Architecture and Attachment: Carceral Collectivism and the Problem of Prison Reform in Russia and Georgia

Laura Piacentini¹ and Gavin Slade

Abstract

This article looks at the trajectory of prison reform in post-Soviet Georgia and Russia. It attempts to understand recent developments through an analysis of the resilient legacies of the culture of punishment born out of the Soviet period. To do this, the article fleshes out the concept of carceral collectivism, which refers to the practices and beliefs that made up prison life in Soviet and now post-Soviet countries. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 revealed a penal culture in notable need of reform. Less obvious, in retrospect, was how over the course of a century this predominantly ‘collectivist’ culture of punishment was instantiated in routine penal practices that stand in opposition to Western penalities. The article shows how the social and physical structuring of collectivism and penal self-governance have remained resilient in the post-Soviet period despite diverging attempts at reform in Russia and Georgia. The paper argues that persistent architectural forms and cultural attachment to collectivism constitute this resilience. Finally, the article asks how studies of collectivist punishment in the post-Soviet region might inform emerging debates about the reform and restructuring of individualizing, cell-based prisons in Western jurisdictions.

¹ Laura Piacentini, Professor of Criminology, the Law School, Strathclyde University, Glasgow, Scotland. Gavin Slade, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Dahlem Research School, Freie Universitat, Berlin. Corresponding author: laura.piacentini@strath.ac.uk
The aim of this article is to discuss the enduring resilience of *carceral collectivism* in Georgian and Russian penal colonies. Remarkably little sociological and theoretical analysis has been published on post-Soviet punishment forms despite the history of the Soviet system looming large and vast across Europe and beyond. The word ‘collectivism’ shapes Russian culture as an ‘object of knowledge and action’ (Kharkhordin, 1999:75). The term derives from the Russian word *kollektiv*, which were the institutions reflecting both a familiar aspect of Russian everyday life and, most often, the *kollektiv* applied to a group of colleagues at work, on a farm or in the factory (Rosenberg, 1984)². For the purpose of this paper we define *kollektiv* as a group of people united and linked to a common cause in a range of public institutions (Getmanec, 1978)³. Proudly cited as an organisational innovation by the Soviets, one of the most striking expressions of collectivism can be found in the prison environments of both post-Soviet Georgia and Russia.

Carceral collectivism is grounded by three elements: a system of penal governance based on mutual peer surveillance, the dispersal of authority and governance to prisoners themselves, and communal living engendered by the spatial and temporal structuring of prison life through the housing of prisoners *en masse* in dormitories. In this article, we will flesh out this definition, demonstrate how carceral collectivism has survived the Soviet Union in the prisons of Georgia and Russia, and suggest how its enduring nature might help understand both the problems of prison reform in the post-Soviet region, and the exceptionality of penality in this region for the field of prison sociology broadly defined.

Attempts to reform prison systems vary across the post-Soviet region. Explaining this variation is not the primary focus of this paper. Instead, we limit our analysis to Georgia and Russia. These countries interest us because they are considered forerunners in prison reform

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² Moreover, it is a term that exists in the abstract because its widespread use makes it difficult to pin down theoretically.

³ We acknowledge here the important debate over the unhelpful categorisation of ‘individuals’ and ‘collectives’ in Russia and agree with Kharkhordin that the distinctions are subtler and cannot be simplified according to two categories. Throughout the twentieth century in Russia, at the centre of the idea of the collective was self-perfection (see also Morris, 1972). To give collectivism some cultural coherence, therefore, an individual had to perfect loyalty to Socialism. Hence the individual cannot be prised out of the debate on collectivism (Kharkhordin, 1999).
in the region. As we detail in this paper, Russia has set out a deep and comprehensive reform project, building on changes introduced in the 1990s. Georgia has, since 2005, overhauled its penitentiary system, deliberately destroying Soviet-style camps in an effort to make a break with the past. Both case studies, however, also reveal inertial legacies that have led to mounting difficulties in the reform process. We argue that this was in large part due to the fact that cultural values, whilst being an internal characteristic of penalty (Garland, 1990; Smith, 2008), were not considered in any assessment of penal reform priorities. We argue that this has been an important factor leading to resistance and failures in the reform projects. There is certainly a story here about ill chosen reform paths at the level of policy-making as well as failures of political will. This is not our focus in this paper however. We are interested in the cultural obstacles to initiated reforms once they reach the level of the prison.

The paper first outlines the collectivist nature of Soviet culture and its effects on punishment forms in the Soviet Union. We next look at how penal reform policy was rationalised in the post-Soviet space in terms of the governance of human rights. We then describe in detail the wide-ranging penal reform projects in our case studies – Georgia and Russia. In the final part of our paper we examine the implications for how the elementary characteristic of collectivism, which is how prisoners are held in space, is resilient in punishment forms. The resilience of carceral collectivism, we suggest, is constituted by two factors: architecture and attachment. Firstly, it is embedded in architectural forms that have not been seriously tackled by reforms; secondly, the practices that constitute carceral collectivism have both instrumental value for prisoners and prison governors as well as making cultural common sense.

