Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds

Carlo Capuano, Giuseppe De Feo

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to investigate how the introduction of the shadow cost of public funds in the utilitarian measure of the economywide welfare affects the behavior of a welfare maximizer public firm in a mixed duopoly. We prove that when firms play simultaneously, the mixed-Nash equilibrium can dominate any Cournot equilibria implemented after a privatization, with or without efficiency gains. This can be true both in terms of welfare and of public firm's profit. When we consider endogenous timing, we show that either mixed- Nash, private leadership or both Stackelberg equilibria can result as subgameperfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). As a consequence, the sustainability of sequential equilibria enlarges the subspace of parameters such that the market performance with an inefficient public firm is better than the one implemented after a full-efficient privatization. Absent efficiency gains, privatization always lowers welfare.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages33
Publication statusPublished - 2006

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Mixed duopoly
Costs
Privatization
Public firm
Nash equilibrium
Efficiency gains
Sequential equilibrium
Cournot equilibrium
Endogenous timing
Stackelberg equilibrium
Duopoly
Sustainability
Profit

Keywords

  • mixed oligopoly
  • privatization
  • endogenous timing
  • distortionary taxes

Cite this

Capuano, Carlo ; De Feo, Giuseppe. / Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds. 2006.
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Mixed duopoly, privatization and the shadow costs of public funds. / Capuano, Carlo; De Feo, Giuseppe.

2006.

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

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AU - De Feo, Giuseppe

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AB - The purpose of this article is to investigate how the introduction of the shadow cost of public funds in the utilitarian measure of the economywide welfare affects the behavior of a welfare maximizer public firm in a mixed duopoly. We prove that when firms play simultaneously, the mixed-Nash equilibrium can dominate any Cournot equilibria implemented after a privatization, with or without efficiency gains. This can be true both in terms of welfare and of public firm's profit. When we consider endogenous timing, we show that either mixed- Nash, private leadership or both Stackelberg equilibria can result as subgameperfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). As a consequence, the sustainability of sequential equilibria enlarges the subspace of parameters such that the market performance with an inefficient public firm is better than the one implemented after a full-efficient privatization. Absent efficiency gains, privatization always lowers welfare.

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M3 - Discussion paper

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