Costly concessions, internally divided movements, and strategic repression: a movement-level analysis

Is government repression of self-determination (SD) movements affected by the internal structure of the movements? This article investigates the relation between internal fragmentation of SD movements and state repression. While internal fragmentation of domestic challengers is well-documented in conflict studies, its effect on state repression is largely overlooked by the extant literature. Here, I argue that inter-faction competition and disagreements within an internally divided movement constrain the government's ability to negotiate concessions in a way that can satisfy all the actors involved, engendering incentives to repress the movement. I expect that the degree to which this mechanism operates depends on the extent to which the movement is internally fragmented. The findings show that higher degrees of within-movement fragmentation are positively associated with higher levels of repression, and this effect is greater in the presence of active violent militants but smaller in the presence of one or a few dominant faction(s). This study sheds light on the mechanisms that drive repression over SD disputes, which often lead to escalation of violence and civil conflict onset. A deeper understanding of these mechanisms can help with the development of early warning systems and conflict prevention in the political practice of national and international organizations.