Inspection and crime prevention: an evolutionary perspective

Vassili Kolokoltsov, Hemant Passi, Wei Yang

Research output: Working paper

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Abstract

In this paper, we analyse inspection games with an evolutionary perspective. In our evolutionary inspection game with a large population, each individual is not a rational payoff maximiser, but periodically updates his strategy if he perceives that other individuals' strategies are more successful than his own, namely strategies are subject to the evolutionary pressure. We develop this game into a few directions. Firstly, social norms are incorporated into the game and we analyse how social norms may influence individuals' propensity to engage in criminal behaviour. Secondly, a forward-looking inspector is considered, namely, the inspector chooses the level of law enforcement whilst taking into account the effect that this choice will have on future crime rates. Finally, the game is extended to the one with continuous strategy spaces.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationGlasgow
PublisherUniversity of Strathclyde
Pages1-33
Number of pages33
Publication statusUnpublished - 18 Jun 2013

Keywords

  • game theory
  • inspection games
  • crime rates

Cite this

Kolokoltsov, V., Passi, H., & Yang, W. (2013). Inspection and crime prevention: an evolutionary perspective. (pp. 1-33). University of Strathclyde.