Abstract
This article demonstrates that majority rule offers more-protection to the worst-off minority than any other system in that it maximizes the ability to overturn an unfavorable outcome. It is known (May, 1952; Dahl, 1956) that majority rule is the only decision rule that completely respects political equality. However, it is frequently argued that other decision rules (such as a system of checks and balances, which are implicitly supermajoritarian) better serve the goals of protecting minorities' rights and preserving stability. This article argues that this trade-off is illusory and that majority rule actually provides most protection to minorities. Furthermore, it does so precisely because of the instability inherent in majority rule, which overcomes the problem of majority tyranny.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 53-77 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Journal of Theoretical Politics |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2004 |
Fingerprint
Keywords
- limits
- social choice
- spatial voting games
- majority
- minority protection
- decision-rules
- democratic theory
- alternatives
- core
Cite this
}
The tyranny of the supermajority - how majority rule protects minorities. / McGann, AJ.
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 16, No. 1, 01.2004, p. 53-77.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - The tyranny of the supermajority - how majority rule protects minorities
AU - McGann, AJ
PY - 2004/1
Y1 - 2004/1
N2 - This article demonstrates that majority rule offers more-protection to the worst-off minority than any other system in that it maximizes the ability to overturn an unfavorable outcome. It is known (May, 1952; Dahl, 1956) that majority rule is the only decision rule that completely respects political equality. However, it is frequently argued that other decision rules (such as a system of checks and balances, which are implicitly supermajoritarian) better serve the goals of protecting minorities' rights and preserving stability. This article argues that this trade-off is illusory and that majority rule actually provides most protection to minorities. Furthermore, it does so precisely because of the instability inherent in majority rule, which overcomes the problem of majority tyranny.
AB - This article demonstrates that majority rule offers more-protection to the worst-off minority than any other system in that it maximizes the ability to overturn an unfavorable outcome. It is known (May, 1952; Dahl, 1956) that majority rule is the only decision rule that completely respects political equality. However, it is frequently argued that other decision rules (such as a system of checks and balances, which are implicitly supermajoritarian) better serve the goals of protecting minorities' rights and preserving stability. This article argues that this trade-off is illusory and that majority rule actually provides most protection to minorities. Furthermore, it does so precisely because of the instability inherent in majority rule, which overcomes the problem of majority tyranny.
KW - limits
KW - social choice
KW - spatial voting games
KW - majority
KW - minority protection
KW - decision-rules
KW - democratic theory
KW - alternatives
KW - core
U2 - 10.1177/0951629804038902
DO - 10.1177/0951629804038902
M3 - Article
VL - 16
SP - 53
EP - 77
JO - Journal of Theoretical Politics
JF - Journal of Theoretical Politics
SN - 0951-6298
IS - 1
ER -