Abstract
| Language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Glasgow |
| Publisher | University of Strathclyde |
| Pages | 1-24 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Publication status | Published - 2012 |
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Keywords
- conflict
- emotions
- reciprocity
- expressive
Cite this
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Rationalising ''Irrational'' Support for Political Violence. / Jennings, Colin.
12. ed. Glasgow : University of Strathclyde, 2012. p. 1-24.Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper
TY - UNPB
T1 - Rationalising ''Irrational'' Support for Political Violence
AU - Jennings, Colin
N1 - Published as a paper within the Discussion Papers in Economics, No. 12-12 (2012)
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence when violence does not provide a material benefit. A theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifice in choosing peace.
AB - This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence when violence does not provide a material benefit. A theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifice in choosing peace.
KW - conflict
KW - emotions
KW - reciprocity
KW - expressive
M3 - Discussion paper
VL - 12
SP - 1
EP - 24
BT - Rationalising ''Irrational'' Support for Political Violence
PB - University of Strathclyde
CY - Glasgow
ER -