Abstract
A pipeline network can potentially be attacked at any point and at any time, but such an attack takes a known length of time. To counter this, a Patroller moves around the network at unit speed, hoping to intercept the attack while it is being carried out. This is a zero sum game between the mobile Patroller and the Attacker, which we analyze and solve in certain cases.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Title of host publication | Proceedings of GameSec 2016 |
Place of Publication | Berlin |
Publisher | Springer |
Number of pages | 10 |
Publication status | Accepted/In press - 14 Aug 2016 |
Event | 2016 Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security - New York University Tandon School of Engineering, New York, United States Duration: 2 Nov 2016 → 4 Nov 2016 http://www.gamesec-conf.org/index.php |
Publication series
Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
---|---|
Publisher | Springer |
ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
Conference
Conference | 2016 Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security |
---|---|
Abbreviated title | GameSec 2016 |
Country/Territory | United States |
City | New York |
Period | 2/11/16 → 4/11/16 |
Internet address |
Keywords
- patrolling
- zero-sum game
- networks
- pipeline network
- patroller
- attacker
- game theory
- continuous game theoretic model