Rivalry under price and quantity competition

Helena Pinto, Dean Paxson

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present a real option model for a duopoly setting where there are two stochastic factors and where the roles of the players are defined both exogenously and endogenously. The two stochastic factors are the number of units (market volume) and the profit per unit, which may have significantly different drifts and volatilities, and different correlations, depending on market structure and (dis)economies of scale. The paper shows that the degree of correlation between unit profits and market volume might result in different value functions and triggers, especially for followers and simultaneous investors in non-pre-emptive games. Monopoly-like volume is a critical determinant of the leader's trigger in both pre-emptive and non-pre-emptive games. First-mover advantages are significant in the definition of the leader's optimal entry moment, if the players are fighting for the leader's position (pre-emptive game).
LanguageEnglish
Pages209-224
Number of pages15
JournalReview of Financial Economics
Volume14
Issue number3-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 23 Jun 2005

Fingerprint

Quantity competition
Rivalry
Price competition
Trigger
Factors
Profit
Real options
Monopoly
First-mover advantage
Investors
Follower
Market structure
Economies of scale
Duopoly
Value function

Keywords

  • real options
  • pre-emption
  • stochastic processes
  • competitive games
  • rivalry

Cite this

Pinto, Helena ; Paxson, Dean. / Rivalry under price and quantity competition. In: Review of Financial Economics. 2005 ; Vol. 14, No. 3-4. pp. 209-224.
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Pinto, H & Paxson, D 2005, 'Rivalry under price and quantity competition' Review of Financial Economics, vol. 14, no. 3-4, pp. 209-224. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rfe.2005.04.002

Rivalry under price and quantity competition. / Pinto, Helena; Paxson, Dean.

In: Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 14, No. 3-4, 23.06.2005, p. 209-224.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

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Pinto H, Paxson D. Rivalry under price and quantity competition. Review of Financial Economics. 2005 Jun 23;14(3-4):209-224. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rfe.2005.04.002

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