Economics of intelligent selection of wireless access networks in a market-based framework: a game-theoretic approach

Jakub Wojciech Konka, James Irvine, Robert Atkinson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The Digital Marketplace is a market-based framework where network operators offer communications services with competition at the call level. It strives to address a tussle
between the actors involved in a heterogeneous wireless access network. However, as with any market-like institution, it is vital to analyze the Digital Marketplace from the strategic perspective to ensure that all shortcomings are removed prior to implementation. In this paper, we analyze the selling mechanism proposed in the Digital Marketplace. The mechanism is based on a procurement first-price sealed-bid auction where the network operators represent the sellers/bidders, and the end-user of a wireless service is the buyer. However, this auction format is somewhat unusual as the winning bid is a composition of both the network operator’s monetary bid and their reputation rating. We create a simple economic model of the auction, and we show that it is mathematically intractable to derive the equilibrium bidding behavior when there are
N network operators, and we make only generic assumptions about the structure of the bidding strategies. We then move on to consider a scenario with only two network operators, and assume that network operators use bidding strategies which are linear functions of their costs. This results in the derivation of the equilibrium bidding behavior in that scenario.
LanguageEnglish
Pages210-224
Number of pages15
JournalIARIA International Journal on Advances in Networks and Services
Volume5
Issue number3&4
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2012

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Economics
Mathematical operators
Sales
Communication
Chemical analysis
Costs

Keywords

  • economics
  • network selection
  • wireless access networks
  • market-based framework
  • game-theoretic approach
  • auction theory

Cite this

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title = "Economics of intelligent selection of wireless access networks in a market-based framework: a game-theoretic approach",
abstract = "The Digital Marketplace is a market-based framework where network operators offer communications services with competition at the call level. It strives to address a tusslebetween the actors involved in a heterogeneous wireless access network. However, as with any market-like institution, it is vital to analyze the Digital Marketplace from the strategic perspective to ensure that all shortcomings are removed prior to implementation. In this paper, we analyze the selling mechanism proposed in the Digital Marketplace. The mechanism is based on a procurement first-price sealed-bid auction where the network operators represent the sellers/bidders, and the end-user of a wireless service is the buyer. However, this auction format is somewhat unusual as the winning bid is a composition of both the network operator’s monetary bid and their reputation rating. We create a simple economic model of the auction, and we show that it is mathematically intractable to derive the equilibrium bidding behavior when there areN network operators, and we make only generic assumptions about the structure of the bidding strategies. We then move on to consider a scenario with only two network operators, and assume that network operators use bidding strategies which are linear functions of their costs. This results in the derivation of the equilibrium bidding behavior in that scenario.",
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