Non-eliminative reductionism

the basis of a science of conscious experience?

Dennis Nicholson

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    21 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    A coherent physicalist view of the nature of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. On the one hand, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical and can be studied and explained using the normal scientific approach used for all other things in the universe and present no problem any harder than any other faced by scientists. . On the other, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia - they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist world view without any concomitant need, either to reduce them into to non-existence, or to treat them as new fundamental properties. It is suggested that the position also has sufficient explanatory power to successfully deal with the 'why like anything - why does experience exist at all' question and to counter both Chalmers' Conceivability Argument and Jackson's Knowledge Argument.
    Original languageEnglish
    Number of pages15
    JournalPhilosophical Psychology
    Publication statusUnpublished - 2010

    Fingerprint

    Conscious Experience
    Qualia
    Reductionism
    Physicalism
    Reductionist
    Physicalist
    Knowledge Argument
    Fundamental
    Hard Problem
    Physical
    World View
    Conceivability
    Universe
    Explanatory Power

    Keywords

    • consciousness
    • mind-body problem
    • qualia
    • physicalism

    Cite this

    @article{d4ba354b894e48ccb1b8276f38bad4d0,
    title = "Non-eliminative reductionism: the basis of a science of conscious experience?",
    abstract = "A coherent physicalist view of the nature of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. On the one hand, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical and can be studied and explained using the normal scientific approach used for all other things in the universe and present no problem any harder than any other faced by scientists. . On the other, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia - they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist world view without any concomitant need, either to reduce them into to non-existence, or to treat them as new fundamental properties. It is suggested that the position also has sufficient explanatory power to successfully deal with the 'why like anything - why does experience exist at all' question and to counter both Chalmers' Conceivability Argument and Jackson's Knowledge Argument.",
    keywords = "consciousness, mind-body problem, qualia, physicalism",
    author = "Dennis Nicholson",
    year = "2010",
    language = "English",
    journal = "Philosophical Psychology",
    issn = "0951-5089",

    }

    Non-eliminative reductionism : the basis of a science of conscious experience? / Nicholson, Dennis.

    In: Philosophical Psychology, 2010.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Non-eliminative reductionism

    T2 - the basis of a science of conscious experience?

    AU - Nicholson, Dennis

    PY - 2010

    Y1 - 2010

    N2 - A coherent physicalist view of the nature of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. On the one hand, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical and can be studied and explained using the normal scientific approach used for all other things in the universe and present no problem any harder than any other faced by scientists. . On the other, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia - they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist world view without any concomitant need, either to reduce them into to non-existence, or to treat them as new fundamental properties. It is suggested that the position also has sufficient explanatory power to successfully deal with the 'why like anything - why does experience exist at all' question and to counter both Chalmers' Conceivability Argument and Jackson's Knowledge Argument.

    AB - A coherent physicalist view of the nature of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. On the one hand, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical and can be studied and explained using the normal scientific approach used for all other things in the universe and present no problem any harder than any other faced by scientists. . On the other, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia - they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist world view without any concomitant need, either to reduce them into to non-existence, or to treat them as new fundamental properties. It is suggested that the position also has sufficient explanatory power to successfully deal with the 'why like anything - why does experience exist at all' question and to counter both Chalmers' Conceivability Argument and Jackson's Knowledge Argument.

    KW - consciousness

    KW - mind-body problem

    KW - qualia

    KW - physicalism

    M3 - Article

    JO - Philosophical Psychology

    JF - Philosophical Psychology

    SN - 0951-5089

    ER -