The nexus of bicameralism: Rapporteurs’ impact on decision outcomes in the European Union

Rory Costello, Robert Thomson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

30 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

When the chambers of a bicameral legislature must negotiate to reach a decision outcome, the bargaining strength of each side is affected by the composition of its negotiating delegations. We examine some of the implications of this proposition for legislative negotiations between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers. We develop and test hypotheses on how the bargaining success of the EP is affected by the choice of its chief negotiator, the rapporteur. Our findings support the argument that negotiators in a bicameral setting play a ‘two-level game’, where bargaining strength is shaped by the degree to which negotiators can credibly claim to be constrained by their parent chamber.
LanguageEnglish
Pages337-357
Number of pages21
JournalEuropean Union Politics
Volume12
Issue number3
Early online date29 Jun 2011
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2011

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bicameralism
European Parliament
Negotiating
European Union
chamber
Clergy
parents
Nexus

Keywords

  • bicameralism
  • Council of Ministers
  • European Parliament
  • legislative bargaining
  • rapporteurs

Cite this

Costello, Rory ; Thomson, Robert. / The nexus of bicameralism : Rapporteurs’ impact on decision outcomes in the European Union. In: European Union Politics. 2011 ; Vol. 12, No. 3. pp. 337-357.
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The nexus of bicameralism : Rapporteurs’ impact on decision outcomes in the European Union. / Costello, Rory; Thomson, Robert.

In: European Union Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3, 09.2011, p. 337-357.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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