Genocide, politicide, and mass atrocities against civilian populations

Prior to the establishment of the Genocide Convention, the international community had formed several conventions, such as the Geneva and Hague, which sought to end attacks on civilians during war. However, the international community lacked both a term for and a law against the purposeful destruction of a specific civilian group during times of peace and war. Yet, as many have pointed out, such atrocities have been common throughout human history. Emerging from the horrors of the Holocaust, and with significant help from the relentless pioneering work of Raphael Lemkin, the international community eventually found a word for these atrocities—genocide—and outlawed such violence both in times of peace and war. This was a significant step in the protection of civilians, as the Convention legislated state behavior during times of peace and specifically protected certain groups. However, since the establishment of the Genocide Convention, significant debate has surrounded the definition of genocide, enshrined in 1948 by the United Nations’ delegates. This is because genocide is understood to refer to (1) the attempted physical destruction of (2) specific groups. Scholars, policymakers, and activists have been concerned that a focus on physical destruction is too limiting as some governments have purposefully destroyed the culture of a group in order to assimilate its people into the majority population. Additionally, by limiting the protections of the Convention to specific groups—national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups—critics are concerned that governments will not face punishment for victimizing groups not covered in the Convention, such as political groups or groups of certain sexual preference. These critiques arise out of legal, normative, and positive concerns for how the Convention’s definition shapes how we understand, prosecute, and prevent genocide. Building from this dissatisfaction, countless observers, pundits, and scholars have proposed new definitions of genocide. The definition of genocide observed by the International Criminal Court even differs from the original codified by the Convention. As the avalanche of definitions continues, we must stop and consider how this array of new definitions also shapes the way in which we can understand why genocide occurs, is conducted, ends, and influences the post-violence society. The goal of this article is to explore various definitions of genocide and the ways in which these definitions influence our understanding of such atrocities from a positivist framework. I begin by considering works on the creation of the Genocide Convention. Then, I engage the debate surrounding the definition of genocide provided in the Convention. From this debate, I consider a number of different approaches scholars have taken to understand the causes of genocide given these competing definitions. I conclude by reviewing a growing literature that highlights the ways in which these definitional debates have contributed to contradictory theory, inconsistent data collection, and disparate findings on the causes of genocide, politicide, and related atrocities.