Patrolling games

Steve Alpern, Alec Morton, Katerina Papadaki

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

48 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A key operational problem for those charged with the security of vulnerable facilities (such as airports or art galleries) is the scheduling and deployment of patrols. Motivated by the problem of optimizing randomized, and thus unpredictable, patrols, we present a class of patrolling games. The facility to be patrolled can be thought of as a network or graph Q of interconnected nodes (e.g., rooms, terminals), and the Attacker can choose to attack any node of Q within a given time T. He requires m consecutive periods there, uninterrupted by the Patroller, to commit his nefarious act (and win). The Patroller can follow any path on the graph. Thus, the patrolling game is a win-lose game, where the Value is the probability that the Patroller successfully intercepts an attack, given best play on both sides. We determine analytically either the Value of the game, or bounds on the Value, for various classes of graphs, and we discuss possible extensions and generalizations.
LanguageEnglish
Pages1246-1257
Number of pages12
JournalOperations Research
Volume59
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2011

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Airports
Scheduling
Graph
Node
Attack
Art

Keywords

  • decision analysis
  • networks/graphs
  • risk analysis
  • military games

Cite this

Alpern, S., Morton, A., & Papadaki, K. (2011). Patrolling games. Operations Research, 59(5), 1246-1257. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1110.0983
Alpern, Steve ; Morton, Alec ; Papadaki, Katerina. / Patrolling games. In: Operations Research. 2011 ; Vol. 59, No. 5. pp. 1246-1257.
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Alpern, S, Morton, A & Papadaki, K 2011, 'Patrolling games' Operations Research, vol. 59, no. 5, pp. 1246-1257. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1110.0983

Patrolling games. / Alpern, Steve; Morton, Alec; Papadaki, Katerina.

In: Operations Research, Vol. 59, No. 5, 09.2011, p. 1246-1257.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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