Governing cooperative approaches under the Paris Agreement

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Parties to the Paris Agreement can engage in voluntary cooperation and use internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards their national climate pledges. Doing so promises to lower the cost of achieving agreed climate objectives, which, in turn, allows countries to increase their mitigation efforts with given resources. Lower costs do not automatically translate into greater climate ambition, however: transfers that involve questionable mitigation outcomes can effectively increase overall emissions, affirming the need for a sound regulatory framework. As Parties negotiate guidance on the implementation of cooperative approaches under the Paris Agreement, they are therefore considering governance options to secure environmental integrity and address the question of overall climate ambition. But country views are far apart on central questions: of all the issues under negotiation to operationalize the Paris Agreement, cooperative approaches are the only agenda item that has not yet been agreed upon. Drawing on an analytical framework that incorporates economic theory and deliberative jurisprudence, practical case studies, and treaty interpretation, this article maps central positions of actors in the negotiations and evaluates relevant options included in the latest textual proposal. It concludes with a set of recommendations on how operational guidance can balance necessary safeguards for climate ambition with flexibility to contain transaction costs and allow for greater participation.
LanguageEnglish
JournalEcology Law Quarterly
Volume46
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 3 Apr 2019

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climate
transaction costs
costs
economic theory
jurisprudence
treaty
integrity
flexibility
governance
interpretation
participation
resources

Keywords

  • climate change
  • Paris Agreement
  • law and economics
  • Article 6
  • carbon markets
  • cooperative approaches

Cite this

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title = "Governing cooperative approaches under the Paris Agreement",
abstract = "Parties to the Paris Agreement can engage in voluntary cooperation and use internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards their national climate pledges. Doing so promises to lower the cost of achieving agreed climate objectives, which, in turn, allows countries to increase their mitigation efforts with given resources. Lower costs do not automatically translate into greater climate ambition, however: transfers that involve questionable mitigation outcomes can effectively increase overall emissions, affirming the need for a sound regulatory framework. As Parties negotiate guidance on the implementation of cooperative approaches under the Paris Agreement, they are therefore considering governance options to secure environmental integrity and address the question of overall climate ambition. But country views are far apart on central questions: of all the issues under negotiation to operationalize the Paris Agreement, cooperative approaches are the only agenda item that has not yet been agreed upon. Drawing on an analytical framework that incorporates economic theory and deliberative jurisprudence, practical case studies, and treaty interpretation, this article maps central positions of actors in the negotiations and evaluates relevant options included in the latest textual proposal. It concludes with a set of recommendations on how operational guidance can balance necessary safeguards for climate ambition with flexibility to contain transaction costs and allow for greater participation.",
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journal = "Ecology Law Quarterly",
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Governing cooperative approaches under the Paris Agreement. / Mehling, Michael.

In: Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol. 46, 03.04.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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AU - Mehling, Michael

PY - 2019/4/3

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AB - Parties to the Paris Agreement can engage in voluntary cooperation and use internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards their national climate pledges. Doing so promises to lower the cost of achieving agreed climate objectives, which, in turn, allows countries to increase their mitigation efforts with given resources. Lower costs do not automatically translate into greater climate ambition, however: transfers that involve questionable mitigation outcomes can effectively increase overall emissions, affirming the need for a sound regulatory framework. As Parties negotiate guidance on the implementation of cooperative approaches under the Paris Agreement, they are therefore considering governance options to secure environmental integrity and address the question of overall climate ambition. But country views are far apart on central questions: of all the issues under negotiation to operationalize the Paris Agreement, cooperative approaches are the only agenda item that has not yet been agreed upon. Drawing on an analytical framework that incorporates economic theory and deliberative jurisprudence, practical case studies, and treaty interpretation, this article maps central positions of actors in the negotiations and evaluates relevant options included in the latest textual proposal. It concludes with a set of recommendations on how operational guidance can balance necessary safeguards for climate ambition with flexibility to contain transaction costs and allow for greater participation.

KW - climate change

KW - Paris Agreement

KW - law and economics

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KW - carbon markets

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