Rationalising ''Irrational'' Support for Political Violence

Colin Jennings

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Abstract

This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence when violence does not provide a material benefit. A theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifice in choosing peace.
LanguageEnglish
Place of PublicationGlasgow
PublisherUniversity of Strathclyde
Pages1-24
Number of pages25
Volume12
Publication statusPublished - 2012

Fingerprint

political violence
Violence
fairness
violence
peace
Group
Psychology
Political violence
Fairness
Psychological
Peace

Keywords

  • conflict
  • emotions
  • reciprocity
  • expressive

Cite this

Jennings, C. (2012). Rationalising ''Irrational'' Support for Political Violence. (12 ed.) (pp. 1-24). Glasgow: University of Strathclyde.
Jennings, Colin. / Rationalising ''Irrational'' Support for Political Violence. 12. ed. Glasgow : University of Strathclyde, 2012. pp. 1-24
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Jennings, C 2012 'Rationalising ''Irrational'' Support for Political Violence' 12 edn, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, pp. 1-24.

Rationalising ''Irrational'' Support for Political Violence. / Jennings, Colin.

12. ed. Glasgow : University of Strathclyde, 2012. p. 1-24.

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

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Jennings C. Rationalising ''Irrational'' Support for Political Violence. 12 ed. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. 2012, p. 1-24.