From this perspective we argue, in conclusion, that study of the post-Soviet region’s penal culture opens up new debates in prison sociology. First of all it concerns how reform must deal with questions of penal cultural norms and their fragmentation into penal architecture and structures, enabling residues of prior regimes to endure. Second, and relatedly, we suggest that in the west recent arguments that greater communality in prison and prison architecture can produce better prisons would do well to take a comparative approach and look east on this issue. Finally, we believe that prison reform and culture are all

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4 There is one exception to this – Estonia. Estonia moved to a fully Western style cellular prison system in the 1990s. We do not include it in this discussion as its small population size and even smaller prison system combined with its proximity to Europe and membership of the European Union make it the one case in which carceral collectivism did not present a major obstacle to reform. It should be noted that Estonia’s bigger neighbours, Latvia and Lithuania, which ran much larger systems of collective Soviet colonies have failed to reform and have experienced similar problems to the ones we describe in this paper for Russia and Georgia.
the more pressing in parts of the world, such as Russia, where democracy is fragile, civil society is weak and the protection of vulnerable persons, including prisoners, is far from assured.

Collectivism as Soviet (penal) order

The term *kollektiv* has a long history in Russia. The concept emphasised a present and a future culture in every Soviet school, factory and public body, including criminal justice institutions. There is much scholarly debate over whether the *kollektiv* was a voluntary group dynamic (see Dontsov, 1984 and Khakhordin, 1999). Indeed, the systematic reality of Soviet life meant that groups were not freely assembled but were units of socialist production embedded in a political strategy working towards a common socialist rationale. Underlying this rationale peer pressure, discipline and fear, including the use of criminal law and imprisonment, mobilized common economic and common goals. Collectivism in the Soviet Union has thus been described as a form of ‘totalitarian surveillance-oriented bio-politics’ (Los, 2004: 22) where a system of mutual surveillance existed.

There were different scales and forms of collectiveness, yet all were undergirded by a notion of self-governance (Kharkhordin, 1999). Surveillance in the Soviet Union was distinctive from the West insofar as it was a form of both horizontal and hierarchical discipline; ‘a network of surveilling peers mediated by the *kollektiv*[s]’ (Kharkhordin, 1999: 122). All social institutions were sites of collective information gathering for the Soviet secret police and penal establishments were folded into the catechism of collectivism also. Kharkhordin, a prominent theorist of Soviet society (1999: 110), writes:

‘Mutual surveillance is the reliable bedrock of Soviet power...surveillance of everybody by everybody else is not a clever institutional trick adopted as a last resort when nothing else is working; on the contrary, this is the ever present rock bottom that one reaches upon dismantling mountains of power. If this bedrock dissolves, Soviet power disappears: hierarchies crumble and pyramids collapse. Mutual surveillance sets the cornerstone of Soviet power: without it, the Soviet Union could never have existed’ (Kharkhordin, 1999: 110).

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5 Although we would caution against a clear distinction between the two axes of horizontal and hierarchical surveillance outlined in the USSR as it cannot adequately explain the varying kinds of collective surveillance that occurred.
These reflections on the nature of power in Soviet society allow us to delineate a form of penal order we have called carceral collectivism. Carceral collectivism was based in part on the mutual surveillance identified by Kharkhordin in sites of punishment. This surveillance was cultivated by distinct penal architectural forms. It was used to enforce cultural standards, legal rules, and political as well as informal norms. This form of prison order based on mutual surveillance, we suggest, must be distinguished from the dominant concept in Western penology of the panopticon, the few watching the many (Bentham 2011; Foucault 1977; Haggerty & Ericson 2000). Instead, order is intentionally built into Soviet and post-Soviet prisons by what we term the polyopticon – the many watching the many. The shared background of collectiveness in penal norms and practices endowed the notion of the polyopticon with a certain kind of common sense formed against a cultural background of self-development through surveillance. Penal order was maintained through establishing group standards and, importantly, the collective came to be entrusted with the task of controlling itself through mutual surveillance.

In the process of recasting convicts as members of a mutually surveilled kollektiv, prisoners held positions of formal authority. The degree to which prisoners became self-governing makes the Soviet prison distinct from Western forms of penality. In Soviet camps, prisoners were required to enrol in organisations such as the ‘sanitary section’, the ‘production section’ and the section for ‘law violations’. Diverse prisoner councils were self-organising, arranging everyday life and dispersing penal discipline (Abramkin and Chesnokova, 1993). The logic of Soviet penal culture can, to some extent, be viewed as a product of the meticulous planning of collective surveillance under the thinly veiled disguise of ‘collective consciousness’. This dramatically altered the nature and operation of punishment, because as Barnes (2011) notes, prison life was where collective life dominated and prisoners learned to live on Soviet terms. Conceptions of the ‘collective’ and ‘individual’ came to be ambiguously twisted due to mutual surveillance of peers and state terror. Indeed, nobody ever quite knew who was an enemy and who was not.

As Goffman (1968) notes in his theory of ‘adjustment’, all penal space is territorialised through the internal order of the institution, and the external order of social structures. When considered in the cases of Georgia and Russia, adjustment occurs in a peculiar penal sub-cultural form where deprived of freedom as ‘individuals’, prisoners then participate in a ‘collective’ penal experience. Educational collectivities developed. In these, ‘the teacher, the tutor, the foreman and the student’ (Danilin, 1991, 6) converged on penal
doctrine turning ‘the organs of the inmate collectives into partners on an equal footing with the administration’ (Papkin, 1988, 168). As Papkin (1988) further notes this ‘increased [the] role of mutual dependency and responsibility, making it necessary for members of the collective to evaluate and influence each other’ (ibid, 169). Across the USSR, ‘relations between comrades’ are ‘not a matter of friendship, love or close contact, but one of responsible dependency’ (Danilin, 1991, 17).

