Acceleration attacks on PBKDF2 Or, what is inside the black-box of oclHashcat?

Andrew Ruddick, Jeff Yan

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)
9 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

The Password Based Key Derivation Function v2 (PBKDF2) is an important cryptographic primitive that has practical relevance to many widely deployed security systems. We investigate accelerated attacks on PBKDF2 with commodity GPUs, reporting the fastest attack on the primitive to date, outperforming the previous state-of-the-art oclHashcat. We apply our attack to Microsoft .NET framework, showing that a consumer-grade GPU can break an ASP.NET password in less than 3 hours, and we discuss the application of our attack to WiFi Protected Access (WPA2). We consider both algorithmic optimisations of crypto primitives and OpenCL kernel code optimisations and empirically evaluate the contribution of individual optimisations on the overall acceleration. In contrast to the common view that GPU acceleration is primarily driven by massively parallel hardware architectures, we demonstrate that a proportionally larger contribution to acceleration is made through effective algorithmic optimisations. Our work also contributes to understanding what is going on inside the black box of oclHashcat.

Original languageEnglish
Pages1-14
Number of pages14
Publication statusPublished - 8 Aug 2016
Event10th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies, WOOT 2016 - Austin, United States
Duration: 8 Aug 20169 Aug 2016

Conference

Conference10th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies, WOOT 2016
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityAustin
Period8/08/169/08/16

Keywords

  • Password Based Key Derivation Function v2 (PBKDF2)
  • cryptographic primitive
  • security systems

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