When international organizations bargain: evidence from the global environment facility

Patrick Bayer, Christopher Marcoux, Johannes Urpelainen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Who gets what in bargaining between states and international organizations (IOs)? Although distributional conflict is unavoidable in international cooperation, previous research provides few empirical insights into the determinants of bargaining outcomes. We test a simple bargaining model of cooperation between states and IOs. We expect that nonegalitarian international organizations, such as the World Bank, secure more gains from bargaining with economically weak than with economically powerful states. For egalitarian international organizations, such as most United Nations (UN) agencies, the state’s economic power should be less important. We test these hypotheses against a novel data set on funding shares for 2,255 projects implemented under the auspices of the Global Environment Facility, from1991 to 2011. The data allow us to directly measure bargaining outcomes. The results highlight the importance of accounting for the interactive effects of international organization and state characteristics.

LanguageEnglish
Pages1074-1100
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
Volume59
Issue number6
Early online date27 Feb 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2015

Fingerprint

International Organizations
evidence
international organization
economic power
international cooperation
World Bank
UNO
funding
determinants
International organizations
Global environment

Keywords

  • bargaining
  • foreign aid
  • global environment
  • international cooperation
  • international organizations

Cite this

Bayer, Patrick ; Marcoux, Christopher ; Urpelainen, Johannes. / When international organizations bargain : evidence from the global environment facility. In: Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2015 ; Vol. 59, No. 6. pp. 1074-1100.
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When international organizations bargain : evidence from the global environment facility. / Bayer, Patrick; Marcoux, Christopher; Urpelainen, Johannes.

In: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 59, No. 6, 01.09.2015, p. 1074-1100.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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