The gains from preferential tax regimes reconsidered

Carl Gaigné, Ian Wooton

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The EU policy against harmful tax competition aims at eliminating tax policies targeted at attracting the internationally mobile tax base. We construct an imperfectly competitive model of costly trade between two countries. In setting their corporate taxes, governments non-cooperatively decide whether to discriminate between internationally mobile and immobile firms. We find the Nash equilibrium tax regimes. When trade costs are high countries impose a uniform tax on all firms while nations will discriminate between mobile and immobile firms when costs are low. At some trade costs, fiscal competition results in tax discrimination despite uniform taxation being socially preferable.
LanguageEnglish
Pages59-66
Number of pages8
JournalRegional Science and Urban Economics
Volume41
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2011

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taxes
firm
costs
corporate tax
tax policy
EU policy
taxation
cost
discrimination
Tax
tax
Trade costs
Tax competition
Nash equilibrium
Competitive model
Discrimination
Corporate tax
Government
Costs
Taxation

Keywords

  • preferential tax regimes
  • trade costs
  • imperfect competition
  • tax competition

Cite this

Gaigné, Carl ; Wooton, Ian. / The gains from preferential tax regimes reconsidered. In: Regional Science and Urban Economics. 2011 ; Vol. 41, No. 1. pp. 59-66.
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Gaigné, C & Wooton, I 2011, 'The gains from preferential tax regimes reconsidered' Regional Science and Urban Economics, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 59-66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2010.08.002

The gains from preferential tax regimes reconsidered. / Gaigné, Carl; Wooton, Ian.

In: Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol. 41, No. 1, 01.2011, p. 59-66.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

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Gaigné C, Wooton I. The gains from preferential tax regimes reconsidered. Regional Science and Urban Economics. 2011 Jan;41(1):59-66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2010.08.002

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