Abstract
This article develops a model of parties in multi-party systems. Instead of treating parties as vote-maximizing candidates able to take any position, parties are assumed to be controlled or at least constrained by their supporters. The model relies on a process whereby supporters sort themselves between parties, as in Aldrich (1983) and the economics literature starting with Tiebout (1956). The results of the model are sensitive to the shape of the preference distribution, particularly its skewness. This can be used to explain how a cohesive minority may have more influence than a more dispersed majority, and why certain parties are systematically advantaged over others.
| Language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages | 37-70 |
| Number of pages | 34 |
| Journal | Journal of Theoretical Politics |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2002 |
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Keywords
- economies
- tiebout
- parties
- factions
- equilibrium
- elections
- spatial modeling
- ideological cohesion
- electoral competition
- multi-party democracies
- constituency representation
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The advantages of ideological cohesion : a model of constituency representation and electoral competition in multi-party democracies. / McGann, AJ.
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1, 01.2002, p. 37-70.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - The advantages of ideological cohesion
T2 - Journal of Theoretical Politics
AU - McGann, AJ
PY - 2002/1
Y1 - 2002/1
N2 - This article develops a model of parties in multi-party systems. Instead of treating parties as vote-maximizing candidates able to take any position, parties are assumed to be controlled or at least constrained by their supporters. The model relies on a process whereby supporters sort themselves between parties, as in Aldrich (1983) and the economics literature starting with Tiebout (1956). The results of the model are sensitive to the shape of the preference distribution, particularly its skewness. This can be used to explain how a cohesive minority may have more influence than a more dispersed majority, and why certain parties are systematically advantaged over others.
AB - This article develops a model of parties in multi-party systems. Instead of treating parties as vote-maximizing candidates able to take any position, parties are assumed to be controlled or at least constrained by their supporters. The model relies on a process whereby supporters sort themselves between parties, as in Aldrich (1983) and the economics literature starting with Tiebout (1956). The results of the model are sensitive to the shape of the preference distribution, particularly its skewness. This can be used to explain how a cohesive minority may have more influence than a more dispersed majority, and why certain parties are systematically advantaged over others.
KW - economies
KW - tiebout
KW - parties
KW - factions
KW - equilibrium
KW - elections
KW - spatial modeling
KW - ideological cohesion
KW - electoral competition
KW - multi-party democracies
KW - constituency representation
U2 - 10.1177/095169280201400104
DO - 10.1177/095169280201400104
M3 - Article
VL - 14
SP - 37
EP - 70
JO - Journal of Theoretical Politics
JF - Journal of Theoretical Politics
SN - 0951-6298
IS - 1
ER -