Intra-group competition and inter-group conflict: an application to Northern Ireland

C. Jennings

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflict settings. The ‘credibility rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The ‘bargaining rationale’ predicts that while doves are more likely to secure peace, post-conflict hawks may be rationally selected. The ‘social psychological rationale’ captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity. Dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the ‘expressive rationale’ predicts that regardless of the underlying nature of the game the large group nature of decision-making in rendering individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.
LanguageEnglish
Pages63-84
Number of pages21
JournalDefence and Peace Economics
Volume22
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2011

Fingerprint

peace
Group
economic theory
credibility
decision maker
emotion
election
leadership
decision making
cause
Intergroup conflict
Northern Ireland
Rationale
history
Peace
Large groups
Economic theory
Psychological
Emotion
Elections

Keywords

  • conflict
  • leadership
  • strategic delegation
  • consociation
  • Northern Ireland

Cite this

@article{c809e16411d54d1b989b36c13986466e,
title = "Intra-group competition and inter-group conflict: an application to Northern Ireland",
abstract = "This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflict settings. The ‘credibility rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The ‘bargaining rationale’ predicts that while doves are more likely to secure peace, post-conflict hawks may be rationally selected. The ‘social psychological rationale’ captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity. Dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the ‘expressive rationale’ predicts that regardless of the underlying nature of the game the large group nature of decision-making in rendering individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.",
keywords = "conflict, leadership, strategic delegation, consociation, Northern Ireland",
author = "C. Jennings",
year = "2011",
month = "2",
doi = "10.1080/10242694.2010.491672",
language = "English",
volume = "22",
pages = "63--84",
journal = "Defence and Peace Economics",
issn = "1024-2694",
number = "1",

}

Intra-group competition and inter-group conflict : an application to Northern Ireland. / Jennings, C.

In: Defence and Peace Economics, Vol. 22, No. 1, 02.2011, p. 63-84.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Intra-group competition and inter-group conflict

T2 - Defence and Peace Economics

AU - Jennings, C.

PY - 2011/2

Y1 - 2011/2

N2 - This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflict settings. The ‘credibility rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The ‘bargaining rationale’ predicts that while doves are more likely to secure peace, post-conflict hawks may be rationally selected. The ‘social psychological rationale’ captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity. Dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the ‘expressive rationale’ predicts that regardless of the underlying nature of the game the large group nature of decision-making in rendering individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

AB - This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflict settings. The ‘credibility rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The ‘bargaining rationale’ predicts that while doves are more likely to secure peace, post-conflict hawks may be rationally selected. The ‘social psychological rationale’ captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity. Dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post-conflict. Finally, the ‘expressive rationale’ predicts that regardless of the underlying nature of the game the large group nature of decision-making in rendering individual decision makers non-decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

KW - conflict

KW - leadership

KW - strategic delegation

KW - consociation

KW - Northern Ireland

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=78951483897&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://ideas.repec.org/p/str/wpaper/0809.html

U2 - 10.1080/10242694.2010.491672

DO - 10.1080/10242694.2010.491672

M3 - Article

VL - 22

SP - 63

EP - 84

JO - Defence and Peace Economics

JF - Defence and Peace Economics

SN - 1024-2694

IS - 1

ER -