@inproceedings{302ea1eb024448fca77ea4aa4f64ab72,
title = "Is Eve nearby? Analysing protocols under the distant-attacker assumption",
abstract = "Various modern protocols tailored to emerging wire-less networks, such as body area networks, rely on the proximity and honesty of devices within the network to achieve their security goals. However, there does not exist a security framework that supports the formal analysis of such protocols, leaving the door open to unexpected flaws. In this article we introduce such a security framework, show how it can be implemented in the protocol verification tool Tamarin, and use it to find previously unknown vulnerabilities on two recent key exchange protocols.",
keywords = "distance bounding, distant attacker, formal verification, key exchange, security protocols",
author = "Reynaldo Gil-Pons and Ross Horne and Sjouke Mauw and Alwen Tiu and Rolando Trujillo-Rasua",
year = "2022",
month = oct,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1109/CSF54842.2022.9919655",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781665484183",
series = "IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium",
publisher = "IEEE",
pages = "17--32",
booktitle = "2022 IEEE 35th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)",
note = "35th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2022 ; Conference date: 07-08-2022 Through 10-08-2022",
}