Allocation rules for global donors

Alec Morton, Ashwin Arulselvan, Ranjeeta Thomas

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In recent years, donors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, have made an enormous contribution to the reduction of the global burden of disease. It has been argued that such donors should prioritise interventions based on their cost-effectiveness, that is to say, the ratio of costs to benefits. Against this, we argue that the donor should fund not the most cost-effective interventions, but rather interventions which are just costineffective for the country, thus encouraging the country to contribute its own domestic resources to the fight against disease. We demonstrate that our proposed algorithm can be justified within the context of a model of the problem as a leader-follower game, in which a donor chooses to subsidise interventions which are implemented by a country. We argue that the decision rule we propose provides a basis for the allocation of aid money which is efficient, fair and sustainable.
LanguageEnglish
Pages67-75
Number of pages8
JournalJournal of Health Economics
Volume58
Early online date8 Feb 2018
DOIs
StatePublished - 31 Mar 2018

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Cost-Benefit Analysis
Financial Management
Costs and Cost Analysis
Allocation rules
Global Burden of Disease

Keywords

  • donations
  • cost effectiveness
  • cost benefit analysis
  • aid allocation

Cite this

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Allocation rules for global donors. / Morton, Alec; Arulselvan, Ashwin; Thomas, Ranjeeta.

In: Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 58, 31.03.2018, p. 67-75.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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