Emission permits trading and downstream strategic market interaction

Giuseppe De Feo, Joana Resende, Maria Eugenia Sanin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper studies inefficiencies arising in oligopolies subject to environmental regulation based on tradable emission permits. We propose a duopoly model of upstream–downstream strategic competition: in the permits market a leader sets the price, whereas in the output market Cournot competition occurs. We find that strategic interaction in the output market gives rise to an additional distortion in the permits market where both firms adopt ‘rival's cost-rising’ strategies to gain a competitive advantage in the output market. As a result, the price of permits is always higher than firms' marginal abatement costs.
LanguageEnglish
JournalManchester School
Early online date25 Jun 2012
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Fingerprint

Permit trading
Market interaction
Emission permits
Competitive advantage
Strategic interaction
Inefficiency
Tradable emission permits
Cournot competition
Costs
Marginal abatement costs
Oligopoly
Duopoly
Environmental regulation

Keywords

  • oligopolies
  • environmental regulation
  • emission permits

Cite this

De Feo, Giuseppe ; Resende, Joana ; Sanin, Maria Eugenia. / Emission permits trading and downstream strategic market interaction. In: Manchester School. 2013.
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Emission permits trading and downstream strategic market interaction. / De Feo, Giuseppe; Resende, Joana; Sanin, Maria Eugenia.

In: Manchester School, 2013.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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