Aggregation and Representation in the European Parliament Party Groups

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

While members of the European Parliament are elected in national constituencies, their votes are determined by the aggregation of MEPs in multinational party groups. The uncoordinated aggregation of national party programmes in multinational EP party groups challenges theories of representation based on national parties and parliaments. This article provides a theoretical means of understanding representation by linking the aggregation of dozens of national party programmes in different EP party groups to the aggregation of groups to produce the parliamentary majority needed to enact policies. Drawing on an original data source of national party programmes, the EU Profiler, the article shows that the EP majorities created by aggregating MEP votes in party groups are best explained by cartel theories. These give priority to strengthening the EP’s collective capacity to enact policies rather than voting in accord with the programmes they were nationally elected to represent.

LanguageEnglish
Pages474-497
Number of pages24
JournalWest European Politics
Volume36
Issue number3
Early online date1 Feb 2013
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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European Parliament
aggregation
Group
voter
cartel
parliament
voting
EU

Keywords

  • aggregation and representation
  • party groups
  • european parliament

Cite this

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Aggregation and Representation in the European Parliament Party Groups. / Rose, Richard; Borz, Gabriela.

In: West European Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2013, p. 474-497.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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