Domestic adjustment costs, interdependence and dissent in the Council of the European Union

Javier Arregui, Robert Thomson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)
78 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Liberal international relations theory posits that the behaviour of states is affected both by domestic interests and other states with which they are linked in significant patterns of interdependence. This article examines the relevance of this proposition to states' behaviour in the most powerful institution in the furthest reaching example of regional integration in the world today: the Council of the European Union. Compared to previous research, more detailed evidence is analysed in this article on the substance of the political debates that preceded Council votes. It is found that states' disagreement with both discretionary and nondiscretionary decision outcomes affects the likelihood that they dissent at the voting stage. Moreover, in line with the theory posited here, the behaviour of states' significant trading partners has a particularly marked effect on the likelihood that they will dissent.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)692-708
Number of pages17
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Research
Volume53
Issue number4
Early online date11 Jul 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2014

Keywords

  • Council of the European Union
  • discretion
  • domestic interests
  • interdependence
  • legislative decision making
  • voting behaviour

Cite this