Manifestos, salience and junior ministerial appointments

Zachary Greene, Christian B. Jensen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We build on previous theories of junior minister allocation and coalition oversight by incorporating a novel theory of strategic changes in the issues covered in party manifestos. We argue that parties use junior ministerial appointments to oversee their coalition partners on portfolios that correspond to issues emphasized by the parties' activists when the coalition partner's preferences deviate from the party's. The findings, based on a data set of more than 2800 party-portfolio dyads in 10 countries, show significant support for these expectations. We find that party leaders who successfully negotiate for junior ministers to particular portfolios are most concerned about checking ideologically contentious coalition partners in areas of concern to activists. The results also illustrate the usefulness of our dyadic approach for the study of junior minister allocation.
LanguageEnglish
Number of pages11
JournalParty Politics
Early online date9 Sep 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

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minister
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Keywords

  • party politics
  • coalition governance
  • ministerial oversight
  • intra-party politics
  • political parties
  • European politics
  • parliamentary democracy
  • porfolio allocation

Cite this

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Manifestos, salience and junior ministerial appointments. / Greene, Zachary; Jensen, Christian B.

In: Party Politics, 2014.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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