Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds: exogenous and endogenous timing

Carlo Capuano, Giuseppe De Feo

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to investigate how the introduction of the shadow cost of public funds in the utilitarian measure of the economy wide welfare affects the behavior of a welfare maximizer public firm in amixed duopoly. We prove that when firms play simultaneously, the mixed-Nash equilibrium can dominate any Cournot equilibria implemented after a privatization, with or without efficiency gains. This can be true both interms of welfare and of public firm's profit. When we consider endogenous timing, we show that either mixed-Nash, private leadership or both Stackelberg equilibria can result as subgameperfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). As a consequence, the sustainability of sequential equilibria enlarges the subspace of parameters such that themarket performance with an inefficient public firm is better than the one implemented after a full-efficient privatization. Absent efficiency gains, privatization always lowers welfare.
LanguageEnglish
Number of pages29
Publication statusPublished - 2006
Event18th Conference of the SIEP - Italian Public Economics Society - Pavia, Italy
Duration: 1 Sep 2005 → …

Conference

Conference18th Conference of the SIEP - Italian Public Economics Society
CityPavia, Italy
Period1/09/05 → …

Fingerprint

Mixed duopoly
Endogenous timing
Privatization
Costs
Public firm
Nash equilibrium
Efficiency gains
Cournot equilibrium
Stackelberg equilibrium
Duopoly
Profit
Sustainability
Sequential equilibrium

Keywords

  • mixed oligopoly
  • privatization
  • endogenous timing
  • distortionary taxes

Cite this

Capuano, C., & De Feo, G. (2006). Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds: exogenous and endogenous timing. Paper presented at 18th Conference of the SIEP - Italian Public Economics Society, Pavia, Italy, .
Capuano, Carlo ; De Feo, Giuseppe. / Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds : exogenous and endogenous timing. Paper presented at 18th Conference of the SIEP - Italian Public Economics Society, Pavia, Italy, .29 p.
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Capuano, C & De Feo, G 2006, 'Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds: exogenous and endogenous timing' Paper presented at 18th Conference of the SIEP - Italian Public Economics Society, Pavia, Italy, 1/09/05, .

Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds : exogenous and endogenous timing. / Capuano, Carlo; De Feo, Giuseppe.

2006. Paper presented at 18th Conference of the SIEP - Italian Public Economics Society, Pavia, Italy, .

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

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AB - The purpose of this article is to investigate how the introduction of the shadow cost of public funds in the utilitarian measure of the economy wide welfare affects the behavior of a welfare maximizer public firm in amixed duopoly. We prove that when firms play simultaneously, the mixed-Nash equilibrium can dominate any Cournot equilibria implemented after a privatization, with or without efficiency gains. This can be true both interms of welfare and of public firm's profit. When we consider endogenous timing, we show that either mixed-Nash, private leadership or both Stackelberg equilibria can result as subgameperfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). As a consequence, the sustainability of sequential equilibria enlarges the subspace of parameters such that themarket performance with an inefficient public firm is better than the one implemented after a full-efficient privatization. Absent efficiency gains, privatization always lowers welfare.

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Capuano C, De Feo G. Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds: exogenous and endogenous timing. 2006. Paper presented at 18th Conference of the SIEP - Italian Public Economics Society, Pavia, Italy, .