As well as formal authority roles, a separate system of informal order existed in parallel among prisoners with the consent of prison administrations. Recidivists belonging to an elite subcultural caste known as vory-v-zakone (thieves-in-law) were co-opted by the authorities to maintain order and repress political prisoners. This particular elite prisoner group are thought to have emerged in the 1930s (Applebaum 2003; Varese 2001). They survived the changes throughout the Soviet period and exist in the post-Soviet period most famously as one manifestation of the ‘Russian mafia’ though in fact they have always drawn members from all ethnicities (Chalidze 1977; Gurov 1995; Varese 2001). The emboldening of the power of these criminals by the 1970s and 1980s became a particular problem in the Georgian prison system (Slade 2013).

In both formal and informal ways, then, the Soviet penal system went beyond cooperation and the coproduction of order to the full dispersal of authority and the problem of order onto the prisoners themselves. Extensive mutual surveillance developed under the auspices of the prison administration and that of the informal governance of the criminal elite. The ‘knockers,’ (an informant) were those prisoners who collected information for the regime, while the ‘overseers’ worked on behalf of the prisoner elite. There was a form of ‘double surveillance’ and information circulated within both formal and informal systems of power.

This interplay of formal enlistment and informal co-optation by the prison administration made oversight of discipline and conflict resolution all the more manageable through the architectural forms of the Soviet prison camp. Collective living in otryady, detachment blocks, or barracks, of two or three-story brick buildings containing mass dormitories where prisoners lived openly and communally,\(^6\) were the main sites for practices of carceral collectivism.

\(^6\) We will refer to these as ‘barracks’ throughout the text.
During the years of the Gulag (from the police camp system of the 1920s to the merger of all detention institutions in the 1930s until the early 1950s), carceral collectivism grew to exponential proportions becoming a brutal, massive and systematized penal apparatus whose broadest function was to enact Soviet economic aspirations and political indoctrination through a forced labour detention system of camps, colonies, prisons and internal exile. While the scale of the penal system was reduced after the death of Stalin in 1953, Khrushchev’s post-Stalin ‘thaw’ (1956-1964) did little to change the harshness of prison conditions. The main bases of carceral collectivism were in place until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

One of the aims of the paper is to demonstrate the distinctiveness of Soviet prison management in contrast to Western models. In concluding this paper, we will comment on how the Soviet and post-Soviet experience speaks to themes and issues in Western penology. In this vein, we include Table 1 below to draw out the differences between Soviet and Western models of prison governance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model of prison governance</th>
<th>Prevailing form of surveillance</th>
<th>Instantiation in prison design</th>
<th>Role of prisoners in order maintenance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western capitalist countries</td>
<td>Carceral individualism</td>
<td>Panopticon (official surveillance of prisoners)</td>
<td>Cellular prison—prisoners separated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Carceral collectivism</td>
<td>Polyopticon (surveillance of prisoners by prisoners)</td>
<td>Prison camp—prisoners share communal living spaces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: comparing Soviet and Western forms of penal governance

In summary, a highly distinct culture of carceral collectivism, born from the institution of the kollektiv, served as the model penal style of management of both institutions and prisoners. Mutual surveillance, or what we have termed the polyopticon, was the basis for such management. The spatial and internal organisational characteristics of the Soviet camp (consisting of administrative, domestic and production territories) as well as the barracks enabled mutual surveillance and carried forward the culture of carceral collectivism. Attachment to the practices and values of carceral collectivism as well as the persistence of
architectural forms that engendered these can, in part, explain some of the failings of prison reform in the region. Penal architecture emboldened collectivist penal sensibility. We go on to discuss precisely these reforms later in the paper. Next, we next outline how prison reformers attempted to intervene in this long-lived Soviet penal system as part of a broader agenda to promote human rights.

Penal reform, human rights and the state

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a radically different approach to penal punishment was called for (Pridemore, 2005; Solomon, 1997). Imprisonment came to be re-framed away from a totalitarian apparatus to one benefitting from the generative import of European norms promoting the rule of law. The picture is complex and incomplete because although the appetite was certainly there for new legalities guiding punishment, the capacities for acting on these positive responses to reform were patchy (Pridemore, 2005). Indeed one could argue that penal reform in this part of the world is highly contested because some penal ideas have been abandoned and others maintained.

All regions of Russia, and all post-Soviet countries including Georgia, inherited the Soviet camp prison system (Detkov 1999). Thus, a huge task faced reformers. In post-Soviet Russia, early attention focused on pre-trial facilities where overcrowding, death and squalor occurred on an industrial scale. Russia joined the Council of Europe (CoE) in 1996, Georgia joined in 1999. Both countries had ratified the European Convention of Human Rights by the end of the 1990s. These international obligations meant that both Georgia and Russia followed similar paths in humanizing their justice systems. Jury trials were re-established, the death penalty was abolished or placed under a moratorium, and the management of the penitentiary system was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Justice. Both countries originally fostered an openness to international emulation and models ‘ensuring that trainers can refer to international instruments and best practice examples, in delivering specialised training’ (UNODC, 2014: 1). With an almost missionary zeal, penal reform was pursued with substantial expert input from Europe that led to improvements to a wide range of legal and criminal structures. This was particularly true of Vladimir Putin’s first term in office (2000-2003) in Russia and Mikheil Saakashvili’s first term in Georgia (2004-2007).
For Russia, this reforming period ended somewhat abruptly in 2003 with the arrest of the Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkhovsky, the continuing unprecedented ruthlessness of a prolonged second war with Chechnya, and numerous failures in applying the jurisprudence of the ECHR in the treatment of vulnerable persons, minority groups and prisoners (see Bowring, 2009). Putin, particularly after his first term, has famously reframed Russia’s political position as no longer inside the nexus of European obligations. Meanwhile, Georgia has maintained its outward commitment to reform within European frameworks while backsliding on human rights and democracy. Most significantly, in November 2007 the government violently clamped down on a peaceful demonstration and took over an opposition-supporting TV channel. Following this, while paying lip-service to its international obligations, Georgia’s reformed prison system became virtually closed to the outside world.

