The paradox of compliance: infringements and delays in transposing European Union directives

Robert Thomson, R Torenvlied, Javier Arregui

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

57 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

What impact does the negotiation stage prior to the adoption of international agreements have on the subsequent implementation stage? We address this question by examining the linkages between decision making on European Union directives and any subsequent infringements and delays in national transposition. We formulate a preference-based explanation of failures to comply, which focuses on states' incentives to deviate and the amount of discretion granted to states. This is compared with state-based explanations that focus on country-specific characteristics. Infringements are more likely when states disagree with the content of directives and the directives provide them with little discretion. Granting discretion to member states, however, tends to lead to longer delays in transposition. We find no evidence of country-specific effects
LanguageEnglish
Pages685-709
Number of pages25
JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
Volume37
Issue number4
Early online date18 Sep 2007
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2007

Fingerprint

international agreement
incentive
decision making
evidence

Keywords

  • negotiation
  • European Union directives

Cite this

Thomson, Robert ; Torenvlied, R ; Arregui, Javier. / The paradox of compliance : infringements and delays in transposing European Union directives. In: British Journal of Political Science. 2007 ; Vol. 37, No. 4. pp. 685-709.
@article{47bbb12d9ce348dc8fec6d3f9943df24,
title = "The paradox of compliance: infringements and delays in transposing European Union directives",
abstract = "What impact does the negotiation stage prior to the adoption of international agreements have on the subsequent implementation stage? We address this question by examining the linkages between decision making on European Union directives and any subsequent infringements and delays in national transposition. We formulate a preference-based explanation of failures to comply, which focuses on states' incentives to deviate and the amount of discretion granted to states. This is compared with state-based explanations that focus on country-specific characteristics. Infringements are more likely when states disagree with the content of directives and the directives provide them with little discretion. Granting discretion to member states, however, tends to lead to longer delays in transposition. We find no evidence of country-specific effects",
keywords = "negotiation, European Union directives",
author = "Robert Thomson and R Torenvlied and Javier Arregui",
year = "2007",
month = "10",
doi = "10.1017/S0007123407000373",
language = "English",
volume = "37",
pages = "685--709",
journal = "British Journal of Political Science",
issn = "0007-1234",
number = "4",

}

The paradox of compliance : infringements and delays in transposing European Union directives. / Thomson, Robert; Torenvlied, R; Arregui, Javier.

In: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 4, 10.2007, p. 685-709.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - The paradox of compliance

T2 - British Journal of Political Science

AU - Thomson, Robert

AU - Torenvlied, R

AU - Arregui, Javier

PY - 2007/10

Y1 - 2007/10

N2 - What impact does the negotiation stage prior to the adoption of international agreements have on the subsequent implementation stage? We address this question by examining the linkages between decision making on European Union directives and any subsequent infringements and delays in national transposition. We formulate a preference-based explanation of failures to comply, which focuses on states' incentives to deviate and the amount of discretion granted to states. This is compared with state-based explanations that focus on country-specific characteristics. Infringements are more likely when states disagree with the content of directives and the directives provide them with little discretion. Granting discretion to member states, however, tends to lead to longer delays in transposition. We find no evidence of country-specific effects

AB - What impact does the negotiation stage prior to the adoption of international agreements have on the subsequent implementation stage? We address this question by examining the linkages between decision making on European Union directives and any subsequent infringements and delays in national transposition. We formulate a preference-based explanation of failures to comply, which focuses on states' incentives to deviate and the amount of discretion granted to states. This is compared with state-based explanations that focus on country-specific characteristics. Infringements are more likely when states disagree with the content of directives and the directives provide them with little discretion. Granting discretion to member states, however, tends to lead to longer delays in transposition. We find no evidence of country-specific effects

KW - negotiation

KW - European Union directives

UR - http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=1340840&jid=JPS&volumeId=37&issueId=04&aid=1340836&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=

U2 - 10.1017/S0007123407000373

DO - 10.1017/S0007123407000373

M3 - Article

VL - 37

SP - 685

EP - 709

JO - British Journal of Political Science

JF - British Journal of Political Science

SN - 0007-1234

IS - 4

ER -