity into the analysis and limits direct interpretation of the results. Robustness checks using the coalition median position reveal substantively similar results, although they do not reach standard levels of statistical significance.

[11] While this approach violates Brambor et al.'s (2006) directive to include constitutive terms in interactions, the use of the conditional logit makes compliance with this rule impossible. As the most appropriate choice in current models of portfolio allocation, our current model and controls mirror those used by Back et al. (2011).

[12] An alternate operationalization that includes the mean parliament position to construct the measure of disagreement leads to substantively similar results.

[13] A Chi-Squared test of the coefficients indicates that the effect of holding the portfolio salient and most salient is jointly significant and different from salience alone at the 90% level in both Model 4 and Model 5.

[14] Chi-Squared tests of the coefficients for the interaction of ideological disagreement and salience indicate that it is jointly significant at the 90% level in Model 3 and different from disagreement than disagreement alone at the 99.9% level. Consistent with the hypotheses, these coefficients are jointly significant at the 95% level in Model 4. The difference in the effect for the most salient interaction with disagreement and salience differs from disagreement at the 95% level in Model 4 and Model 5. The joint effect off holding the issues most salient is statistically different from zero at the 90% level the full models.

[15] The graph plots the change in the likelihood of a Minister from Issue Salience when there is low and high disagreement (2 standard deviations below and above mean disagreement) between the coalition party and the minister for the party with the highest salience and another party that finds the issue salient. 90% confidence intervals are simulated from 1000 draws of the variance-covariance matrix. Predictions are from the Conditional Logit estimates in Model 4. Predictions are smoothed using Lowess.

[16] The graph plots the change in the likelihood of a Minister from Disagreement between the coalition party and the minister when the party holds the portfolio weakly salient (one standard deviation below mean issue salience, 2%). 90% confidence intervals are simulated from 1000 draws of the variance-covariance matrix. Predictions are from the Conditional Logit estimates in Model 2. Predictions are smoothed using Lowess.