Yet, despite these setbacks, the reality is that the ECHR is now very much part of Georgian and Russian law, which means judges, lawyers and penal authorities are trained to consider wider European protocols. Penal authority, therefore, cannot reasonably be said to be the sole preserve of national sovereignty now that these countries have entered bilateral management agreements with European bodies where a domain of external judgement is maintained on behalf of European political elites. One of the side-effects of this development is the complex and large case law on prisoner rights violations (see Van Zyl Smit and Snacken 2009), which test the extent to which managerial and legal reform have indeed been transformative.

Whilst these steps at reform were utterly necessary to deal with the scandalous management of prisoners, and were part of a repertoire of measures improving the conduct of the penal apparatus, they have been remarkably less concerned with moral or philosophical rationales of penal approaches. One such critical but overlooked aspect is the fundamental question of the role of the state in the practice of punishment. Political scientists and economists have published prolifically on the changing nature of the post-Soviet (weak) state in terms of its limited capacity to provide public goods, services, and protections, its autonomy from special interest groups, and its legitimacy to wield power (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Buzan 1997; Weiler 2004; Coppieters & Legvold 2005; Taylor 2011; Mendras 2012). Following the Soviet collapse, states emerged that had more democratic potential and greater accountability while lacking capacity and immediate legitimacy to act.
The role of the state in practices of punishment is a clear area in which questions of accountability, autonomy, capacity and legitimacy are highly pertinent. Reform in Russia and Georgia so far has been concerned with reframing accountability and allowing international oversight. It has been concerned with mapping out internationally tried and tested techniques to identify, classify and manage the penal system according to common norms, reshaped legal terms, and agreements between governmental bodies. Wider questions about the meaning of punishment – legitimacy - and the overriding use of prison – capacity – have been largely left to one side. On the former issue, attempts at deep prison reform in Russia and Georgia have run into dire, in some cases disastrous, problems of legitimacy. On the latter issue, in 2013, out of the ten countries in Europe that had the highest incarceration rates per capita, nine were post-Soviet countries. In 2012, the top two countries were Russia and Georgia (International Centre for Prison Studies 2012; 2013).

The issue of post-Soviet penal reform, therefore, is vulnerable to a lack of depth on key sociological questions such as: ‘do the countries of the post-Soviet region now have a fundamentally different understanding of the role of the state in prison matters?’ And relatedly ‘what depth can penal reform reach above and beyond ‘improved management’? There are three interlocking issues here: firstly, penal culture (values, norms and ‘feelings’ about incarceration); secondly, penal infrastructure, architecture and the ways it embeds cultural values that lead to penal ideas; and thirdly, penal policy, prison populations levels and developing a heterogeneity of policies around rehabilitation that connect to real crime problems.

Taking these themes as broadly guiding our discussion, we suggest that the most striking penal legacy that reformers in the post-Soviet region have to deal with is that of carceral collectivism. We see the effects of this in Georgia and Russia where attempts to dismantle the Soviet penal colony in favour of Western-style prisons have either floundered or collapsed into controversy. Western countries and organizations continue to push for penal reform and the protection of human rights in the post-Soviet region. In achieving such goals, the inertial force of carceral collectivism must be acknowledged and engaged with because it imposes constraints on penal modernization in both jurisdictions. We now turn our attention to more specifically describing reform and its consequences in our two case studies.

*Problems of Penal Reform in Georgia and Russia*
At one time or another since 1991, the political leaderships in both Russia and Georgia have declared a willingness to end the Soviet system of labour colonies. The type of reform conducted has, however, varied drastically. In Russia, the legal architecture was reformed but ponderous discussion about punishment forms and stalled processes have prevailed, whereas in Georgia a radical, quick and deep overhaul was carried out. In both cases reforms did not fully acknowledge or tackle the architectural form of incarceration and the Sovietized cultural sensibility towards collectivism that it incubates\(^7\). Due to this, the results of penal reform have been structurally and conceptually problematic.

Georgia

As part of a ‘zero tolerance’ crime control policy the prison population increased 300% between 2003 and 2010 and the country became the fourth biggest incarcerator in the world proportionately, leapfrogging even Russia. Georgia’s largely untouched and creaking penal infrastructure was overhauled to accommodate this increase. Old prisons and colonies were renovated or demolished, new prisons were built from scratch using the gains to the budget from new fines and plea-bargaining, aid and loans from abroad. A mass turnover of staff within prisons had been implemented with 80% of personnel in some institutions fired or told to reapply for their jobs ostensibly to root out corruption (Prison Service Georgia 2006).

Other than special facilities for juveniles and women, the reforms divided custodial establishments for remand and convicted prisoners in Georgia into ‘closed’ and ‘semi-open’ types. Closed prisons replaced colonies, accommodating prisoners in 6 to 8 person cells for 23 hours of the day. Remand prisoners are also held in such facilities. Less highly securitized ‘semi-open’ prisons were also established often on the grounds of the old penal colonies. In these semi-open facilities, prisoners have greater interaction and freedom of movement and in some prisoners are still kept in *otryady*, the collective dormitories of Soviet times (UNODC 2013).

