Managerial incentives and firm survival

Gonul Colak, Dimitrios Gounopoulos, Panagiotis Loukopoulos, Georgios Loukopoulos

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Abstract

We find that IPO firms with generously compensated CEOs and large pay disparities in the boardroom have lower failure rates and longer survival time in the periods following the offering. Economically, an interquartile change in the distribution of CEO pay (pay gap) results, on average, in a reduction of the failure risk probability by 21.81% (20.55%). The relationship between CEO pay and IPO survival is strengthened among firms with lower agency conflicts, while the link between pay gap and IPO survival is pronounced when CEO succession planning is more important. Both measures of managerial pay are associated with lower information asymmetry, better valuation, and superior operating performance in the post-IPO market. The results are robust to alternative interpretations and additional tests.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings European Financial Management Association 2018 Annual Meeting
Place of PublicationMilan, Italy
Pages1-75
Number of pages75
Publication statusPublished - 27 Jun 2018
EventEuropean Financial Association 2018 Annual Meeting: Milan, Italy - Milan, Italy
Duration: 27 Jun 201930 Jun 2019
https://efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2018-Milan/confpap2018.php

Conference

ConferenceEuropean Financial Association 2018 Annual Meeting
CountryItaly
CityMilan
Period27/06/1930/06/19
Internet address

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Keywords

  • executive compensation
  • initial public offerings
  • IPO survival
  • pay gap
  • nanagerial incentives
  • pay disparity
  • CEO pay

Cite this

Colak, G., Gounopoulos, D., Loukopoulos, P., & Loukopoulos, G. (2018). Managerial incentives and firm survival. In Proceedings European Financial Management Association 2018 Annual Meeting (pp. 1-75). Milan, Italy.