Earnings management, stakeholders and the impact of competition and political representation

  • Christos Gialtouridis

Student thesis: Doctoral Thesis

Abstract

This PhD thesis is comprised of three individual research papers, examines issues around earnings management and its implications for firms and stakeholders, and provides new insights on factors that drive or mitigate the accounting practice of earnings management. In the second chapter, I examine whether earnings management and managerial overconfidence are factors that affect the relationship of the firm with its customers and employees. Furthermore, I examine the incremental effect of managerial overconfidence on the association between earnings management and stakeholder relationships, focusing on customers and employees. I find that both earnings management and managerial overconfidence improve the relationship between the firm and its customers, while I find some evidence that they deteriorate the relationship of the firm with its employees. I do not find evidence to suggest that managerial overconfidence acts as a factor amplifying the association between earnings management stakeholder relationships. The results remain consistent in various robustness tests, including alternative measures, instrumental variable regressions, and difference in differences approach. In the third chapter, I assess whether product market competition amplifies the negative relationship between ESG and earnings management. ESG engagement on its own is effective in mitigating earnings management. However, engagement in ESG practices is more important in limiting earnings management by the firm when competition is high. Disclosing ESG related information, irrespective of the actual ESG performance of the firm, also reduces earnings management when competition is high as managers voluntarily provide more information about the firm’s operations. In the fourth chapter, I assess whether political representation amplifies the negative relationship between ESG engagement and earnings management. I find that when Democrats are in power as elected state governors, ESG engagement is effective in mitigating earnings management, as the Democratic party places more emphasis on ESG policies. A one standard deviation increase in ESG score leads to a 0.79% reduction in firms’ earnings management when Democrats are in power. Moreover, engagement in ESG practices is a better hedge against earnings management for firms incorporated in states with governors from the Democratic party compared to Republican states. Results remain consistent when using the control of the Senate suggesting that political representation has a persistent effect on ESG practices across different government levels.
Date of Award15 Feb 2023
Original languageEnglish
Awarding Institution
  • University Of Strathclyde
SponsorsUniversity of Strathclyde
SupervisorKrishna Paudyal (Supervisor) & Dimitris Andriosopoulos (Supervisor)

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