The influence of the subculture of the thieves-in-law had been felt in Georgia more than in any other post-Soviet republic (Kupatadze 2012; Slade 2013). In legislation emulating an approach adopted in Italy for tackling the mafia, thieves-in-law and were removed from

\(^7\)More details on specific reforms can be found in Piacentini (2004, Pallot and Piacentini (2012), Slade (2012a; 2012b; 2013)
prisons and placed in a separate institution (prison #7 in Tbilisi) with curtailed rights of visitation and access to phones. Privileges were taken away and administrative sanctions imposed for expressions of support for the thievish subculture. These reforms met with resistance inside the prison system. Riots and hunger strikes continually broke out in 2005 and 2006, often directly before transfer to new or renovated facilities (Public Defender of Georgia 2007).

Methods of spreading information in the communal spaces of the old system, such as tattooing, coded messages, slang, the keeping of a mutual aid communal fund, and an informal postal system were all outlawed. A small cadre of staff ran this reformed and volatile prison system at a staff-inmate ratio of roughly 1:10. Some prisons were significantly understaffed, populated by a professional corps that was undertrained (training courses last as little as 20 days), and overworked with non-proportional breaks for shift work (UNODC 2013).

It was in this context that the use of coercion, leading to widespread abuse and torture took hold, existing across prisons and principally in closed establishments and remand prisons (Open Society Georgia Foundation, forthcoming). After a change of government in 2012, the prison system once more became an object of political intervention. Prison reform was declared a failure and a mass amnesty was announced. The courts reconsidered thousands of cases and over half of the prison population was released from penal institutions by March 2013. Reports of the new Ombudsman show that the system of elite prisoner ‘overseers’ had not in fact been destroyed as the previous government had claimed but had been adapted to the new system (Slade 2013). Moreover, Ministry of Corrections officials now claim that the cultural frame of the thieves-in-law and their practices were still very much present in prison and making a resurgence following the amnesty. Carceral collectivism had proven much more resilient than the government had claimed.

Russia

Following the collapse of the USSR, criminal justice officials and human rights lawyers pronounced that penal reform would be swift, innovative and, importantly, mark a clear departure from the harsh Soviet penal and legal norms. In the process of dismantling the complex Soviet legal architecture in the decade after 1991 an avalanche of legislative measures appeared centered on the management and maintenance of human rights standards. Calls and campaigns from human rights groups to ‘end the Gulag’ did indeed provide much
for the Russian authorities to consider about the creaking edifice of Soviet penal architecture. However, it was the brutal hardship of the remand prisons, the SIZO, where the very worst human rights atrocities were documented. With the economic and financial chaos dominating Russian society under the then President Boris Yel’tsin for much of the ten years that followed the collapse of the USSR, the necessary first steps in the 1990s were (for sensible reasons) to embed European justice norms. To this extent, Russia has travelled very far indeed with compliance with many Council of Europe rules forthcoming. Within this new territory of penal change, however, imprisonment remained the default penal sanction (King 1994). Organisational and economic reasons were again given for Russia not implementing alternatives to custody, and there were no reforms or re-structuring of prison architecture. Russia remains in the top three of the highest prison populations in the world (per 100,000 people) and the total number of prisoners often exceeds the capacities of pre-trial detention facilities and correctional institutions. The Soviet ‘prison complex’, in other words, has endured.

Exploring the enduring legacy of carceral collectivism, and its relationship to penal reform, requires a consideration of the pressing question: if not penal collectivism, then what? Providing alternatives to Soviet-style imprisonment (en masse accommodation in otryad halls, double wooden fences, watch towers and barbed wire) has not been forthcoming. Such reluctance is significant not only because alternatives to custody would be the first step towards ending the penal echoes of the Gulag, but also the high penal population would be reduced. Supervised release was mentioned as long ago as 1997 in the new Criminal Code that became statute. In its original version it was intended that supervised release should be served in so-called “correctional centers” with prisoners staying in special hostels without guard but under supervision of the authorities in charge of sentence management. However, the government did not approve funds or staff for these correctional facilities. Amnesties have reduced the prison population in a very piecemeal way but it was not until December 2010 with the publication of the ‘Concept Paper for the Reform of Prison Institutions in the Russian Federation until 2020’ that conditional sentences, holistic approaches and probation surfaced once again.

The Concept paper marked four years of penal reform discussions in an effort to end Russia’s notorious reputation and, ‘improve the effective operation of penal institutions, and punishment, to meet international standards and to ensure public safety (Concept paper, p.6). Minor to medium offences, it is stated, will be addressed by non-custodial measures to ensure
public safety, reduction in the level of crime in society, fragmentation of the criminal community and reduction in the number of the persons kept in penal institutions’. To achieve these goals there would be fines, an improvement of the legislation governing alternatives to create inspectorates that are community-facing, and, interestingly, more robust engagement of local self-government bodies and the general public (see section 4.2.1). Unfortunately, only a very small number of offences could be covered through a fine penalty system and alternatives to custody could not be sustained economically. Of key note is that Russia did not create the probation service it needs, so dealing with most offenders remains in the domain of the penal system. The adoption of parts of the Concept, as revealed from data on re-offending rates, has also had almost no impact on court practice and many essential provisions of the Concept remain unimplemented (Utkin, 2013). However, a need to address the culture of collectivism, and fragment the criminal community, (Concept, p. 6-8) was, for the first time since the collapse of the USSR, the clearest reference to carceral collectivism, albeit in an indirect way:

‘...there will be new penal establishments that fulfil the legal requirements of punishment, and the deprivation of liberty, but which will be a move away from the barrack system of housing prisoners’ (Concept paper, p.6).

