Board structure and institutional ownership at the time of IPO

Suman Neupane, Biwesh Neupane

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of mandatory regulatory provisions on board structure and the influence of such board structure on institutional holdings. Design/methodology/approach: The study uses unique hand-collected data set of Indian IPOs during the 2004-2012 period after the corporate governance reforms with the introduction of clause 49 in the listing agreements in 2001. Using OLS regression, the paper empirically analyses the determinants of board size and board independence at the time of the IPOs and the influence of such a board structure on shareholdings by domestic and foreign institutional investors. Findings: The authors find that complying with mandatory regulatory provisions does not impede firms from structuring their boards to reflect the firms’ advising and monitoring needs. The authors also find that complying with provisions have positive implication for the firm, as firms with greater board independence appear to attract more foreign institutional investors. Originality/value: To the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first study to examine the issue in a regime where regulation mandates the composition of the board of directors. The paper also extends the literature on institutional holdings by providing evidence on the impact of board structure on institutional ownership at a critical time in a firm’s life cycle when concerns for endogeneity for empirical investigations are weaker.
LanguageEnglish
Pages950-965
Number of pages6
JournalManagerial Finance
Volume43
Issue number9
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 11 Sep 2017

Fingerprint

Board structure
Institutional ownership
Institutional investors
Board independence
Board of directors
Mandate
Design methodology
Empirical investigation
Life cycle
Board size
Endogeneity
Shareholding
Corporate governance reform
Monitoring

Keywords

  • institutional investors
  • board independence
  • board size
  • foreign institutional investors
  • Indian IPOs

Cite this

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Board structure and institutional ownership at the time of IPO. / Neupane, Suman; Neupane, Biwesh.

In: Managerial Finance, Vol. 43, No. 9, 11.09.2017, p. 950-965.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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