Strategic abandonment or sincerely second best?: strategic considerations in the 1999 Israeli prime ministerial election

Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, Matthew Diamond, Abraham Diskin, Renan Levine, Thomas J. Scotto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The Israeli election for Prime Minister in 1999 featured five candidates. Three, including a major, centrally located candidate, Yitzhak Mordechai, withdrew from competition during the two days before the voting. Mordechai withdrew in large measure in reaction to the strategic decisions of voters, that is, some voters who favored him deserted his candidacy as his poll standings declined. We use surveys conducted during the 1999 campaign to estimate models of strategic voting behavior based on the multicandidate calculus of voting. We find that strategic voting in the Israeli, majority-with-runoff electoral system closely resembled the level and nature of strategic voting found in the more nearly pure plurality systems for which the statistical models were originally developed. The result is support for the reasoning Mordechai provided for his decision, illustrating the interlocking nature of strategic decisions between candidates and voters.

LanguageEnglish
Pages706-728
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Politics
Volume66
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2004
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Israeli
voting
candidacy
election
voting behavior
electoral system
minister
campaign

Keywords

  • Israeli elections
  • strategic voting

Cite this

Abramson, Paul R. ; Aldrich, John H. ; Diamond, Matthew ; Diskin, Abraham ; Levine, Renan ; Scotto, Thomas J. / Strategic abandonment or sincerely second best? strategic considerations in the 1999 Israeli prime ministerial election. In: Journal of Politics. 2004 ; Vol. 66, No. 3. pp. 706-728.
@article{7aabe97792b042beb9889efa0941797d,
title = "Strategic abandonment or sincerely second best?: strategic considerations in the 1999 Israeli prime ministerial election",
abstract = "The Israeli election for Prime Minister in 1999 featured five candidates. Three, including a major, centrally located candidate, Yitzhak Mordechai, withdrew from competition during the two days before the voting. Mordechai withdrew in large measure in reaction to the strategic decisions of voters, that is, some voters who favored him deserted his candidacy as his poll standings declined. We use surveys conducted during the 1999 campaign to estimate models of strategic voting behavior based on the multicandidate calculus of voting. We find that strategic voting in the Israeli, majority-with-runoff electoral system closely resembled the level and nature of strategic voting found in the more nearly pure plurality systems for which the statistical models were originally developed. The result is support for the reasoning Mordechai provided for his decision, illustrating the interlocking nature of strategic decisions between candidates and voters.",
keywords = "Israeli elections, strategic voting",
author = "Abramson, {Paul R.} and Aldrich, {John H.} and Matthew Diamond and Abraham Diskin and Renan Levine and Scotto, {Thomas J.}",
year = "2004",
month = "8",
doi = "10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00273.x",
language = "English",
volume = "66",
pages = "706--728",
journal = "Journal of Politics",
issn = "0022-3816",
number = "3",

}

Strategic abandonment or sincerely second best? strategic considerations in the 1999 Israeli prime ministerial election. / Abramson, Paul R.; Aldrich, John H.; Diamond, Matthew; Diskin, Abraham; Levine, Renan; Scotto, Thomas J.

In: Journal of Politics, Vol. 66, No. 3, 08.2004, p. 706-728.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strategic abandonment or sincerely second best?

T2 - Journal of Politics

AU - Abramson, Paul R.

AU - Aldrich, John H.

AU - Diamond, Matthew

AU - Diskin, Abraham

AU - Levine, Renan

AU - Scotto, Thomas J.

PY - 2004/8

Y1 - 2004/8

N2 - The Israeli election for Prime Minister in 1999 featured five candidates. Three, including a major, centrally located candidate, Yitzhak Mordechai, withdrew from competition during the two days before the voting. Mordechai withdrew in large measure in reaction to the strategic decisions of voters, that is, some voters who favored him deserted his candidacy as his poll standings declined. We use surveys conducted during the 1999 campaign to estimate models of strategic voting behavior based on the multicandidate calculus of voting. We find that strategic voting in the Israeli, majority-with-runoff electoral system closely resembled the level and nature of strategic voting found in the more nearly pure plurality systems for which the statistical models were originally developed. The result is support for the reasoning Mordechai provided for his decision, illustrating the interlocking nature of strategic decisions between candidates and voters.

AB - The Israeli election for Prime Minister in 1999 featured five candidates. Three, including a major, centrally located candidate, Yitzhak Mordechai, withdrew from competition during the two days before the voting. Mordechai withdrew in large measure in reaction to the strategic decisions of voters, that is, some voters who favored him deserted his candidacy as his poll standings declined. We use surveys conducted during the 1999 campaign to estimate models of strategic voting behavior based on the multicandidate calculus of voting. We find that strategic voting in the Israeli, majority-with-runoff electoral system closely resembled the level and nature of strategic voting found in the more nearly pure plurality systems for which the statistical models were originally developed. The result is support for the reasoning Mordechai provided for his decision, illustrating the interlocking nature of strategic decisions between candidates and voters.

KW - Israeli elections

KW - strategic voting

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=3543055942&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00273.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00273.x

M3 - Article

VL - 66

SP - 706

EP - 728

JO - Journal of Politics

JF - Journal of Politics

SN - 0022-3816

IS - 3

ER -