Corporate takeovers: mode of payment, returns and trading activity

Paul Draper, Krishna Paudyal

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

46 Citations (Scopus)


This paper examines the impact of takeover bids and, in particular, the method of payment to the shareholders of the target firms on the returns, trading activity and bid‐ask spreads of target and bidding firms traded on the London Stock Exchange. It suggests that the shareholders of target firms benefit substantially from takeover activity while the shareholders of bidding firms do not suffer. The combined value of the firms engaged in takeover activity increases by a small percentage during the event period. However, the benefit from a takeover announcement to the shareholders of the target firm varies from year to year and has declined in the recent past. The magnitude of excess returns available to the shareholders is also dependent on the mode of payment. Prices of target (bidding) firms increase (decrease) most if the shareholders of the target firms are given an option to receive payment in shares or in cash. The findings also reveal that during the event period trading activity in target and bidding companies increases depending on the form in which payments to shareholders are made. In response to this increased liquidity, the bid‐ask spreads of target and bidding firms decline during the event period.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)521-558
Number of pages38
JournalJournal of Business Finance and Accounting
Issue number5-6
Publication statusPublished - 31 Jul 1999


  • takeover
  • mode of payment
  • bid-ask spreads
  • excess returns
  • trading activity

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