Mechanism design for risk allocation and benefit sharing in the development of a geological disposal facility for nuclear radioactive waste

Oscar Nieto-Cerezo, Edoardo Patelli, Jan Wenzelburger, Michael Beer

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution book

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In this research, we analyse a mathematical model using principal-agent theory where NDA delegates the implementation of a GDF to site licenced companies through the take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract. A risk sharing incentive mechanism is designed to overcome the moral hazard problem when agents hide information on the level of risk, in order to accomplish the highest level of economic, environmental and social performance. An application to a simplified model will show the potential of the proposed approach. This paper will be of interest to academic and consultants concerned with the design of incentive contracts in the nuclear industry.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSafety and Reliability
Subtitle of host publicationMethodology and Applications - Proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2014
Pages481-486
Number of pages6
Publication statusPublished - 18 Sep 2014
EventEuropean Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2014 - Wroclaw, Poland
Duration: 14 Sep 201418 Sep 2014

Publication series

NameSafety and Reliability: Methodology and Applications - Proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2014

Conference

ConferenceEuropean Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2014
CountryPoland
CityWroclaw
Period14/09/1418/09/14

Keywords

  • nuclear industry
  • radioactive waste disposal
  • radioactive wastes
  • reliability
  • risk management
  • mathematical models
  • machine design
  • linear programming
  • safety engineering

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  • Cite this

    Nieto-Cerezo, O., Patelli, E., Wenzelburger, J., & Beer, M. (2014). Mechanism design for risk allocation and benefit sharing in the development of a geological disposal facility for nuclear radioactive waste. In Safety and Reliability: Methodology and Applications - Proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2014 (pp. 481-486). (Safety and Reliability: Methodology and Applications - Proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2014).