TY - GEN
T1 - Pricing models for 5G multi-tenancy using game theory framework
AU - Anantha Kumar, Shruthi Koratagere
AU - Crawford, David
AU - Stewart, Robert
N1 - © 2023 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting /republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
PY - 2023/6/3
Y1 - 2023/6/3
N2 - 5G network slicing with multi-tenancy, known as neutral host networks (NHN), is being investigated to reduce the digital divide in regions with and without existing infrastructure. The digital divide is typically higher in rural areas. Hence, the key questions that need to be addressed include: What are the potential pricing strategies for 5G supporting multi-operator network sharing? Which pricing strategy is most profitable in areas with a digital divide for the infrastructure provider (InP) and the 5G operator? The study uses the game theory framework's pricing strategies - Shapley value, bargaining game, and dynamic pricing. We also apply the Nash equilibrium concept to find the most suitable pricing strategy for various input scenarios for the players. This paper evaluates pricing strategies for 5G NHN in rural areas to attract investment from stakeholders and maximize their return on investment. The results from the case study for rural areas show that the Shapley value produces the highest payoff for the operator in a scenario with more than 200 subscribers, whereas dynamic pricing is more suitable for the InP. Applying the Nash equilibrium concept to both players in this game suggests that dynamic pricing produces a mutually beneficial strategy.
AB - 5G network slicing with multi-tenancy, known as neutral host networks (NHN), is being investigated to reduce the digital divide in regions with and without existing infrastructure. The digital divide is typically higher in rural areas. Hence, the key questions that need to be addressed include: What are the potential pricing strategies for 5G supporting multi-operator network sharing? Which pricing strategy is most profitable in areas with a digital divide for the infrastructure provider (InP) and the 5G operator? The study uses the game theory framework's pricing strategies - Shapley value, bargaining game, and dynamic pricing. We also apply the Nash equilibrium concept to find the most suitable pricing strategy for various input scenarios for the players. This paper evaluates pricing strategies for 5G NHN in rural areas to attract investment from stakeholders and maximize their return on investment. The results from the case study for rural areas show that the Shapley value produces the highest payoff for the operator in a scenario with more than 200 subscribers, whereas dynamic pricing is more suitable for the InP. Applying the Nash equilibrium concept to both players in this game suggests that dynamic pricing produces a mutually beneficial strategy.
KW - 5G
KW - pricing strategy
KW - game theory
KW - infrastructure sharing
UR - https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/RecentIssue.jsp?punumber=35
M3 - Article
SN - 0163-6804
JO - IEEE Communications Magazine
JF - IEEE Communications Magazine
ER -