Constitutionalising secondary rules in global environmental regimes: non-compliance procedures and the enforcement of multilateral environmental agreements

Due to its remarkable success, the model of the Montreal Protocol's non-compliance procedure (NCP) has been adopted in other environmental regimes, whose primary norms differ considerably. Hence, this article distinguishes different types of global environmental regimes and assesses the performance of NCPs therein as endogenous enforcement mechanisms. In fact, the reciprocal nature of the main conventional obligations in some more recent environmental regimes seems to hamper the effectiveness of compliance procedures. On this basis, the article puts forward some tentative considerations from a constitutional perspective. Drawing from the experience gained under environmental regimes in the region of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), it explores the feasibility of transplanting some aspects of the model of the Aarhus Convention NCP into the more complex global context. Further, it reflects upon the potential of enhancing synergies between NCPs and national and international judiciaries as a step towards the consolidation of international public law in this area.