Abstract
Current sanctions orthodoxy argues that groups' ability to set policy depends on their total budget. According to such a perspective, successful sanctions must target the unfriendly within the target countries while shielding "innocent bystanders" from harm. The authors argue that the focus on groups' aggregate budget constraint and the war-of-attrition view of policy formation misconceives of how policies are determined. The most effective groups to sanction will be those whose spending has the greatest marginal effect on policy. The authors show that this will often be the very innocent bystanders that prevailing theories have argued must be protected. Although this conclusion is conditional on their level of institutional empowerment and their having sufficient resources to make an impact on policy if properly motivated, when these initial conditions are met, a sanctions design can be specified with a high degree of prospective utility for sender states.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 337-359 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | Journal of Conflict Resolution |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jun 2005 |
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Keywords
- interest group lobbying
- south africa
- interest group politics
- public choice
- economic sanctions
- innocent bystanders
- optimal targets
Cite this
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Caught in the crossfire "Innocent bystanders" as optimal targets of economic sanctions. / Major, S; McGann, AJ.
In: Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 3, 06.2005, p. 337-359.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Caught in the crossfire "Innocent bystanders" as optimal targets of economic sanctions
AU - Major, S
AU - McGann, AJ
PY - 2005/6
Y1 - 2005/6
N2 - Current sanctions orthodoxy argues that groups' ability to set policy depends on their total budget. According to such a perspective, successful sanctions must target the unfriendly within the target countries while shielding "innocent bystanders" from harm. The authors argue that the focus on groups' aggregate budget constraint and the war-of-attrition view of policy formation misconceives of how policies are determined. The most effective groups to sanction will be those whose spending has the greatest marginal effect on policy. The authors show that this will often be the very innocent bystanders that prevailing theories have argued must be protected. Although this conclusion is conditional on their level of institutional empowerment and their having sufficient resources to make an impact on policy if properly motivated, when these initial conditions are met, a sanctions design can be specified with a high degree of prospective utility for sender states.
AB - Current sanctions orthodoxy argues that groups' ability to set policy depends on their total budget. According to such a perspective, successful sanctions must target the unfriendly within the target countries while shielding "innocent bystanders" from harm. The authors argue that the focus on groups' aggregate budget constraint and the war-of-attrition view of policy formation misconceives of how policies are determined. The most effective groups to sanction will be those whose spending has the greatest marginal effect on policy. The authors show that this will often be the very innocent bystanders that prevailing theories have argued must be protected. Although this conclusion is conditional on their level of institutional empowerment and their having sufficient resources to make an impact on policy if properly motivated, when these initial conditions are met, a sanctions design can be specified with a high degree of prospective utility for sender states.
KW - interest group lobbying
KW - south africa
KW - interest group politics
KW - public choice
KW - economic sanctions
KW - innocent bystanders
KW - optimal targets
U2 - 10.1177/0022002705276568
DO - 10.1177/0022002705276568
M3 - Article
VL - 49
SP - 337
EP - 359
JO - Journal of Conflict Resolution
JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution
SN - 0022-0027
IS - 3
ER -