Patrolling a pipeline

Steve Alpern, Thomas Lidbetter, Alec Morton, Katerina Papadaki

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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Abstract

A pipeline network can potentially be attacked at any point and at any time, but such an attack takes a known length of time. To counter this, a Patroller moves around the network at unit speed, hoping to intercept the attack while it is being carried out. This is a zero sum game between the mobile Patroller and the Attacker, which we analyze and solve in certain cases.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of GameSec 2016
Place of PublicationBerlin
PublisherSpringer
Number of pages10
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 14 Aug 2016
Event2016 Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security - New York University Tandon School of Engineering, New York, United States
Duration: 2 Nov 20164 Nov 2016
http://www.gamesec-conf.org/index.php

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer
ISSN (Print)0302-9743

Conference

Conference2016 Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security
Abbreviated titleGameSec 2016
CountryUnited States
CityNew York
Period2/11/164/11/16
Internet address

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Keywords

  • patrolling
  • zero-sum game
  • networks
  • pipeline network
  • patroller
  • attacker
  • game theory
  • continuous game theoretic model

Cite this

Alpern, S., Lidbetter, T., Morton, A., & Papadaki, K. (Accepted/In press). Patrolling a pipeline. In Proceedings of GameSec 2016 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). Berlin: Springer.