An introduction to imperfect competition via bilateral oligopoly

Alexander Dickson, Simone Tonin

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we provide a unified framework, by means of non-trivial examples, to compare the results obtained in simultaneous-move and sequential-move versions of bilateral oligopoly with the Cournot model and the Cournot-Walras approach. We also survey the main contributions on imperfect competition and strategic market games that are linked with our analysis. Secondly, we show how the bilateral oligopoly model can be used to study different kinds of oligopoly: symmetric oligopoly, where all agents act strategically; asymmetric oligopoly where only some agents act strategically; simultaneous oligopoly, where sellers and buyers make their choices without knowledge of others' decisions; and sequential oligopoly, where some agents move first. Thirdly, we focus on how the bilateral oligopoly model can clarify how either strategic or competitive behaviours may emerge endogenously depending on the fundamentals of the economy.
LanguageEnglish
Place of PublicationIthaca, N.Y.
Number of pages21
Publication statusPublished - 24 Mar 2018

Fingerprint

Imperfect competition
Bilateral oligopoly
Oligopoly
Cournot model
Competitive behavior
Asymmetric oligopoly
Seller
Buyers
Cournot
Strategic market games
Strategic behavior

Keywords

  • bilateral oligopoly
  • Cournot competition
  • competition

Cite this

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abstract = "The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we provide a unified framework, by means of non-trivial examples, to compare the results obtained in simultaneous-move and sequential-move versions of bilateral oligopoly with the Cournot model and the Cournot-Walras approach. We also survey the main contributions on imperfect competition and strategic market games that are linked with our analysis. Secondly, we show how the bilateral oligopoly model can be used to study different kinds of oligopoly: symmetric oligopoly, where all agents act strategically; asymmetric oligopoly where only some agents act strategically; simultaneous oligopoly, where sellers and buyers make their choices without knowledge of others' decisions; and sequential oligopoly, where some agents move first. Thirdly, we focus on how the bilateral oligopoly model can clarify how either strategic or competitive behaviours may emerge endogenously depending on the fundamentals of the economy.",
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An introduction to imperfect competition via bilateral oligopoly. / Dickson, Alexander; Tonin, Simone.

Ithaca, N.Y., 2018.

Research output: Working paper

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N2 - The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we provide a unified framework, by means of non-trivial examples, to compare the results obtained in simultaneous-move and sequential-move versions of bilateral oligopoly with the Cournot model and the Cournot-Walras approach. We also survey the main contributions on imperfect competition and strategic market games that are linked with our analysis. Secondly, we show how the bilateral oligopoly model can be used to study different kinds of oligopoly: symmetric oligopoly, where all agents act strategically; asymmetric oligopoly where only some agents act strategically; simultaneous oligopoly, where sellers and buyers make their choices without knowledge of others' decisions; and sequential oligopoly, where some agents move first. Thirdly, we focus on how the bilateral oligopoly model can clarify how either strategic or competitive behaviours may emerge endogenously depending on the fundamentals of the economy.

AB - The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we provide a unified framework, by means of non-trivial examples, to compare the results obtained in simultaneous-move and sequential-move versions of bilateral oligopoly with the Cournot model and the Cournot-Walras approach. We also survey the main contributions on imperfect competition and strategic market games that are linked with our analysis. Secondly, we show how the bilateral oligopoly model can be used to study different kinds of oligopoly: symmetric oligopoly, where all agents act strategically; asymmetric oligopoly where only some agents act strategically; simultaneous oligopoly, where sellers and buyers make their choices without knowledge of others' decisions; and sequential oligopoly, where some agents move first. Thirdly, we focus on how the bilateral oligopoly model can clarify how either strategic or competitive behaviours may emerge endogenously depending on the fundamentals of the economy.

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M3 - Working paper

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