Commitment or expertise? Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises

Despina Alexiadou, Hakan Gunaydin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Why do prime ministers or presidents appoint non-elected experts, also known as technocrats, during economic crises? Do they appoint them for their expertise or for their commitment to pro-market reforms? Answering this question is crucial for understanding and predicting the longer-term role of technocrats in democracies. With the aid of unique data on the political and personal background of finance ministers in 13 parliamentary and semi-presidential European democracies we show that commitment, not expertise is the primary drive of technocratic appointments during major economic crises. Technocrats are preferred over experienced politicians when the latter lack commitment to policy reform. An important implication of our findings is that technocratic appointments to top economic portfolios in West European countries are unlikely to become the norm outside economic crises, assuming economic crises are short-lived and not recurring.
LanguageEnglish
Pages845-865
Number of pages21
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Research
Volume58
Issue number3
Early online date25 Apr 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 30 Aug 2019

Fingerprint

economic crisis
expertise
commitment
minister
democracy
reform policy
politician
finance
president
expert
reform
lack
market
economics

Keywords

  • technocracy
  • parliamentary democracies
  • financial crises
  • finance ministers

Cite this

@article{00d10195efe94e84897d22d39b2070f4,
title = "Commitment or expertise? Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises",
abstract = "Why do prime ministers or presidents appoint non-elected experts, also known as technocrats, during economic crises? Do they appoint them for their expertise or for their commitment to pro-market reforms? Answering this question is crucial for understanding and predicting the longer-term role of technocrats in democracies. With the aid of unique data on the political and personal background of finance ministers in 13 parliamentary and semi-presidential European democracies we show that commitment, not expertise is the primary drive of technocratic appointments during major economic crises. Technocrats are preferred over experienced politicians when the latter lack commitment to policy reform. An important implication of our findings is that technocratic appointments to top economic portfolios in West European countries are unlikely to become the norm outside economic crises, assuming economic crises are short-lived and not recurring.",
keywords = "technocracy, parliamentary democracies, financial crises, finance ministers",
author = "Despina Alexiadou and Hakan Gunaydin",
year = "2019",
month = "8",
day = "30",
doi = "10.1111/1475-6765.12338",
language = "English",
volume = "58",
pages = "845--865",
journal = "European Journal of Political Research",
issn = "0304-4130",
number = "3",

}

Commitment or expertise? Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises. / Alexiadou, Despina ; Gunaydin, Hakan.

In: European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 58, No. 3, 30.08.2019, p. 845-865.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Commitment or expertise? Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises

AU - Alexiadou, Despina

AU - Gunaydin, Hakan

PY - 2019/8/30

Y1 - 2019/8/30

N2 - Why do prime ministers or presidents appoint non-elected experts, also known as technocrats, during economic crises? Do they appoint them for their expertise or for their commitment to pro-market reforms? Answering this question is crucial for understanding and predicting the longer-term role of technocrats in democracies. With the aid of unique data on the political and personal background of finance ministers in 13 parliamentary and semi-presidential European democracies we show that commitment, not expertise is the primary drive of technocratic appointments during major economic crises. Technocrats are preferred over experienced politicians when the latter lack commitment to policy reform. An important implication of our findings is that technocratic appointments to top economic portfolios in West European countries are unlikely to become the norm outside economic crises, assuming economic crises are short-lived and not recurring.

AB - Why do prime ministers or presidents appoint non-elected experts, also known as technocrats, during economic crises? Do they appoint them for their expertise or for their commitment to pro-market reforms? Answering this question is crucial for understanding and predicting the longer-term role of technocrats in democracies. With the aid of unique data on the political and personal background of finance ministers in 13 parliamentary and semi-presidential European democracies we show that commitment, not expertise is the primary drive of technocratic appointments during major economic crises. Technocrats are preferred over experienced politicians when the latter lack commitment to policy reform. An important implication of our findings is that technocratic appointments to top economic portfolios in West European countries are unlikely to become the norm outside economic crises, assuming economic crises are short-lived and not recurring.

KW - technocracy

KW - parliamentary democracies

KW - financial crises

KW - finance ministers

UR - https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14756765

U2 - 10.1111/1475-6765.12338

DO - 10.1111/1475-6765.12338

M3 - Article

VL - 58

SP - 845

EP - 865

JO - European Journal of Political Research

T2 - European Journal of Political Research

JF - European Journal of Political Research

SN - 0304-4130

IS - 3

ER -