Abstract
Despite over 50 years of concerted effort by government and industry since the end of the Second World War, expectations for a cheap, durable commercial fuel cell have been repeatedly dashed. I argue this is so mainly because researchers have historically conceived the fuel cell as a universal chemical energy converter, a kind of super battery that combined the best aspects of battery and heat engine. Dramatic demonstrations of notional and prototype hydrogen fuel cells in controlled conditions attracted short-term investments in further research and inspired hopes that long-lived and affordable commercial fuel cells using hydrocarbons could be developed. However, building such an electrochemical engine proved a complex and costly process, one that few sponsors were willing to support for long in the absence of rapid progress. I explore these dynamics in a comparative study of the fuel cell programs of General Electric and Ballard Power Systems.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 49-68 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | History and Technology |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 25 Feb 2009 |
Funding
Ballard Power Systems’ involvement in fuel cells stemmed from material advances and the technopolitics of the post-Cold War automobile industry. Founded in Vancouver in 1977 as a research and development start-up called Ultra Energy, the company spent most of the 1980s unsuccessfully trying to commercialize rechargeable lithium batteries, mainly under contract to Amoco.43 Desperate for funding, the company, renamed Ballard Research in 1979, won a contract from the Canadian Department of National Defence in 1983 to build prototype PEM fuel cells, investigate their potential for military and civilian use and reduce the cost of materials, above all platinum catalysts and the membrane.44 A key problem was Nafion. Then the only suitable electrolytic material for membrane fuel cells, it was an expensive low-volume substance then used mainly for industrial electrolysis. In 1986, Ballard acquired an experimental Dow Chemical perfluorosulfonic acid polymer membrane. Thinner than Nafion and with a higher sulfonic acid concentration and ion exchange capacity, it produced over four times as much power as Nafion when applied in a fuel cell. The results galvanized observers in power source circles and inspired concerted work at Ballard to develop the technology in static and mobile applications.45 The first of the NECARs, an electric van using a Mk 5 powerplant, was unveiled in April 1994 and hailed by the Wall Street Journal as a breakthrough in non-battery electric automobile technology.55 The resultant publicity brought fuel cells to the attention of the US auto industry and the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV). Initiated by the Clinton administration in September 1993, the PNGV was a joint research and development program between American automakers and the federal government designed to improve the fuel economy of the average 1994 passenger sedan from 26.6 miles per gallon (11.3 kilometers per liter) to 80 miles per gallon (34 kilometers per liter) by 2004. Given this ambitious objective, PNGV managers stated in 1994 that only the most advanced powertrain technologies, including fuel cells, would be considered.56 That year, the PNGV began sponsoring fuel cell work. It was supported by the Department of Energy, which took a dual approach to fuel systems, funding a methanol reformer/PEM fuel cell program at General Motors and hydrogen PEM fuel cell systems at Ford and Chrysler.57 Three months after the demonstration of NECAR I, Ford and Chrysler received their first Department of Energy contracts for automotive fuel cell systems as part of the PNGV worth US$13.8 and US$15 million respectively.58 11. Memorandum, ‘Project Lorraine Summary,’ undated, Box 4, Project Lorraine – Energy Conver-sion, 1958–1966 Official Correspondence Files – Materials Sciences Office, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Accession Number 68-A-2658, Record Group 330, National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, MD (hereafter cited as 1958–1966 OCF-MSO, ARPA, AN 68-A-2658, RG 330). The IDA had an intimate relationship with ARPA that had important consequences for the hydrocarbon fuel cell program. Formed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1954 at the request of the Secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the IDA was designed to give the Department of Defense access to civilian scientific expertise. It also played a key role in organizing ARPA and supplying it with systems analysis. Both ARPA and IDA officials were allowed to approach private companies that were under contract to the Department of Defense and recruit staff to work for them for one to two years, receiving compensation only from the IDA. In short, industry researchers were paid to advise ARPA on the disbursement of contracts to industry; see York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace, 140–3. As a result of this close relationship, ARPA planners went to work for the IDA and vice-versa while industry leaked progress reports to IDA that eventually filtered back to ARPA. 56. National Research Council, Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles, 12–13. 70. National Research Council, Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles, Second Report, 53–4; National Research Council, Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles, Third Report, 65; Chalk et al., ‘Challenges for Fuel Cells,’ 44. 71. Eudy, ‘Field Operations Program,’ 10. 72. By the late 2000s, Toyota had sold several hundred thousand copies of its Prius model, relatively few compared to gasoline automobiles but far more than the battery electric automobile programs. 73. Stone, First Annual Society of Chemical Industry–Chemical Heritage Foundation Innovation Day, Philadelphia, PA, 14 September 2004. 74. Stobart, ‘Fuel Cell Power for Passenger Cars,’ 14. 75. DeCicco, Fuel Cell Vehicles, 61. 76. Casten et al., ‘Fuels for Fuel Cell-Powered Vehicles,‘ 61–7. 77. National Research Council, Review of the Research Program of the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles, Sixth Report, 85–7. 78. National Research Council and National Academy of Engineering, Hydrogen Economy, 27. 79. Stone, 14 September 2004. In its annual reports, Ballard did not cite fuel as a factor under ‘Risks and Uncertainties’ until the 2002 edition, released in early 2003. The firm then cautioned that hydrogen was the only suitable fuel for fuel cell automobiles and that a mass market required third party investment in a hydrogen infrastructure; Ballard Power Systems, 2002 Annual Report, 44–5. 80. Ball, ‘Fuel Cell Makers,’ B2. 81. Bush, ‘President Delivers;’ Bush, ‘Hydrogen Fuel Initiative.’ 82. US House, Path to a Hydrogen Economy, 96, 125. 83. Kirsch, The Electric Vehicle and the Burden of History, 206. 84. Kirsch, The Electric Vehicle and the Burden of History, 204–5; Mom, Electric Vehicle, 273–4. 85. Fackler, ‘Latest Honda Runs on Hydrogen.’
Keywords
- battery electric vehicle
- fuel cell
- proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cell
- zero emission vehicle
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