Trade in Bilateral Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Formation

Alex Dickson; Roger Hartley

Trade in Bilateral Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Formation

Research output: Working paper

86 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can choose whether to buy or sell the good. We derive conditions under which a non-autarkic equilibrium exists and when the only equilibrium is autarky. Autarky is ‘nice’ (robust to small perturbations in the game) when it is the only equilibrium, and ‘very nice’ (robust to large perturbations) when no gains from trade exist. We characterize economies where autarky is nice but
not very nice; that is, when gains from trade exist and yet no trade takes place.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Glasgow
Publisher	University of Strathclyde
Number of pages	20
Publication status	Published - 1 Feb 2011

Publication series

Name	Strathclyde Discussion Papers in Economics
Publisher	University of Strathclyde
Volume	11-04

Keywords

bilateral oligopoly
endogenous markets
autarky

Access to Document

Dickson-Hartley-SDPE-2011-Trade-in-bilateral-oligopoly-with-endogenousFinal published version, 218 KBLicence: Strath_1

Cite this

@techreport{86d53708d8614ccf8fcbafadb194dfa0,

title = "Trade in Bilateral Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Formation",

abstract = "We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can choose whether to buy or sell the good. We derive conditions under which a non-autarkic equilibrium exists and when the only equilibrium is autarky. Autarky is {\textquoteleft}nice{\textquoteright} (robust to small perturbations in the game) when it is the only equilibrium, and {\textquoteleft}very nice{\textquoteright} (robust to large perturbations) when no gains from trade exist. We characterize economies where autarky is nice butnot very nice; that is, when gains from trade exist and yet no trade takes place.",

keywords = "bilateral oligopoly , endogenous markets, autarky",

author = "Alex Dickson and Roger Hartley",

year = "2011",

month = feb,

day = "1",

language = "English",

series = "Strathclyde Discussion Papers in Economics",

publisher = "University of Strathclyde",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "University of Strathclyde",

}

TY - UNPB

T1 - Trade in Bilateral Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Formation

AU - Dickson, Alex

AU - Hartley, Roger

PY - 2011/2/1

Y1 - 2011/2/1

N2 - We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can choose whether to buy or sell the good. We derive conditions under which a non-autarkic equilibrium exists and when the only equilibrium is autarky. Autarky is ‘nice’ (robust to small perturbations in the game) when it is the only equilibrium, and ‘very nice’ (robust to large perturbations) when no gains from trade exist. We characterize economies where autarky is nice butnot very nice; that is, when gains from trade exist and yet no trade takes place.

AB - We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can choose whether to buy or sell the good. We derive conditions under which a non-autarkic equilibrium exists and when the only equilibrium is autarky. Autarky is ‘nice’ (robust to small perturbations in the game) when it is the only equilibrium, and ‘very nice’ (robust to large perturbations) when no gains from trade exist. We characterize economies where autarky is nice butnot very nice; that is, when gains from trade exist and yet no trade takes place.

KW - bilateral oligopoly

KW - endogenous markets

KW - autarky

UR - https://www.strath.ac.uk/business/economics/research/discussionpapers/

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Strathclyde Discussion Papers in Economics

BT - Trade in Bilateral Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Formation

PB - University of Strathclyde

CY - Glasgow

ER -

Trade in Bilateral Oligopoly with Endogenous Market Formation

Abstract

Publication series

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this