@inproceedings{59ae87b06ca84f3683d04f6310e06f3c,
title = "Mechanism design for risk allocation and benefit sharing in the development of a geological disposal facility for nuclear radioactive waste",
abstract = "In this research, we analyse a mathematical model using principal-agent theory where NDA delegates the implementation of a GDF to site licenced companies through the take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract. A risk sharing incentive mechanism is designed to overcome the moral hazard problem when agents hide information on the level of risk, in order to accomplish the highest level of economic, environmental and social performance. An application to a simplified model will show the potential of the proposed approach. This paper will be of interest to academic and consultants concerned with the design of incentive contracts in the nuclear industry.",
keywords = "nuclear industry, radioactive waste disposal, radioactive wastes, reliability, risk management, mathematical models, machine design, linear programming, safety engineering",
author = "Oscar Nieto-Cerezo and Edoardo Patelli and Jan Wenzelburger and Michael Beer",
year = "2014",
month = sep,
day = "18",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781138026810",
series = "Safety and Reliability: Methodology and Applications - Proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2014",
pages = "481--486",
booktitle = "Safety and Reliability",
note = "European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2014 ; Conference date: 14-09-2014 Through 18-09-2014",
}