Explaining regulatory autonomy in EU network sectors: varieties of utility regulation?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This article explains variation in the autonomy in the range of activities that European regulators perform. By focusing on 102 regulators of four network sectors (electricity, gas, telecom, and railways), we test for functional and institutional explanations. The findings indicate that the inclusion of institutional factors matters for our understanding of recent changes in the governance of European network sectors. Reforms toward the independent agency form of governance and the range of competencies granted to sector regulators seem to be shaped not only by international functional pressures but also by domestic institutional factors. Beyond the credibility hypothesis, we find that national governments grant less regulatory autonomy to utility regulators the more coordinated an economy is and the more veto players are present. On the contrary, common law countries are associated with higher levels of regulatory autonomy.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)41-60
Number of pages20
JournalGovernance
Volume33
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 27 Jan 2020
EventECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops - Nottingham University, Nottingham, United Kingdom
Duration: 25 Apr 201730 Apr 2017
https://ecpr.eu/Events/EventDetails.aspx?EventID=104

Fingerprint

EU
autonomy
institutional factors
regulation
governance
common law
credibility
electricity
German Federal Railways
inclusion
reform
economy
Utility regulation
Autonomy
Governance
Institutional factors
veto player
Inclusion
Common law
Railway

Keywords

  • public policy
  • utility regulation
  • European public utility regulators

Cite this

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Explaining regulatory autonomy in EU network sectors : varieties of utility regulation? / Wassum, Moritz; De Francesco, Fabrizio.

In: Governance, Vol. 33, No. 1, 27.01.2020, p. 41-60.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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