Information and energy policy preferences: a survey experiment on public opinion about electricity pricing reform in rural India

Michaël Aklin, Patrick Bayer, S. P. Harish, Johannes Urpelainen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A common argument for the lack of economic reform in developing countries is popular opposition. If current economic policies are dysfunctional, could information about alternatives sway the voters? We examine if a simple argument emphasizing the need to increase electricity prices for improved supply can change public opinion in the case of India’s power sector reforms. The evidence comes from a survey experiment in rural Uttar Pradesh, which is both India’s largest state and has one of the lowest levels of household electrification. As expected, people respond to information about the relationship between electricity pricing, capacity investment, and reliability of supply by increasing their support for higher prices. However, no corresponding increase is observed for privatization of electricity generation. For external validity, we analyze an existing national survey on electricity privatization conducted in 2004/2005, finding patterns that support our argument.

LanguageEnglish
Pages305-327
Number of pages23
JournalEconomics of Governance
Volume15
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2014

Fingerprint

Public opinion
Energy policy
Rural India
Information policy
Electricity pricing
Experiment
India
Privatization
Electricity
Developing countries
Electricity price
External validity
Household
Voters
Economic reform
Electricity generation
Capacity investment
Economic policy

Keywords

  • electricity
  • India
  • investment
  • power sector
  • rural development
  • survey experiment

Cite this

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Information and energy policy preferences : a survey experiment on public opinion about electricity pricing reform in rural India. / Aklin, Michaël; Bayer, Patrick; Harish, S. P.; Urpelainen, Johannes.

In: Economics of Governance, Vol. 15, No. 4, 01.01.2014, p. 305-327.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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