Ruling divided: disagreement, issue salience and portfolio allocation

Zachary Greene, Christian Jensen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Issue salience and ideological disagreement often predict coalition government behavior. However, research on portfolio allocation has yet to fully specify the complex relationship between issue salience, disagreement and coalition negotiations. Scholars treat issue salience and disagreement as distinct and disconnected, despite evidence that they work together and with conditional effects in a range of settings. Following a logic of portfolio trades or ‘logrolls’, we propose that the relative salience of issues and disagreements at the issue level within the coalition both moderate the effect of issue salience on portfolio allocation. Using data drawn from the Parliamentary Democracy Data Archive, we find compelling evidence for our theory that links party manifestos to portfolio allocation. Consistent with a story on the conditional effect of salience and disagreement, we find evidence that the effect of salience is mitigated by the extent of disagreement between coalition parties.
LanguageEnglish
Pages1-53
Number of pages53
JournalParty Politics
Early online date26 Jan 2017
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 26 Jan 2017

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Keywords

  • issue salience
  • issue disagreement
  • most salient
  • portfolio allocation
  • coalition governance

Cite this

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Ruling divided : disagreement, issue salience and portfolio allocation. / Greene, Zachary; Jensen, Christian.

In: Party Politics, 26.01.2017, p. 1-53.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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