This comment was not a reference to Russia’s cultural attachment to collectivism but was an attempt to publicly address the on-going problem of criminal gangs. Moving ‘away from barrack system’ is a formidable challenge. It means changing the spatio-temporal choreography of penal discipline and how power and control are maintained. Moreover, it requires a re-configuration of the organising principles of punishment in Russia because it is inscribed in the physical architecture. These issues, intimately part of the culture and practices of carceral collectivism, have, up to this point, not been addressed by reform.

In both Georgia and Russia, wide-ranging attempts at prison reform failed to radically alter the features of carceral collectivism that define prison life for prisoners. Below we examine why carceral collectivism has survived in the two of the most reformed penal systems in the post-Soviet region.

*Architecture and Attachment: the Resilience of Carceral Collectivism in Georgia and Russia*
In both Georgia and Russia, despite attempts to make significant reform, prisoners still find themselves in regimes that are marked by legacies of carceral collectivism. This is not just due to a lack of robustness in reform. Rather, the forms of penal governance that constitute carceral collectivism have proven resilient in the face of pressure. Resilience, defined as the ability of some entity or institution to survive under pressure from an exogenous intervention or adapt and continue on in the wake of a shock (Gunderson 2000; Levin et al. 1998) is a key property of carceral collectivism and one that prison reform has not managed to overcome.

In this section, we examine two important elements that help constitute this resilience. Firstly, architectural forms continue to incubate carceral collectivism. Secondly, prisoners and administrators have an attachment to this punishment form. In the language of political science, there is both a logic of instrumentality and a logic of appropriateness to the practices of carceral collectivism that sustain it (March and Olsen 1996). This means that, first, for all involved there are rational incentives in maintaining the frames for order and social life that carceral collectivism provides. Second, there is a degree of cultural attachment to carceral collectivism as a form of punishment. Before coming to this issue of attachment, we now turn to architecture.

Carceral collectivism is resilient, in part, because no reform has gone far enough in destroying its physical manifestations found in architecture and the structure of social life that this engenders. During the Soviet era, the architecture of prisons attempted to bring about a seamless cohesion between penal ideology, broadly defined, and the cultural aspirations of the regime. Despite two decades of reform, Russia has so far resisted reform towards Western style cellular prisons, though its new reform plan to 2020 intends this. For now, very few prisoners are held in cells (only those in jails, *tyurmy*, and in the strictest regime colonies for men); the vast majority are still held in penal colonies or *kolonniye* corresponding to the zoned military detachments of the post-Gulag Soviet era. In Georgia, there is now a mix of prisoners held in cells (closed prisons) and semi-open prisons that have remnants of carceral collectivist architecture and governance philosophies. The continual presence of mutual surveillance and the re-casting of prisoners into administrative roles, creating a form of collective penal self-governance, still mark both these systems.

The architectural setting of post-Soviet prison holds within it particular forms of social institutions: roles, modes of interaction and normative ordering are defined and

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8 See Pallot and Piacentini (2012) for a full breakdown of contemporary Russian penal architecture.
maintained. In Russia’s prison society the collectivisation of penal life is reflected in the internal spatio-temporal infrastructure (zoning, collective living, and timed work tasks and daily roll-call checks), which maintain the hierarchies of power between inmates. As we have argued, a systematic effect of Soviet penal architecture was to induce a high level of enhanced surveillance, the polyopticon of all watching all. Maintaining carceral collectivism, therefore, requires many things from prisoners that are borrowed from the past: collectives of work teams, discipline groups, carers, informant cliques and administrators. In Russia, larger associative groups come together based on tasks and work-placements as well as places of birth. The most authoritative position, conferred by the latter-day version of the *kollektiv*, is ‘head prefect’ who is the prisoner with devolved responsibility for managing the dormitory when the prison officers go home. Then the so-called *aktivisti* or ‘activists’ manage the self-organised collectives⁹. The official line is that the activists’ role is to empower and teach prisoners to learn to raise issues amongst themselves. The positions of authority that prisoners occupy heighten the collective experience. Becoming part of a collective, for some, means much more than being a ‘person’ (Pallot and Piacentini, 2012).

Captains and Deputies look after the interests of the prison administrators, and in the barracks the supervisors can mete out punishment and also inform on fellow prisoners, creating a kind of inverted and complex role for prisoners in the collective environment that relocates the centre of penal power straight into the heart of the living quarters. In practice, however, self-governance is contradictory. Some view prisoner authority as a ‘sell out’ whilst others believe that it is better to have prisoners assist in prisoner over-sight. Pallot and Piacentini’s (2012) research suggests that in Russia, older prisoners, who grew up in Soviet Russia, recalled a golden age of confinement when the lines between those who worked for the administration and those who resisted were much clearer.

