Livestock disease management for trading across different regulatory regimes

Andrew M. Bate, Glyn Jones, Adam Kleczkowski, Rebecca Naylor, Jon Timmis, Piran C. L. White, Julia Touza

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

The maintenance of livestock health depends on the combined actions of many different actors, both within and across different regulatory frameworks. Prior work recognised that private risk management choices have the ability to reduce the spread of infection to trading partners. We evaluate the efficiency of farmers’ alternative biosecurity choices in terms of their own-benefits from unilateral strategies and quantify the impact they may have in filtering the disease externality of trade. We use bovine viral diarrhoea (BVD) in England and Scotland as a case study, since this provides an example of a situation where contrasting strategies for BVD management occur between selling and purchasing farms. We use an agent-based bioeconomic model to assess the payoff dependence of farmers connected by trade but using different BVD management strategies. We compare three disease management actions: test-cull, test-cull with vaccination and vaccination alone. For a two-farm trading situation, all actions carried out by the selling farm provide substantial benefits to the purchasing farm in terms of disease avoided, with the greatest benefit resulting from test-culling with vaccination on the selling farm. Likewise, unilateral disease strategies by purchasers can be effective in reducing disease risks created through trade. We conclude that regulation needs to balance the trade-off between private gains from those bearing the disease management costs and the positive spillover effects on others.

LanguageEnglish
Number of pages15
JournalEcoHealth
Early online date12 Feb 2018
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 12 Feb 2018

Fingerprint

Livestock
Disease Management
livestock
farm
vaccination
Diarrhea
Vaccination
Cost of Illness
Risk Management
spillover effect
Scotland
culling
regulatory framework
England
trade-off
Maintenance
Farms
Health
Infection
cost

Keywords

  • co-operation
  • disease management
  • endemic disease
  • externality
  • livestock

Cite this

Bate, Andrew M. ; Jones, Glyn ; Kleczkowski, Adam ; Naylor, Rebecca ; Timmis, Jon ; White, Piran C. L. ; Touza, Julia. / Livestock disease management for trading across different regulatory regimes. In: EcoHealth. 2018.
@article{46eaa021a2f04566bbbbec2f5fbb6a4f,
title = "Livestock disease management for trading across different regulatory regimes",
abstract = "The maintenance of livestock health depends on the combined actions of many different actors, both within and across different regulatory frameworks. Prior work recognised that private risk management choices have the ability to reduce the spread of infection to trading partners. We evaluate the efficiency of farmers’ alternative biosecurity choices in terms of their own-benefits from unilateral strategies and quantify the impact they may have in filtering the disease externality of trade. We use bovine viral diarrhoea (BVD) in England and Scotland as a case study, since this provides an example of a situation where contrasting strategies for BVD management occur between selling and purchasing farms. We use an agent-based bioeconomic model to assess the payoff dependence of farmers connected by trade but using different BVD management strategies. We compare three disease management actions: test-cull, test-cull with vaccination and vaccination alone. For a two-farm trading situation, all actions carried out by the selling farm provide substantial benefits to the purchasing farm in terms of disease avoided, with the greatest benefit resulting from test-culling with vaccination on the selling farm. Likewise, unilateral disease strategies by purchasers can be effective in reducing disease risks created through trade. We conclude that regulation needs to balance the trade-off between private gains from those bearing the disease management costs and the positive spillover effects on others.",
keywords = "co-operation, disease management, endemic disease, externality, livestock",
author = "Bate, {Andrew M.} and Glyn Jones and Adam Kleczkowski and Rebecca Naylor and Jon Timmis and White, {Piran C. L.} and Julia Touza",
year = "2018",
month = "2",
day = "12",
doi = "10.1007/s10393-018-1312-y",
language = "English",
journal = "EcoHealth",
issn = "1612-9202",

}

Livestock disease management for trading across different regulatory regimes. / Bate, Andrew M.; Jones, Glyn; Kleczkowski, Adam; Naylor, Rebecca; Timmis, Jon; White, Piran C. L.; Touza, Julia.

In: EcoHealth, 12.02.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Livestock disease management for trading across different regulatory regimes

AU - Bate, Andrew M.

AU - Jones, Glyn

AU - Kleczkowski, Adam

AU - Naylor, Rebecca

AU - Timmis, Jon

AU - White, Piran C. L.

AU - Touza, Julia

PY - 2018/2/12

Y1 - 2018/2/12

N2 - The maintenance of livestock health depends on the combined actions of many different actors, both within and across different regulatory frameworks. Prior work recognised that private risk management choices have the ability to reduce the spread of infection to trading partners. We evaluate the efficiency of farmers’ alternative biosecurity choices in terms of their own-benefits from unilateral strategies and quantify the impact they may have in filtering the disease externality of trade. We use bovine viral diarrhoea (BVD) in England and Scotland as a case study, since this provides an example of a situation where contrasting strategies for BVD management occur between selling and purchasing farms. We use an agent-based bioeconomic model to assess the payoff dependence of farmers connected by trade but using different BVD management strategies. We compare three disease management actions: test-cull, test-cull with vaccination and vaccination alone. For a two-farm trading situation, all actions carried out by the selling farm provide substantial benefits to the purchasing farm in terms of disease avoided, with the greatest benefit resulting from test-culling with vaccination on the selling farm. Likewise, unilateral disease strategies by purchasers can be effective in reducing disease risks created through trade. We conclude that regulation needs to balance the trade-off between private gains from those bearing the disease management costs and the positive spillover effects on others.

AB - The maintenance of livestock health depends on the combined actions of many different actors, both within and across different regulatory frameworks. Prior work recognised that private risk management choices have the ability to reduce the spread of infection to trading partners. We evaluate the efficiency of farmers’ alternative biosecurity choices in terms of their own-benefits from unilateral strategies and quantify the impact they may have in filtering the disease externality of trade. We use bovine viral diarrhoea (BVD) in England and Scotland as a case study, since this provides an example of a situation where contrasting strategies for BVD management occur between selling and purchasing farms. We use an agent-based bioeconomic model to assess the payoff dependence of farmers connected by trade but using different BVD management strategies. We compare three disease management actions: test-cull, test-cull with vaccination and vaccination alone. For a two-farm trading situation, all actions carried out by the selling farm provide substantial benefits to the purchasing farm in terms of disease avoided, with the greatest benefit resulting from test-culling with vaccination on the selling farm. Likewise, unilateral disease strategies by purchasers can be effective in reducing disease risks created through trade. We conclude that regulation needs to balance the trade-off between private gains from those bearing the disease management costs and the positive spillover effects on others.

KW - co-operation

KW - disease management

KW - endemic disease

KW - externality

KW - livestock

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85041903483&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10393-018-1312-y

DO - 10.1007/s10393-018-1312-y

M3 - Article

JO - EcoHealth

T2 - EcoHealth

JF - EcoHealth

SN - 1612-9202

ER -