Contingent democratization: when do economic crises matter?

Min Tang, Narisong Huhe, Qiang Zhou

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article argues that the effect of economic crises on democratic transition is contingent on economic structure. Specifically, a high level of state engagement in the economy makes social forces dependent on the ruling elites for patrimonial interests and, therefore, the authoritarian regime liable for economic failure. Moreover, when authoritarian elites own a high share of economic assets, this aggravates the economic loss of both the business class and the masses when economic crises occur, which in turn makes defection of the business class, the revolt of the masses and the alliance of the two social classes more likely. Cross-national analyses show that economic crises trigger democratic transition only when state engagement in the economy is above a certain level.
LanguageEnglish
Number of pages22
JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
Early online date20 May 2015
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 20 May 2015

Fingerprint

economic crisis
democratization
elite
economics
social economy
revolt
economic structure
social class
assets
regime
economy
Democratization
Economic crisis
Economics
Democratic transition
Elites
Trigger
Assets
Economic structure
Economic loss

Keywords

  • economic crises
  • economic structure
  • economic failure
  • democratization
  • the State
  • coalition
  • legitimacy

Cite this

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abstract = "This article argues that the effect of economic crises on democratic transition is contingent on economic structure. Specifically, a high level of state engagement in the economy makes social forces dependent on the ruling elites for patrimonial interests and, therefore, the authoritarian regime liable for economic failure. Moreover, when authoritarian elites own a high share of economic assets, this aggravates the economic loss of both the business class and the masses when economic crises occur, which in turn makes defection of the business class, the revolt of the masses and the alliance of the two social classes more likely. Cross-national analyses show that economic crises trigger democratic transition only when state engagement in the economy is above a certain level.",
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Contingent democratization : when do economic crises matter? / Tang, Min; Huhe, Narisong; Zhou, Qiang.

In: British Journal of Political Science, 20.05.2015.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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