To a lesser extent than in Russia, many prisons still architecturally operate in part or in full along collectivist lines in Georgia too. Semi-open facilities still maintain dormitory ‘zones’ though the production and industry zones now lie dormant and outside the prison fence. Ksani #15 for example exhibits both a Soviet block with one building holding 500 people in dormitories, while nearby a newly built block of the closed type holds prisoners in six person cells. Such institutions embody the halfway house character of the Georgian reforms, exhibiting an attempt to break with the past while at the same time manifesting the

⁹ The term descends directly from the Gulag era when the *aktiv* was the prisoner who was given extra powers from the authorities.
clear physical vestiges of Soviet collectivist punishment. While prisoners might have greater privacy in the closed cell system, they are also denied access to the talk and exchange of the old dormitories. Prisoners go to extraordinary lengths to find information on each other in the strictly controlled environment of the reformed, closed prison system, continually tapping and making small holes in walls and passing along messages and questions along an entire floor or wing.

In Georgia, prior to reform, a system of ‘overseers’ existed. An individual overseer reported to the elite criminal caste, thieves-in-law. They could watch over and resolve disputes arising from card games and gambling, look after individual dormitories, while more authoritative individuals had responsibility for whole barrack buildings, zones and the prison itself. This system was largely dismantled in closed type prisons from 2005 onwards. In such prisons the notion of ‘overseer’ (working with the criminal elite) and ‘informant’ (working with the prison administration) became blurred such that there were extreme difficulties in working out which prisoners might be informants when entering a closed cell after the space and interaction of the open colonies. In semi-open camps however the notion of overseer persists. In these prisons overseers remain highly conspicuous and are presumed to be there for the welfare of the prisoners.

The issue of architecture and its role in structuring social life is of comparative interest. As Hancock and Jewkes (2011) note, the architecture of cellular confinement, common to most Western prisons, can have the debilitating effect of de-stabilising prisoners through physical isolation from others. Beijersbergen et al. (2014) found that prisoner attitudes concerning relationships with staff were worse in panopticon prison designs and best in ‘campus’ style prisons that fostered greater interaction. Western penal architecture today predominantly follows a cellular model that originated in the design of monasteries where austerity and lack of privacy necessitated small cells of one or two prisoners. Prison architects implemented a rehabilitation concept that promoted isolated, silent contemplation (Brand, 1975). A cultural specificity of Western imprisonment is how power over prisoners was secured. The mental uncertainty implicit in prisoners not knowing when they are being watched was promoted as a crucial advancement because it ensured automatic power over prisoners by authorities. Prison design has since been updated to include environmental and health concerns but, as is also the case in Georgia and Russia, visibility is key to control and discipline.
Over and above the issue of architecture, the resilience of carceral collectivism is also constituted by cultural attachment to it among prisoners. This can manifest itself as active resistance to reform. In both Russia and Georgia, prisoners have engaged in collective forms of resistance in protest at being moved from camps to cellular prisons. For example, in Georgia, in March 2006, seven prisoners lost their lives during a prison riot in Tbilisi’s notorious Ortachala facility after the action was put down by special forces (Public Defender of Georgia 2007). Just months before this, in December 2005, a massive hunger strike involving around 70% of the entire prison population had broken out (Regnum 2005). The demands were a return to the old system of ‘overseers’, the use of mobile phones and to remain in the old prison facilities. Disturbances in the Russian penal system during the most recent attempt to implement the 2020 reform program were one of the main reasons the reforms were halted.

Carceral collectivism is a culturally readable frame for social action. It is an understandable way of punishing and becomes a form of accepted common sense (Garland 1990). Carceral collectivism then ensures stability in everyday prison life according to complex normative templates. Thus, for example, collectivism produces rules for the circulation of information about any newcomer’s character, his/her attitude towards the prison society and prison life, and, lastly, the demands to be placed upon him by the collective. This information enables the formation and sustenance of groups. Norms concerning group living and the suppression of egoistic behaviour engenders stability generating the informal rules that frame mutual obligations, reciprocity and dispute resolution. Attempts to dismantle the old system provoke resistance as it does damage to what individuals understand punishment is and what it should be as well as the specific methods prisoners develop to negotiate the pains of imprisonment.

The communal living arrangements of the detachment block create the formation of small social groups of varying hierarchical status. In Russia, in the low status groups of 2-8 prisoners unity is maintained through ‘loaf sharing’ or ‘family cohesion’. In classic Goffman (1968) terms, both are positively social psychological (they distil emotional comfort) and negatively destabilising (they can never fully satisfy a prisoner’s need to feel trust and be trusted). While smaller hierarchical groups are common, Oleinik (2003), in his study of Soviet and post-Soviet male penal colonies shows the importance of ‘coming from the same place’ or zemliachestvo in the forming of larger associations. Group formation becomes, in one sense, a marker of discrimination, superiority and fear and also an ability to manage the
penal collective according to regional stereotypes. Prisoners in Georgia also form subgroups from the regions of this small but incredibly diverse country. Prisoners feel that there are few bonds of real trust or solidarity and thus gravitate to people of common origin for support. Crucially, in a small, tight knit country like Georgia prisoners rely on common origins for character references, once again producing information that helps categorise, order, and make demands on newcomers in the complex world of the collectivist prison system.

While carceral collectivism has endured, it is a system of collective penal self-governance that also faces the possibility of abuse and manipulation because it delivers what the regimes require - discipline, and a culturally familiar form of peer-surveillance. For some then, there are sunk investments in maintaining the collective system from which they benefit, both from the side of the officers and among certain sections of the prisoner population. This is not limited to prisoner-on-prisoner abuse but extends to preying on the weaker prison officers to bring in alcohol, drugs and perfumes into the colonies (Pallot and Piacentini, 2012). In Russia, prison authorities feel confident that sufficient checks and balances are in place to ensure that protocol is followed when devolving authority to prisoners. However, power imbalances remain non-linear and opaque. The reform of Georgia’s prisons has increased uncertainty in prison management and therefore levels of coercion and violence from staff to prisoners. Meanwhile the reforms have reinforced the need for prisoner self-organization and created adaptive new forms of information gathering and informal governance.

