Abstract
A pipeline network can potentially be attacked at any point and at any time, but such an attack takes a known length of time. To counter this, a Patroller moves around the network at unit speed, hoping to intercept the attack while it is being carried out. This is a zero sum game between the mobile Patroller and the Attacker, which we analyze and solve in certain cases.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings of GameSec 2016 |
| Place of Publication | Berlin |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Publication status | Accepted/In press - 14 Aug 2016 |
| Event | 2016 Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security - New York University Tandon School of Engineering, New York, United States Duration: 2 Nov 2016 → 4 Nov 2016 http://www.gamesec-conf.org/index.php |
Publication series
| Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Springer |
| ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
Conference
| Conference | 2016 Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security |
|---|---|
| Abbreviated title | GameSec 2016 |
| Country | United States |
| City | New York |
| Period | 2/11/16 → 4/11/16 |
| Internet address |
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Keywords
- patrolling
- zero-sum game
- networks
- pipeline network
- patroller
- attacker
- game theory
- continuous game theoretic model
Cite this
Alpern, S., Lidbetter, T., Morton, A., & Papadaki, K. (Accepted/In press). Patrolling a pipeline. In Proceedings of GameSec 2016 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). Berlin: Springer.