Speeding, punishment, and recidivism - evidence from a regression discontinuity design

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper estimates the effects of temporary driver's license suspensions on driving behavior. A little known rule in the German traffic penalty catalogue maintains that drivers who commit a series of speeding transgressions within 365 days should have their license suspended for one month. My regression discontinuity design exploits the quasi-random assignment of license suspensions caused by the 365-days cut-off and shows that 1-month license suspensions lower the probability of recidivating within a year by 20 percent. This is largely a specific deterrence effect driven by the punishment itself and not by incapacitation, information asymmetries, or the threat of stiffer future penalties.
LanguageEnglish
Pages497-528
Number of pages32
JournalJournal of Law and Economics
Volume60
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 30 Aug 2017

Fingerprint

license
penalty
regression
driver's license
evidence
traffic behavior
deterrence
asymmetry
driver
traffic
threat
Regression discontinuity design
Recidivism
License
Punishment
Penalty

Keywords

  • crime
  • speeding
  • deterrence
  • regression discontinuity

Cite this

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abstract = "This paper estimates the effects of temporary driver's license suspensions on driving behavior. A little known rule in the German traffic penalty catalogue maintains that drivers who commit a series of speeding transgressions within 365 days should have their license suspended for one month. My regression discontinuity design exploits the quasi-random assignment of license suspensions caused by the 365-days cut-off and shows that 1-month license suspensions lower the probability of recidivating within a year by 20 percent. This is largely a specific deterrence effect driven by the punishment itself and not by incapacitation, information asymmetries, or the threat of stiffer future penalties.",
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Speeding, punishment, and recidivism - evidence from a regression discontinuity design. / Gehrsitz, Markus.

In: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 60, No. 3, 30.08.2017, p. 497-528.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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