Carceral collectivism has proven highly resilient. For Kharkhordin (1999), however, the image of collectivism contains within it too many contradictions and possibilities for abuse to be seen as a meaningful alternative form of self-organization. Whether carceral collectivism, might, with the right policies, be transformed into a ‘good thing,’ – an inclusive, supportive and dignified social form of prison order - particularly in light of Western critiques of cellular-based punishment is something we explore in conclusion. For the moment, a key question of policy, which we do not have space to address here, is: in the story of post-Soviet penal change, why has the issue of collectivism been mainly omitted from the reform project?

Conclusion: Collectivism, Western penology and the post-Soviet Region
Carceral collectivism endures as a Soviet legacy, as a penal institutional form, and in wider discourse, because it makes for a certain kind of ‘common sense’. It brings cultural coherence and is resilient because it is part of the cultural imaginary of the post-Soviet region. It is a penal style that peers into the heart of wider society. Embedded cultural attachment to a particular punishment form, reflected in architectural design, creates obstacles to successful prison reform in post-Soviet Georgia and Russia. This view supports Garland’s (1990: 199) argument that ‘penal practices are shaped by the symbolic grammar of cultural forms as well as by the more instrumental dynamics of social action, so that, in analysing punishment, we should look for patterns of cultural expression as well as logics of material interest or social control’ (Garland, 1990: 199, our emphasis). While the cultural dimension of punishment in general has been long recognized (Garland 1990: 250; Smith 2008), this paper focuses on how culture can impede the progress of well-intentioned prison reform. Moreover, this paper is a rare attempt to analyse this process in a non-Western setting.

The cases presented here are important for reformers whether in the West or in the post-Soviet region. Hancock and Jewkes’ important study of Western prison design (2011) notes that the prison is not merely an extension of state power where norms and meanings can be found in penal practice. The prison is also, within its exterior and interior design, an incubator of bold statements about the modernization process itself. The architecture of prison institutions enables insights into how prisoners encounter power and the effects of these encounters on creating meaning from confinement. Alongside delivering punishment, prison spaces also organise the social life of captives and this means that prison design must be socially, culturally and politically compatible with the aspirations and goals of the institution. Related to this point, aesthetic principles are now being applied to prison design to create punishment forms ‘allowing the principle of collaboration to take precedence over isolation and individualization’ (Hancock and Jewkes, 2011: 619).

Hancock and Jewkes argue that better aesthetics and more communality push against the over-arching, indeed emblematic, goals of social control and discipline. If the ‘new generation prisons’ found in Northern Europe are intended to free up movement between staff and prisoners and be less confrontational in design (Ibid; Beijersbergen et al. 2014), the question arises as to whether prison design reform towards collectivism, might, therefore, capture a more progressive, less harmful approach to punishment. This is a question for reformers in both the West and the post-Soviet region. For policy-makers in the latter, the emphasis has been on a quick move towards Western cellular prisons. In the former, recent
prison design has aimed to reduce alienation in prison and create a ‘campus’ feel in day-to-day life. Reform in the two regions is then moving in opposite directions, yet there is little dialogue on what each could learn from the other. Comparative research is required to explore the question of what type of penal environment may be fostered by what forms of collectivism.

From the Western perspective, moves towards collectivism might learn from the Soviet experience by looking at the form of order that emerged in Soviet camps. Paradoxically for us, the collectivist nature of penal punishment in the Soviet state was an enhanced panopticism which goes beyond the Foucauldian all-seeing-eye towards something a little more peculiar: a single prisoner is watched by all prisoners – the polyopticon. Hancock and Jewkes’ thesis on penal architecture in Western prisons suggests that architectural modernisation in some of today’s prisons is seen - by penal administrators, architects and government officials - as innovations towards new and better environments. However, our cases also caution that what is ‘better’ can be resisted by prisoners possessing specific cultural understandings of how punishment should be practiced, experienced and negotiated.

Lastly from the post-Soviet perspective, reformers might ask whether all elements of Western penal models are desirable. Certainly, as a cultural trope carceral collectivism contains many of the contradictions inherent in ideas of (Soviet) collectivism. These continue to haunt both Georgian and Russian penal systems. Yet, post-Soviet Georgian and Russian penal discourse has yet to recognise how collectivism fosters at least the possibility for a more benign, pastoral and supportive culture of communality. In Russia and Georgia this culture is ingrained in the penal and cultural psyche. Post-Soviet societies are now folded into the European space. They exist at a point of international penal exceptionality in terms of penal culture, penal infrastructure and penal practices but, with culturally sensitive reform, this could yet yield inclusive, supportive, social and benign punishment forms.

While ending on this note of cautionary optimism, we highlight the fact here that such reform would have to deal fully with the startlingly high incarceration rates in the post-Soviet region and the lack of alternatives to prison. We do not have space to consider such matters here. Suffice it to say that mass incarceration in many post-Soviet countries endures because prison still signifies a much more capacious notion of a socially and economically useful commune – a further legacy of Soviet carceral collectivism. The more basic question for us
then is whether Georgia and Russia are ready to move their prison systems towards something that engages with the past, meaningfully comes from internal public and political conversations, and is concerned with maintaining the safety, human rights, dignity and privacy of all prisoners.

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