Political uncertainty, public expenditure and growth

J. Darby, C.W. Li, A.V. Muscatelli

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

32 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We set out an infinite-horizon political economy model with partisan and office motivation effects in an endogenous growth context to demonstrate that the existence of political uncertainty regarding re-election tends to reduce the amount of public investment by incumbent governments and underlies a switch from government investment to government consumption, thereby reducing growth. The political equilibrium is inefficient and so does not maximise social welfare. Using panel data regressions we show, for OECD countries, that there is empirical support for the hypothesis that political uncertainty tends to reduce public investment, and that there are partisan effects in public investment decisions.
LanguageEnglish
Pages153-179
Number of pages26
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
Volume20
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2004

Fingerprint

public investment
public expenditures
uncertainty
social welfare
OECD
political economy
election
regression
Public investment
Public expenditure
Political uncertainty
Government

Keywords

  • public investment
  • endogenous growth
  • ecomomic growth
  • political economy

Cite this

Darby, J. ; Li, C.W. ; Muscatelli, A.V. / Political uncertainty, public expenditure and growth. In: European Journal of Political Economy. 2004 ; Vol. 20, No. 1. pp. 153-179.
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Political uncertainty, public expenditure and growth. / Darby, J.; Li, C.W.; Muscatelli, A.V.

In: European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2004, p. 153-179.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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KW - ecomomic growth

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