Abstract
In recent years, donors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, have made an enormous contribution to the reduction of the global burden of disease. It has been argued that such donors should prioritise interventions based on their cost-effectiveness, that is to say, the ratio of costs to benefits. Against this, we argue that the donor should fund not the most cost-effective interventions, but rather interventions which are just costineffective for the country, thus encouraging the country to contribute its own domestic resources to the fight against disease. We demonstrate that our proposed algorithm can be justified within the context of a model of the problem as a leader-follower game, in which a donor chooses to subsidise interventions which are implemented by a country. We argue that the decision rule we propose provides a basis for the allocation of aid money which is efficient, fair and sustainable.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 67-75 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Journal of Health Economics |
Volume | 58 |
Early online date | 8 Feb 2018 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 31 Mar 2018 |
Keywords
- donations
- cost effectiveness
- cost benefit analysis
- aid allocation
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'Allocation rules for global donors'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Profiles
Impacts
-
Improved patient outcomes through evidence-based decisions by Scottish and global health organisations
Alec Morton (Main contact), Robert van der Meer (Participant), Itamar Megiddo (Participant) & Susan Howick (Participant)
Impact: Impact - for External Portal › Health and welfare - new products, guidelines and services
File