Choosing international organizations: when do states and the World Bank collaborate on environmental projects?

Patrick Bayer, Christopher Marcoux, Johannes Urpelainen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

While international cooperation research emphasizes institutional design, states mostly interact with existing organizations. How do states choose organizations for cooperation? We develop a theory of agency choice for development projects, emphasizing the importance of domestic institutions, the scope of cooperation, and the resources of the implementing agency. If states are to cooperate with funding agencies that have abundant resources, such as the World Bank, they must accept more stringent conditions on project implementation. We argue states accept the stringent conditions that resourceful organizations demand if the public goods from project implementation are highly valuable. Empirically, this is the case for democratic states, large projects, and projects that produce national instead of global public goods. We test this theory using data on 2,882 Global Environment Facility (GEF) projects, 1991–2011. The GEF offers an ideal case because various implementing agencies are responsible for the actual projects. States implement projects in collaboration with the World Bank, which has the most expertise and resources among the GEF’s implementing agencies, if their regime type is democracy, the project size is large, and the benefits are primarily national. Qualitative evidence sheds light on causal mechanisms.

LanguageEnglish
Pages413-440
Number of pages28
JournalReview of International Organizations
Volume9
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jan 2014

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International Organizations
World Bank
resources
test theory
International organizations
Resources
Global environment
international cooperation
development project
expertise
funding
regime
democracy
demand
evidence

Keywords

  • donor-recipient interactions
  • environment
  • foreign aid
  • global environment facility
  • international cooperation
  • international organizations

Cite this

Bayer, Patrick ; Marcoux, Christopher ; Urpelainen, Johannes. / Choosing international organizations : when do states and the World Bank collaborate on environmental projects?. 2014 ; Vol. 9, No. 4. pp. 413-440.
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Choosing international organizations : when do states and the World Bank collaborate on environmental projects? / Bayer, Patrick; Marcoux, Christopher; Urpelainen, Johannes.

Vol. 9, No. 4, 01.01.2014, p. 413-440.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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